Reforming the governance of Chinese non-profits: a comparative analysis based on the UK's regulatory regime by LI, RUOQI
Durham E-Theses
Reforming the governance of Chinese non-prots: a




LI, RUOQI (2017) Reforming the governance of Chinese non-prots: a comparative analysis based on the
UK's regulatory regime, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/12335/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP











Reforming the governance of Chinese non-profits: a comparative analysis based 

























China has witnessed a proliferation in the number of non-profits over the past two 
decades. As the ‘third sector’ that sits between the government, on the one hand, and 
commercial/for-profits, on the other, non-profit organisations have helped generate 
revenue for the Chinese Government, increased the number of jobs in this sector and 
delivered a wide variety of essential services. Notwithstanding these benefits, however, 
non-profits in China are unlikely to fulfil the increased social, economic or cultural 
expectations placed upon them, unless their own governance and infrastructure 
mechanisms are efficient, functional and well-designed.  
 
This throws up important and difficult questions about the role (and design) of board 
governance for non-profits in modern China. To answer these questions, the thesis 
seeks to develop an account of what contribution a board can make to the effective 
governance of non-profits in China, and how certain features of a board might be 
designed to achieve that. However, whilst the UK benefits from an abundance of 
academic literature, and regulatory experience, addressing non-profit governance, the 
Chinese non-profit sector, by contrast, has given such governance much less attention. 
Hence, this work provides a comparative study on non-profit board governance, 
drawing on the UK’s richer literature, thought and history in order to analyse better the 
challenges which China presents.  
 
Within this comparison, a number of social and political characteristics will be 
emphasised which distinguish the Chinese non-profit sector from that of the UK. Of 
crucial importance here is the interplay between board governance and social 
determinants in the Chinese context, especially the relationship between the sector and 
the Chinese Government. In short, then, the overarching goal of my thesis is to develop 
a blueprint for an effective board for non-profits, which can be adapted to the 
distinctive characteristics of the Chinese non-profit sector, and against which current 
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Chapter 1 | Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The not-for-profit or non-profit sector has witnessed a burgeoning in public interest 
over the course of recent decades.1 It has been repeatedly championed as a ‘third 
sector’ that sits between the government/public sector, and the commercial/for-profit 
market,2 and succeeds in making up for at least some of the deficiencies of each of 
these others. Academics and policy makers proclaim its invaluable contribution to the 
social and economic life of society.3 To take just the UK as an example, according to 
the UK Civil Society Almanac 2016,4 there were approximately 163,000 charities alone 
in the UK with net assets of approximately £105.1 billion in 2013/2014.5 The income 
of charities, which is the most typical form of non-profit organisation, represented over 
£64 billion in England and Wales until 2014.6 Alongside this, the Voluntary Sector 
Almanac 2016 reported considerable growth in both the number of non-profit 
organisations in the UK, as well as in that of their income over the past several years.7 
It would seem apparent this has nearly doubled when compared to estimations in 2010, 
which document a sector income of over £36.7 billion.8  
 
Moreover, to cast non-profits merely in terms of their financial contribution would also 
take too limited a view of what such organisations achieve. For non-profits have proved 
to be of immense social value too, in a variety of important and novel ways. The most 
common among these have been the contribution of UK non-profits to the provision of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 D O Renz, The Jossey-Bass Handbook of Nonprofit Leadership and Management (John Wiley & Sons 
2016); M E Romero-Merino and Í García-Rodriguez, 'Good Governance in Philanthropy and Nonprofits' 
(2016) The Routledge Companion to Philanthropy 395, 402 
2 Non-profits can be subdivided into various types based on different standards. According to legal forms: 
trusts, unincorporated associations, or corporate bodies. According to their funding sources, non-profits 
can be classified as commercial and donative non-profits.  
3 V A Hodgkinson and M S Weitzman, Dimensions of the Independent Sector: A Statistical Profile 
(Independent Sector 1986)  
4 It is the leading annually resource which draws together trends, facts and information, both from the 
NCVO’s own research and other latest data. 
5  S Etherington, The UK Voluntary Sector Almanac 2016: The State of the Sector (NCVO, 2016) 
<https://www.vonne.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/resources/Intro%20and%20overview.pdf> accessed 
13 September 2016  
6 ibid  
7 In 2013/14, there was a notable rise in the number of organisations with an income over £100m.  
8 D K O Reichardt, and K Wilding, The UK Voluntary Sector Almanac 2010: The State of the Sector 
(NCVO 2010) 9 
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social services (18%), cultural and recreational services (14%) and religious activities 
(8%), to name just a few.9 Although the private sector and public sector both, of course, 
deliver important financial and social benefits, each also possesses a number of alleged 
serious limitations when compared to non-profits. These points will explore more fully 
in Chapter 2, but two examples will serve to illuminate the point. Private enterprise 
being almost entirely driven by profit, cannot be relied on to undertake certain 
activities, such as pollution control or consumer health and safety protections, which 
consumers may value highly, but which cannot be delivered profitably.10 Similarly, the 
public sector is often the subject of political pressures that render it vulnerable to well-
organized demands from industry and other pressure groups, or under-responsive to the 
interests of poorly organized groups, such as consumers.11  
 
To be sure, as Chapter 2 will concede, non-profits do possess shortcomings of their 
own.  Nevertheless, in contrast with purely commercial orientated programs, non-
profits seem to enjoy a clear advantage in serving important social and cultural aims, 
whilst also pursuing commercial or business related objectives—a commitment neither 
a wholly private sector nor public sector organisations are often adequately positioned 
to fulfil.12  
 
These heightened claims for, and expectations of, non-profits have, unsurprisingly led 
to an increased focus on the way in which non-profits actually operate and perform. 
And as part of this, increased attention has been given to, specifically, their 
governance. 13  By governance here is meant those systems of control which are 
designed to ensure that a non-profit fulfils its objectives.14 Questions of organisational 
governance have been prominent in recent years, both in respect of for-profit 
enterprises and non-profits.15 Notwithstanding many of the aforementioned benefits, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 R Keen, Charity and the Voluntary Sector: Statitics (2015) 5 
10 H K Anheier, Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management, Policy (Routledge 2014); and see 
further in Chapter 2. 
11 See Anheier, ibid  
12 B A Weisbrod, The Voluntary Nonprofit Sector: An Economic Analysis (Lexington Books 1977) 
13 Anheier, (n10); I Filatotchev and C Nakajima, 'Corporate Governance, Responsible Managerial 
Behavior, and Corporate Social Responsibility: Organizational Efficiency Versus Organizational 
Legitimacy?' (2014) 28 The Academy of Management Perspectives 289 
14 C Mallin, Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press 2016); J A Miles, Management and 
Organization Theory: A Jossey-Bass Reader, vol 9 (John Wiley & Sons 2012)  
15 Renz, (n1) 
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non-profit organisations are unlikely to entirely fulfil the increased social, economic or 
cultural expectations placed upon them, unless their own governance and infrastructure 
mechanisms are efficient, functional and well-designed. 
 
A governance regime for any organisation encompasses a wide range of both legal and 
non-legal mechanisms designed to ensure the organisation’s effective fulfilment of its 
objectives.16 To study them all would be beyond the scope of a single work. However, 
the board of directors is undoubtedly one key element of any organisation’s governance 
system, and it is the board which forms the focus of this thesis.17 In a nutshell, then, the 
thesis seeks to develop an account of what contribution a board can make to the 
effective governance of non-profits and, how certain features of a board might be 
designed to achieve that. Moreover, it seeks to adapt and then apply this theoretical 
blueprint to non-profits in one particular country, namely contemporary China, and to 
measure the extent to which China’s currently regulatory structure for non-profits 
satisfies the requirements of this blueprint. Let me unpack and expand a little on these 
aims.  
 
What does an effective non-profit board look like? What should it do? What should be 
its membership and characteristics? The first major task of the thesis is to address these 
questions. In seeking to do that, two problems immediately arise. The first is that, 
despite a wealth of literature addressing good board design for for-profits,18 even for 
that sector there has been little agreement among either academics or commercial 
practitioners as to what an ‘ideal board’ might look like.19 Some even question whether 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 C Caldwell and M H Hansen, 'Trustworthiness, Governance, and Wealth Creation' (2010) 97 Journal 
of Business Ethics 173; P M Guest, 'The Impact of Board Size on Firm Performance: Evidence from the 
UK' (2009) 15 The European Journal of Finance 385; P M Guest, 'The Determinants of Board Size and 
Composition: Evidence from the UK' (2008) 14 Journal of Corporate Finance 51 
17 J L Coles, N D Daniel and L Naveen, 'Boards: Does One Size Fit All?' (2008) 87 Journal of Financial 
Economics 329; G O Jobome, 'Management Pay, Governance and Performance: The Case of Large UK 
Nonprofits' (2006) 22 Financial Accountability & Management 331; J Kaler, 'Differentiating Stakeholder 
Theories' (2003) 46 Journal of Business Ethics 71 
18 C Weir, D Laing and P J McKnight, 'Internal and External Governance Mechanisms: Their Impact on 
the Performance of Large UK Public Companies' (2002) 29 Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 
579; E W Orts and A Strudler, 'The Ethical and Environmental Limits of Stakeholder Theory' (2002) 12 
Business Ethics Quarterly 215; M Tan and B Liu, 'CEO's Managerial Power, Board Committee 
Memberships and Idiosyncratic Volatility' (2016) 48 International Review of Financial Analysis 21; G P 
Martin, R M Wiseman and L R Gomez-Mejia, 'The Interactive Effect of Monitoring and Incentive 
Alignment on Agency Costs' (2016) Journal of Management 14 
19 J Ma and Y Jing, 'Mission Alignment as a Substitute or Incentive: How Nonprofits Utilize the 
Alignment between Mission Statement and Daily Operation' (2017) 
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a board really matters or has much impact on the actual operation of companies.20 For 
some, boards are in many cases regarded as little more than a ‘rubber-stamp’ function 
within the governance and management of companies,21 or simply an apparatus of legal 
necessity (something akin to the wearing of wigs in English courts; a rule only 
followed because it is a requirement).22  
 
I shall argue that such a view of the board is untenable: when things go wrong, the 
board naturally become the point of focus, and rightly the very centre of public 
attention. 23  Examples of this can be observed in the commercial context, such as 
scandals involving Volkswagen and emissions,24 FIFA and corruption,25 Toshiba and 
accounting,26 and BHS with pensions and ‘greed’ allegations.27 Boards matter, in other 
words. To be sure, given that the functioning of a board depends to some extent on an 
organisation’s individual characteristics, type or feature, board design must vary in 
some measure to reflect such differences: there cannot be a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach.28   
 
However, this merely brings us on to our second problem: we cannot even safely 
transpose our limited knowledge of for-profit boards onto non-profit boards, about 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2915677> accessed 13 March 2017; M J Worth, 
Nonprofit Management: Principles and Practice (Sage Publications 2016) 
20 Worth, (n19) 
21 ibid  
22 C Marquis and M Lee, 'Who Is Governing Whom? Executives, Governance, and the Structure of 
Generosity in Large Us Firms' (2013) 34 Strategic Management Journal 483, 493 
23 C Cornforth and N Chambers, 'The Role of Corporate Governance and Boards in Organisational 
Performance' in K Walsh, G Harvey and P Jas (eds), Connecting Knowledge and Performance in Public 
Services: From Knowing to Doing (Cambridge University Press 2010); F Ostrower and M M Stone, 
'Governance: Research Trends, Gaps, and Future Prospects' (2006) 2 The nonprofit sector: A research 
handbook 612; D R Young, If Not for Profit, for What? A Behavioral Theory of the Nonprofit Sector 
Based on Entrepreneurship (Lexington Books 1983) 101 
24 H Kretchmer, 'The Man Who Discovered the Volkswagen Emissions Scandal' (BBC News, 2015) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34519184> accessed 12 May 2016 
25 G Jorge, 'Fixing Fifa: The Experience of the Independent Governance Committee' (2014) 21 
Southwestern Journal of International Law 165 
26 M M Jennings, 'Toshiba Lessons: On Not Being So Judgmental of the Company or Japan' (2015) 20 
Corporate Finance Review 36 
27 J Moore, 'Frank Field Is Right: Sir Philip Should Hand a £15m “Rebate” from His Bhs Pension 
Scheme Settlement Back to Members' (Independent, 2017) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/bhs-sir-philip-green-could-get-as-much-as-
15m-back-from-settlement-with-pension-scheme-a7641656.html> accessed 01 April 2017 
28 B Groysberg, P M Healy and R Vijayaraghavan, 'What Factors Drive Director Perceptions of Their 
Board's Effectiveness?' (2016) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2731512> accessed 
25 September 2016  
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which we know even less. We have seen already that governance is about ensuring 
organisations achieve their purposes.29 The board is part of the governance system. But 
the design of the board must reflect the purpose which the organisation is supposed to 
achieve.30 We cannot, then, sensibly discuss good principles for board-design in respect 
of non-profits without fully taking into account the distinctive purposes of non-
profits.31 The unique nature and character of the non-profit sector, and the organisations 
contained within it, necessarily require a specifically designed board structure and 
governance.32 Or so I shall argue in this thesis. If this is correct, it makes it essential to 
build principles of good board design for non-profits on a firm foundation of theoretical 
analysis of what is distinctive and special about the role of non-profits, as this thesis 
attempts to do. Indeed, as much as I would argue that the board is an important 
institution in all companies, for-profit or non-profit, it can also be claimed, as does 
Rosenthal, that ‘despite the common ancestry and legal underpinnings, non-profit 
corporate governance places heightened demands on its board: a larger mix of 
stakeholders, a more complex economic model, and a lack of external accountability’.33  
 
I have, so far, emphasised the importance of understanding what is distinctive about 
non-profits if we are successfully to address their effective (board) governance. But 
what is truly distinctive about non-profits is largely dependent on the society in which 
those organisations operate. This is starkly evident if we compare the role of the non-
profit sector in, say, the UK and China, each of which has its own unique culture, legal 
system and ideology.34  A number of social and political characteristics distinguish 
Chinese non-profits from those in, say, the UK. 35  And yet, perhaps surprisingly, 
research on the non-profit sector in China is barely in its infancy.   
 
For China, the Government – with its single-party political system, and determination 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Cornforth and Chambers, (n23) 
30 ibid ; D Cumming, W Hou and E Lee, 'Sustainable and Ethical Entrepreneurship, Corporate Finance 
and Governance, and Institutional Reform in China' (2016) 134 Journal of Business Ethics 505 
31 This is not to say, of course, that board design for non-profits cannot draw on, and learn from, theory 
and practice in the for-profit sector; see A M. Viader and M I. Espina, 'Are Not-for-Profits Learning 
from for-Profit-Organizations? A Look into Governance' (2014) 14 Corporate Governance 1 
32 Groysberg, Healy and Vijayaraghavan, (n32) 
33 L Rosenthal, Good Counsel: Meeting the Legal Needs of Nonprofits (John Wiley & Sons 2011) 45 
34 R Hasmath and J Y Hsu, NGO Governance and Management in China (Routledge 2015) 
35 For example, the establishment of guanxi, the face saving social strategies, the Chinese collectivism, 
and the government control; see W R Vanhonacker, 'Guanxi Networks in China' (2004) 31 China 
Business Review 48 
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to secure its nationwide authority and power36 – impacts hugely upon the majority of 
national activities, across most aspects of social and economic life.37 This inevitably 
makes for a significant difference in the role of non-profits, as well as the modes of 
non-profit governance available in China, especially when compared to the UK.38 At 
the same time, there is strong evidence indicating that the increase in the range of social 
issues to be solved is encouraging more individuals’ to participate, or at least develop 
public interest, in the non-profit sector in China. And yet, during the last two decades, 
the development of the non-profit sector has been disappointingly slow, owing to 
political suppression and strict legal regulations surrounding their development.39  
 
All this throws up important and difficult questions about the role of the sector in 
modern China, and the role (and design) of board governance therein. This thesis 
attempts, in at least a modest way, to start to fill this gap. Interestingly, during the 
writing of it, the Chinese Government made its own contribution to what might be 
called the non-profit governance gap in China by introducing a New Chinese Charity 
Law (‘the Charity Law 2016’), enacted in April 2016. Perhaps paradoxically, this also 
immediately raised public and academic concern, having altered the situation for 
Chinese non-profits to a certain degree.40 Indeed, it can be implied from a number of 
relevant articles in the Charity Law 2016 that there has been a strong sense on the 
Chinese Government’s part towards reconsidering its position and attitude in relation to 
non-profits, which could represent a promising and new phase in Chinese non-profit 
history. At this point, it is highly possible that non-profit related academic research in 
China would strongly influence the Government towards opening the door to reform. In 
this respect, based upon the findings of research carried out during this project, the 
thesis shall look to posit several blueprints, which it intends to be developed in 
response to what may contribute to the improved governance or management of non-
profit organisations; with a view to detailing what an ideal or improved Chinese non-
profits model might also look like, and how this might adapt or improved ways of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 C Guo, 'When Government Becomes the Principal Philanthropist: The Effects of Public Funding on 
Patterns of Nonprofit Governance' (2007) 67 Public Administration Review 458 
37 J Han, 'The Emergence of Social Corporatism in China: Nonprofit Organizations, Private Foundations, 
and the State' (2016) 16 China Review 27 
38 C Guo and Z Zhang, 'Mapping the Representational Dimensions of Nonprofit Organizations in China' 
(2013) 91 Public Administration 325 
39 Hasmath and Hsu, (n34)  
40 The New Chinese Charity Law 2016 
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working in China. 
 
1.2 Research questions  
To recap on what I have sketched out above, the overarching goal of my thesis is to 
develop a blueprint for an effective board for non-profits, which can be adapted to the 
distinctive characteristics of the Chinese non-profit sector, and against which current 
board regulatory requirements in China can then be measured. To achieve this 
overarching goal, my thesis in turn identifies, and addresses, the following individual 
research questions: 
1. Why do non-profit organisations exist as a separate sector, and what distinguishes 
them from the ‘commercial’ sector on the one hand, and the public sector (government) 
on the other hand? To this end, what is the nature of the non-profit sector, and how does 
this impact upon or influence the governance mechanism adopted by such 
organisations?  
2. What attributes should an optimal board in this sector possess? Indeed, if this work is 
to present prospective blueprints in order as to guide the board’s actions and 
performance, what might this look like? And, how easily can this be transplanted into 
the Chinese context? 
3. Does the non-profit sector merely grow to play the same function in China as their 
Western counterparts? Can non-profits in China effectively fill the gaps left by the 
failings of the commercial and governmental sectors? 
4. What are the contextual determinants of Chinese non-profits, and how could these 
elements be adapted to promote better governance practices in the Chinese non-profit 
sector? How does the reality (regulations and legal practices) of board performance in 
the UK and in China compare to such a model? That is to say, how large is the ‘gap’ 
between the ideal and reality in this context?  
5. What reforms to the legal framework are necessary to close such a gap, if any? 
Which type of reform is more practical, specifically in the Chinese context? What are 
the potential gaps between the blueprint and the Charity Law 2016 in China?  
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1.3 Thesis design and structure  
The thesis is divided into four parts, comprising nine chapters (plus an introduction in 
Chapter 1). The first part (Chapters 2-3) provides the theoretical foundation of the 
thesis, in the following sense. They set out and explain current theorising about the 
nature of non-profits (Chapter 2) and the role of the board in non-profit governance 
(Chapter 3).  
 
To address the first of my research questions, Chapter 2 explains the essence and 
unique nature of the non-profit sector. More specifically, it does two things. First, it 
provides a brief overview of the non-profit sector. Second, it highlights the points of 
difference between non-profit organisations and organisations in both the public and 
private sectors. By identifying these differences, it helps identify how far one might 
apply for-profit corporate governance ideas and practices in the non-profit sector. 
Enriched by the content and nature of non-profit literature, Chapter 3 examines board 
governance theories specifically within the non-profit context. Following a selection, 
adjustment and combination of these individual theories widely applied in the public 
and private sectors, a comprehensive theoretical framework will then be outlined in 
relation to non-profit organisations.  
 
Part 2 (Chapter 4) concentrates on the second research question. Before attempting to 
compare non-profit board governance between the UK and China, Chapter 4 develops a 
blueprint for an effective non-profit board on the basis of non-profit distinctiveness 
(Chapter 2) and the theoretical framework established in Chapter 3. To achieve this, 
this chapter first identifies four essential attributes for non-profit boards (board size, 
characteristics, structure and process, for example). Within each attribute, this work 
investigates the essential elements/mechanisms contributing to an optimal board 
structure. Subsequently, a combining these four attributes is used with a view to 
informing the development of a guide toward board performance and operation in the 
non-profit sector and organisations.  
 
With this blueprint in mind, and before turning to China, Part 3 (Chapter 5) measures 
the UK against that blueprint. It does so for three reasons. First, the UK is itself a well-
developed legal regime (far more so, for example, than China). Given that, it is 
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intrinsically interesting to understand its current regulatory regime for board 
governance. Second, through this investigation, we shall see how far the actual 
regulatory regime in the UK does indeed either conform with, or depart from, that 
suggested by the blueprint I have developed. Third, and finally, China seeks to develop 
its own non-profit sector, it is likely to look to other regimes – including the UK – for 
inspiration. Since I hope my research will have some real impact on Chinese regulation 
and practice, showing the extent to which my proposals correspond to UK practices 
will likely add to their plausibility with this potential audience. Chapter 5 focuses upon 
two main legal forms used in the UK non-profit sector, namely the Company Limited 
by Guarantee (CLG) and the Charitable Incorporated Organisation (CIO).  
 
Part 4 - Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9 - turns to focus on China. In order to ensure that the 
UK-based blueprint may be properly applied to Chinese non-profits, a variety of social 
characteristics are carefully taken into account, and any necessary elements of non-
profit governance are considered in full. With respect to research questions 3 and 4, the 
thesis first reviews the Chinese non-profit system, and identifies its principle 
foundations and characteristics. Following this, the work then adapts my earlier 
blueprint to the Chinese context. So, Chapter 6 identifies the distinctive nature of non-
profits in China. On the basis of this distinctiveness, Chapter 7 then outlines a series of 
prospective modifications or additions to the blueprint designed in Chapter 4, adapting 
it to the Chinese context. Through this process, a range of important social 
determinants essential to Chinese non-profit performance are taken into account. 
Applying a modified blueprint, Chapter 8 then examines the three most typical legal 
forms of non-profit organisations in the Chinese legal system, with their accompanying 
regulatory framework, and compares the same to the UK regulatory framework. The 
analysis focuses specifically upon Chinese law up to the enactment of the new (2016) 
Act. Naturally, the Charity Law 2016 represents a new phase in the Chinese context, 
and therefore an entire chapter (Chapter 9) shall be dedicated to discussing and 
considering the prospective changes, contributions and deficiencies apparent within the 
Chinese legal and social context. Chapter 10 provides a concluding evaluation.  
 
! 10!
1.4 Research method  
1.4.1 Methodologies 
The methods which I have used to develop the argument in this thesis are those which 
are appropriate to the different strands that make up my work. So, in exploring the role 
of the non-profit, both in the UK and in China, the work adopts a socio-legal approach. 
This entails understanding the institution of the non-profit in its social context. In doing 
so, it was inevitably necessary to draw on other disciplines outside of law to better 
understand how non-profits function: economics, sociology and politics all help this 
understanding of the non-profit. Similarly, my account of the function of boards also 
required insights from management/governance theorists. Alongside this socio-legal 
material, other parts of my project necessitated more traditional doctrinal exposition. 
So, Chapter 5 examines the UK regulatory approach to non-profit boards, Chapters 8 
and 9 do the same for China.  
 
This work also clearly provides a comparative study on non-profit board governance 
that offers comparisons between the approach adopted by the UK and China. These two 
comparator countries are chosen based on several considerations. First, the primary 
objective of this thesis is to improve academic literature and consideration of the 
Chinese non-profits approach to governance. By comparing non-profits governance in 
the UK and China, potential difficulties and shortcomings, which challenge China’s 
non-profit enterprises, can thereby be identified. Such a work shall provide an 
invaluable opportunity for Chinese non-profits to advance their board governance 
mechanisms, modelling themselves on materials and legislation which have been 
developed for a number of decades within the UK regime.41 The UK non-profit sector 
has already theorized governance mechanisms and benefits from advanced practices 
and experiences.42 It offers a rich body of knowledge to improve the operation of 
China’s non-profit sector. By contrast, the Chinese non-profit sector, with a less 
improved regime and short history, has had several difficulties advancing itself. Hence, 
borrowing and adapting from the UK methods and mechanisms could prove beneficial 
to this project (and the blueprint it seeks to develop).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 C C Huang and others, China's Nonprofit Sector: Progress and Challenges (Transaction Publishers 
2013) 
42 Anheier, (n10) 
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It might be objected that this work adopts only a one-direction comparison from the 
UK to China. Surely, my critic might complain, each country can learn from the other. 
After all, the UK non-profit system likely harbours many of its own pitfalls and 
disadvantages, some of which might be addressed by drawing lessons from, say, China. 
Whether or not this is true, my reason for adopting a one-directional comparative study 
is more practical: owing to limited space, and my overriding goal of improving board 
governance for non-profits in China, my focus must be restricted to this comparison.  
Others may address how much the UK might be improved by looking eastwards.  
 
Although taking a comparative approach to study between UK and China is an 
opportunity to improve the Chinese non-profit sector, such work of course presents 
challenges as well. One challenge is methodological. Hoecke and Warrington, like 
many, emphasise ‘the problems caused by analysing foreign legal systems through 
one’s own doctrinal concepts’. 43  Any comparative study, especially insofar as it 
recommends ‘borrowing’ or ‘transplanting’ elements of one country’s regime by 
another, must be sensitive to the distinctive features – culture, history, and so on – of 
each country.44  Comparatists must recognise the context in which comparisons are 
being made, and should take into account and ‘grasp their legal styles’.45 This concept 
of ‘style’ here encompasses much more than the word would first appear to suggest, 
and includes history, modes of thought, institutions, legal sources, and ideology.46 Such 
warnings are important, and hopefully reflected throughout Part 4, and especially 







43 M Van Hoecke and M Warrington, 'Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a 
New Model for Comparative Law' (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 495, 501 
44 ibid 502 
45 K Zweigert and H Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press 1992) 89 
46 ibid 90 
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1.4.2 Library search  
This thesis primarily consists of library-based research, which shall offer a 
comprehensive engagement with existing literature, from a wide range of sources.47 
Through the process of carrying out library-based research so far, a serious dearth in 
Chinese literature and the relative scope of non-profit organisational governance had 
been identified. This is, of course, in stark contrast to the voluminous amount of 
resources available in the UK: where there are at least 30 leading digital 
libraries/academic websites, which supply non-profit related journals, books, as well 
legislation.48  
 
Access to research in the Chinese context is comparatively more challenging, owing to 
the limited and restricted academic resources available on the non-profit sector. The 
particular Chinese social and historical context (further investigation shall be given in 
Chapters 6-9) even restricts the resources relevant to the non-profit research. First and 
foremost, there are fewer digital libraries supplying literature of this kind, with even 
fewer that consider matters such as board governance.49 In terms of other sources in 
China, although non-profit-related regulations, policies and guidance are open and 
available to the public, most of these comprise of legislative materials which provide a 
general and vague description on relevant issues, which fail to adequately support the 
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47 It shall consist of books, journals, magazines, newspapers and websites of both Western and Chinese 
origin. 
48 Some of the most commonly searched libraries include, but are not limited to, SSRN, JSTOR, 
SpringerLink, Lexis Library, Wiley Online Library, HeinOnline, SAGE, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 
Oxford Journals, Westlaw. A variety of pioneer journals shall frequently be found cited in this work, 
including: Non-Profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Voluntas, The Journal of Law and Economics, 
Nonprofit Management and Leadership, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, Academy of Management 
Journal, Journal of Business Ethics, Academy of Management Review, Harvard Law Review, Journal of 
Law &Economics. In addition, a number of up-to-date information, report and data sources concerning 
non-profit organisations in the UK have also been accessed through a variety of different websites and 
research institutions. These include: NCVO, www.gov.uk, The Charity Commission, Institute for 
Volunteering Research, the UK Civil Society Almanac, the Nonprofit Almanac. 
49 There are essentially three digital libraries that may be used for this purpose; these are China 
Academic Journals, China Yearbook Full-text Database and Wanfang Data. As international research 
rankings would suggest, these are only two core research institutions in China — Qinghua University 
and Perking University, both of which have a long established history in academic research and 
specifically in relation to non-profit organisations. The ‘China Non-profit Review’ serves as a forum for 
researchers specializing in the undertakings and organisation of Chinese non-profits, and is the only 
international level journal with an English version published in China. 
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arguments or concepts discussed by this work. 50  Accordingly, whilst the research 
considering the Chinese aspect of this thesis has required a considerable degree more 
effort, this has also contributed to providing a greater degree of originality and thus 
significance in the claims made by this work. 
 
1.4.3 Empirical materials 
In the UK, there has been a great deal of empirical research in relation to the 
performance of non-profit organisations. In the Chinese context, although non-profit 
performance has gained increasing academic attention over recent years, relevant 
empirical literature exploring the non-profit board governance aspect of corporations 
has been much less common. Therefore, in an attempt to probe the performance of non-
profit board governance, and close the gap between UK and China, the thesis has relied 
upon empirical evidence which supplements relevant chapters throughout. In doing so, 
this study aims to achieve a twofold purpose. First, it intends to introduce empirical 
evidence on the non-profit board governance both in the UK and in China. Second, the 
study compares the legal frameworks (e.g. Acts, codes of practices, regulations) of both 
the UK and China, to see how their performance may be assessed using empirical 
evidence. However, this project does not itself generate new empirical data; but instead, 
it relies upon existing sources.  
 
The justification for taking the aforementioned approach is supported by an attempt to 
avoid several apparent difficulties or hurdles that shall impact upon the study 
otherwise. With respect to the Chinese aspect of research, collecting first-hand 
empirical data appears to be impractical owing to the time and space limitation placed 
upon this work. The non-profit-related issue has long since been, and remains, a 
sensitive topic in China, and would therefore confound this aspect of research.51 Since 
this is subject to the strict control of academic resources,52  this would very likely 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Supporting documents, such as the numbers of non-profits, annual income, funding resources, director 
numbers or similar information can be easily accessed in the UK, whilst comparable information is 
considerably more difficult to obtain in China. 
51 Y Jing, 'Between Control and Empowerment: Governmental Strategies Towards the Development of 
the Non-Profit Sector in China' (2015) 39 Asian Studies Review 589 
52 A great deal of non-profit information and data are categorized as confidential, and filed and 
accessible only to specialist Chinese government departments. Furthermore, the official system 
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impinge upon the sorts of data access required for a project of this kind. Similarly, the 
non-profit development in China is in its initial phase. Accordingly, the majority of the 
organisations involved are grassroots non-profit based, and are either unregistered or 
registered as corporate/commercial enterprises. 53  Consequently, defining and 
categorizing non-profit organisations in China is a problem, especially insofar as it 
prevents the conducting of empirical research from the outset. Interestingly, the 
majority of non-profits are located in the most deprived areas of China, where there is a 
significant lack of public transport and telecommunication. 54  This brings added 
difficulties, such as locating them, collecting data, and maintaining contact in order to 
update research in this area. These challenges seriously impair the conducting of first-
hand empirical research in this context, especially owing to the time, sample size and 
scope required for this to be effective, which would mean a failure to ensure a robust or 



















regulating the non-profit sector in China fails to record the non-profit information systematically and 
accurately, upheld by a system that lacks transparency. 
53 This issue shall be further discussed in Chapters 6-8.  
54 J Y Hsu and R Hasmath, 'The Local Corporatist State and NGO Relations in China' (2014) 23 Journal 
of Contemporary China 516 
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Chapter 2 | The roles of non-profit organisations: a theoretical analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
As argued in Chapter 1, we cannot sensibly discuss good board design for non-profits 
without first identifying the proper role of a non-profit board. And we cannot do that 
without first identifying the proper role of the non-profit itself. This chapter, therefore, 
now begins that task of identifying the role of non-profits.   
 
It does so by focusing on what we might, for convenience, call the ‘Western’ literature 
addressing this issue. Given, however, that the overarching purpose of this thesis is to 
develop a blueprint for good board governance in Chinese non-profits, this approach 
might seem rather inappropriate, and requires some justification. As noted in Chapter 1, 
Chinese literature addressing non-profits remains limited, and this is especially true of 
literature theorising about the nature and the role of non-profits.55 By contrast, Western 
literature is much richer, and offers much deeper insights into the role played by non-
profits specifically, and the ‘Third Sector’ more generally.56 Moreover, this literature, 
whilst it focuses on the role of these organisations in Western societies, is by no means 
merely attempting to ‘survey’ or ‘map’ what role or ‘functions’ the existing population 
of non-profits happens to play in Western societies. As we shall see, the best of the 
literature is much deeper or more ‘fundamental’ than that. It focuses on the essential 
economic relationships between individuals, organisations, and Government, 
relationships which give rise to the type of organisation that a non-profit represents.  
And, crucially, there is good reason to think that many (though not all) aspects of these 
relationships are replicated in contemporary Chinese society.   
 
Nevertheless, we certainly cannot take for granted that these theories, developed in the 
context of Western societies, will fully explain the role of non-profits in China. My 
approach therefore must, and does, involve two steps. In this Chapter 2, I focus on the 
Western theories, for the reasons just noted. Then, in Chapter 6, I revisit and revise the 
account of the role of non-profits developed in this Chapter 2, by placing it within the 
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55 Hasmath and Hsu, (n34); Q Hui, 'NGOs in China: The Third Sector in the Globalisation Process and 
Social Transformation' (2004) <http://web.mit.edu/newmediaactionlab/www/papers/qinhui_ngo.pdf> 
accessed 19 July 2015 
56 S Hasan and J Onyx, Comparative Third Sector Governance in AsiaStructure, Process, and 
Political Economy (Springer 2008) 
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context of current Chinese society.  
     
The chapter focuses on the three leading theories have been developed in the literature. 
The first (and arguably most influential) is the market failure theory.57 This argues, 
essentially, that non-profits exist to fill the gap that arises in certain situations where the 
private market struggles to supply the goods or services that consumers demand.58  The 
second theory I shall call the government failure theory. This is particularly associated 
with Weisbrod,59 although it has been developed further by later writers, including 
James,60 Anheier,61 Ben-Ner and Hoomissen,62 and Frumkin.63 It accepts, like the first 
theory, that the market may sometimes fail to deliver the services that consumers 
demand, but asks why government does not then step in to fill that gap. In answering 
that question, it both offers reasons why governments may fail to meet such consumer 
demands, and why non-profits may succeed where governments fail.    
 
The third theory I shall call the participatory/expressive theory. It evaluates the social 
role of non-profits more from what we might call the ‘supply side’. It is associated with 
the work of Ben-Ner,64 Frumkin,65 Riley66 and Anheier.67 They emphasize the role of 
non-profits less in meeting the otherwise unmet demands of consumers, and more in 
meeting the interests or needs of those who ‘supply’ non-profits – social entrepreneurs, 
non-profit volunteers, donors, and the like. Thus, essentially, non-profits provide 
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57 I shall use the terms market failure theory, and contract failure theory, here interchangeably.  
58  H B Hansmann, 'The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise' (1980) 89 The Yale Law Journal 835, 840; 
Romero-Merino and García-Rodriguez, (n1); R Steinberg and B H Gray, '" The Role of Nonprofit 
Enterprise" in 1993: Hansmann Revisited' (1993) 22 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 297, 302 
59  See B A Weisbrod, 'Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy', 
The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions : Studies in Structure and Policy (Oxford University Press 
1986); B A Weisbrod, 'The Future of the Nonprofit Sector: Its Entwining with Private Enterprise and 
Government' (1997) 16 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 541 549 
60 E James, 'Comments on Nonprofit Theories' in S Rose-Ackerman (ed), The Economics of Nonprofit 
Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy (Oxford University Press 1986)   
61 Anheier, (n10) 
62 A BenNer and T Van Hoomissen, 'Nonprofit Organizations in the Mixed Economy' (1991) 62 
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 519 
63 P Frumkin, On Being Nonprofit: A Conceptual and Policy Primer (Harvard University Press 2009) 
64 BenNer and Van Hoomissen, (n62) 
65 P Frumkin, 'Between Nonprofit Management and Social Entrepreneurship' (2013) 73 Public 
Administration Review 372 
66 C A Riley, 'The Not-So-Dynamic Quality of Corporate Law: A UK Perspective on Hansmann's 
‘Corporation and Contract’' (2010) 21 King's Law Journal 469  
67  H K Anheier and J Kendall, Trust and Voluntary Organisations: Three Theoretical Approaches 
(London School of Economics and Political Science 2000) 
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opportunities for those stakeholders 68  of non-profits to achieve self-
fulfilment/accomplishment, gather ‘a sense of belonging’, or express the values they 
hold and cherish.69   
 
A final word of introduction is appropriate. Though in one sense each of these three 
theories is in competition with the others, I shall argue that these theories are in fact 
inter-connected and, moreover, complementary to one another in their attempts to 
explain the non-profit sector. As Riley has argued, each of these theories adds 
‘something significant to the other. Taken together, they offer a valuable account of not-
for-profits’.70 More importantly still for the purpose of this thesis, it is only by building 
on the insights of each of these three theories that we can fully understand the role of 
non-profits, and thus, the role of their boards. Thus, the multiple-explanation for the 
role of non-profits that I argue for here should be understood as related to the multiple-
account of the role of the board that I shall put forward, and defend, in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2 The definition and categories of non-profit organisations 
2.2.1 Definition  
According to Hansmann, Salamon and Anheier, non-profits may be defined as 
organisations that use surplus revenues to achieve various ‘positive’ or non-commercial 
orientated goals, in place of distributing surplus revenue as profit or dividends.71 This 
core feature of non-profit operations is reflected in US law, which provides that 
although non-profit enterprises are permitted to generate surplus revenues, such 
revenues must be retained by non-profits for the purposes of self-preservation, 
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68 Here we define stakeholders of non-profits as anyone involves/participant in the non-profit relevant 
activities.  
69 See e.g. Riley, (n66) 56 
70 C A Riley, 'Theorising the Governance of Not-for-Profits' (2007) 16 Nottingham Law Journal 44, 49 
71 Salamon and Anheier have also suggested the use of a seven-fold test to distinguish non-profits from 
other organisational forms in Western culture. In their study, non-profits are deemed as ‘formal; private; 
non-profit-distributing; self-governing; voluntary; non-religious; [or] non-political’. Hansmann, (n58); H 
B Hansmann, R Kraakman and R Squire, 'Law and the Rise of the Firm' (2006) Harvard Law Review 
1333; H B Hansmann, 'The Role of Trust in Nonprofit Enterprise' in A B-N Helmut K. Anheier (ed), The 
Study of the Nonprofit Enterprise (Springer 2003); L M Salamon, S W Sokolowski and H K Anheier, 
Social Origins of Civil Society: An Overview (Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies Baltimore 
2000) 6 
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expansion, or associated plans.72 Broadly speaking, they are not permitted to be formed 
of or operated for the purpose of pecuniary gains, unless those gains are 
devoted/restricted to the aforementioned causes. 73  In this context, the term ‘non-
distribution constraint’ (often referred to as a ‘lock on assets’ in the UK)74 was first 
employed by Hansmann to describe this most crucial aspect to non-profits. 75  This 
criterion prevents non-profit institutions from distributing their net earnings (not gross) 
to individuals who exercise control over the institution itself. 76  This may include 
directors, managers or other members.77  
 
Interestingly here, lay observers may, and often do, mistakenly believe that non-profits 
are organisations that do not charge others for what they provide, or pay others 
(individuals or institutions) for the services they supply.78 But this is clearly not so.79 
Even non-profits must cover the cost of the resources they consume.80  
 
2.2.2 Categories of non-profits  
Having understood the distinguishing feature shared by all non-profits (the non-
distribution constraint), how might we now sub-divide or ‘categorise’ them? One way 
might be according to the activities they pursue, and thus the sectors within which they 
operate. They are most prevalent in sectors such as health (hospitals, nursing homes), 
education (universities, research institutions), citizen welfare (libraries and trade unions 
and associations), and the performing art (theatres and arts centres).81 Along such lines, 
the International Classification of Non-profit Organisations (ICNPO) classifies non-
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72 Hansmann, (n58) 
73 ibid  
74 I Snaith, 'Recent Reforms to Corporate Legal Structures for Social Enterprise in the UK: Opportunity 
or Confusion?' (2007) 3 Social Enterprise Journal 20; ‘Asset Lock’ is a term used to cover all the 
provisions designed to ensure that the assets of the CIC are used for the benefit of the community. 
75 Hansmann, (n58) 
76 Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire, (n71) 1356 
77 ibid  
78 ibid   
79 Steinberg and Gray, (n58) 
80 ibid  
81 Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire, (n71) 1376 
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profit institutions into 11 different groups ranging from ‘culture and recreation’, 
‘education and research’, ‘health’, to ‘social services’, ‘environment’ and ‘religion’.82  
 
A more useful categorisation, for our purpose, however, examines not the activities 
they tend to pursue, but rather who ‘demands’, and thus pays for, their activities. So, 
Hansmann, expanding on the categorization found in the IRS rules,83 divides non-
profits into ‘donative’ and ‘commercial’ non-profits. 84 Donative non-profits get most or 
all of their income from grants or donations, while commercial non-profits derive their 
income from selling their goods or services.85  
 
2.3 Why theorise non-profits? 
I have explained already why an understanding of the role of non-profits is essential for 
a proper understanding of the role of the board. Without repeating that argument here, a 
little elaboration is appropriate.  
 
It might be argued that understanding the proper role of non-profits is crucial to 
understanding, or improving, any aspect of the operation of non-profits, including say 
how they are managed, as much as how they are governed by their boards. There is 
some truth in this. But it is arguable that the governance of non-profits is particularly, 
intensely, dependent on the role they perform.86 This is because, as Cornforth and 
Brown have convincingly shown, non-profit governance will often be more 
complicated than non-profit management.87 Compared to day-to-day management, the 
board, as a governing body, must govern; it must provide leadership and strategy, and 
must focus on the ‘big picture’. 88  Accordingly, governance is about planning the 
framework for work, and ensuring such an approach is followed. It is distinct from 
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82 The International Classification of Non-profit Organisations (ICNPO) was developed through a 
collaborative process involving a team of scholars across 13 different countries; see L M Salamon and H 
K Anheier, 'The International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations: Icnpo-Revision 1, 1996', 
Working Papers of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (Baltimore 1996) 
83 Internal Revenue Service, s501 (c) (3) 
84 Hansmann, (n58) 861 
85 ibid 861 
86 C Cornforth and W A Brown, Nonprofit Governance: Innovative Perspectives and Approaches 
(Routledge 2013); R P Chait, W P Ryan and B E Taylor, Governance as Leadership: Reframing the 
Work of Nonprofit Boards (John Wiley & Sons 2011) 
87 Cornforth and Brown, (n86) 
88 ibid   
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management (‘organizing the work’) and operations (‘doing the work’).89  
 
One consequence of the complexity of governance is that, so far as possible, the 
governing body of an organisation should steer clear from making managerial decisions 
or from getting involved in the day-to-day implementation of strategy.90 As Rosen 
notes, if the board trespasses into management, it could make things even worse, and in 
many cases may lead to rifts between the board and executive management.91 
 
Another consequence of the complexity of governance is that we cannot assume that 
governance will be the same, or require the same mechanisms, in for-profits as in non-
profits. To be sure, corporate governance mechanisms in the for-profit sector have been 
well developed for decades. However, there remains a danger that in only looking at 
for-profit based governance, we may overlook the subtle and important differences 
between the for-profit and non-profit sectors, as well as the means by which these 
differences boards of governance operate, especially in the non-profit sector.92 A vast 
array of literature has detailed these differences. For example, scholars such as Hung,93 
Riley and Cornforth94 have each examined this phenomenon in terms of the essential 
roles or characteristics that the organisation’s nature plays in influencing governance 
strategies, and have insisted that borrowing and adapting governance mechanisms from 
the profit based sector may well be a shortcut to improve non-profit governance. 
Indeed, through an analysis of these literatures, it may well be possible to develop an 
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2.4 The role of non-profits 
 As noted, we shall focus here on three theories: Market Failure, Government Failure 
and ‘Participatory/Expressive’. Before addressing each in turn, it might be worth 
noting an overarching distinction between them, alluded to already.  
 
The Market Failure and Government Failure theories are both, in one sense, ‘demand 
side’ theories.  They each suggest that non-profits arise, and flourish, because of a 
demand for their goods and services from consumers, a demand which the private 
market, and government, are sometimes, in some circumstances, unable to meet. By 
contrast, the participatory/expressive theory can be characterised as a ‘supply side’ 
theory. It focuses not on why others demand/favour the outputs of non-profits, but 
rather why anyone chooses to create (and thus supply) a non-profit in the first place. 
This categorisation of the three theories is captured in Table 2.1 below.   
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2.4.1 The Instrumental role of non-profits in Hansmann’s ‘contract failure’ theory 
Hansmann’s work was the first to have proposed a ‘contract failure’ theory of non-
profits, and thus to focus on how non-profits address the apparent shortcomings 
inherent within ‘market relationships’ (i.e. relationships with for-profit enterprises).95 In 
doing so, his work insisted that the non-profit sector plays an important role in 
compensating for market failures in society, and especially for ‘asymmetric 
information’.96 Essentially, where problems of asymmetric information are sufficiently 
great, consumers will be reluctant to trust a for-profit organisation, fearing it will 
exploit the consumer’s ignorance in the pursuit of profit.97 A non-profit, by contrast, 
will have less incentive to take advantage of the consumer’s ignorance, and will in 
consequence be more trustworthy.  
 
2.4.1.1 Explaining contract failure  
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Table 2.2 Social roles of non-profit and for-profit sector 
 
 
2.4.1.1.1 Asymmetric information and contract failure  
Economic theories explain how, once certain conditions are satisfied, the competitive 
commercial market is able to provide for the majority of products and services ‘at the 
quantity and price that represents maximum social efficiency’.98 Consumers can, for 
themselves, choose between the most desirable products, by comparing prices and 
product qualities, thereby reaching a reasonable agreement with suppliers while, 
finally, considering whether suppliers comply with the agreements and how they might 
apply for redress, if they do not.99 During such a process, contracts may help prevent 
the interests of the consumers from being exploited.  
 
However, consumer interests cannot be ensured through market contracts in all 
situations. Rather, contract failure may sometimes occur, with information asymmetry 
being one of the principal reasons for this shortcoming.100  Information asymmetry 
refers to the circumstance in which one party to a contract knows significantly less 
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(about matters relevant to the contract) than the other does.101 Where the consumer is 
significantly under-informed, compared to the producer-organisation, then there is the 
danger that the organisation will act ‘opportunistically’, taking advantage of its superior 
information to promote its own interests (say its own profits) at the expense of the 
consumer.102   
 
Two clear examples of asymmetrical-information situations that are relevant to our 
analysis of non-profits might include: 
 
(a) Where purchasers of services are separated from beneficiaries. The clearest 
example of this may be charities, who receive much of their funding from individual 
donations, and then deliver services or goods to people in need, such as the relief of aid 
of poverty (i.e. CARE and Oxfam).103 The ‘purchaser’ (donor) will typically be far-
distant from the recipients (or beneficiaries), and unable to see or discover how their 
contributions to the charity’s work have been spent.104  
 
 (b) The second example concerns complex personal services. Some personal services – 
intricate surgery might be the best example – require a level of knowledge and 
expertise that the consumer (the patient in my example) is unlikely to possess, but 
which the providing organisation would be expected to have.105 Education provides a 
similar example. How can a student assess the quality of a teacher or lecturer’s 
guidance, when almost by definition the teacher or lecturer is more knowledgeable than 
the student?106    
 
2.4.1.1.2 Trustworthiness in non-profits 
Why might some consumers or donors, aware of their relative ignorance, prefer to deal 
with a non-profit rather than a for-profit? Hansmann’s answer is that they will trust 
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non-profits more. 107  They will reason that an organisation that is committed to 
maximising its profits will have a strong incentive to exploit the consumer or donor’s 
ignorance.108 By contrast, organisations that do not have profit-maximization as their 
chief purpose have less incentive to expropriate consumers’ or donors’ benefits.109 
 
Thus, non-profits are, according to Hansmann, more trustworthy than for-profits in 
situations where asymmetric information is a significant problem,110 and where that is 
indeed so, non-profits may flourish at the expense of for-profits.111 Non-profits are 
more trustworthy because they are subject to the feature which defines the sector: the 
non-distributional constraint.112 Managers of non-profits have less incentive to exploit 
consumers’ or donors’ ignorance, because they cannot extract the fruits of doing so. 
Within the non-profit sector, consumers believe that they are protected by a ‘trust-
based implicit contract’ in which non-profit institutions promise to devote their entire 
profits to service production.113 In short, Hansmann claims, ‘consumers can and will 
trust organisations that wear the non-profit label over those organisations that exist to 
earn a profit’.114  
 
It is important to stress that the argument here is not that non-profits are always entirely 
trustworthy, with the non-distribution constraint completely negating any incentive to 
exploit consumers’ ignorance. The non-distribution constraint cannot prevent all 
personal profiting by managers of non-profits. 115  They may pay themselves 
excessively. They may benefit from services provided by the non-profit at reduced rates 
(such as free child care) whilst consumers are over-charged.116 Hansmann’s argument is 
only that, where information asymmetry is a significant problem, then sufficient 
consumers or donors will think that non-profits are sufficiently more trustworthy than 
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for-profits to allow non-profits to out-compete for-profits.117 And, Hansmann argues, 
empirical evidence confirms a correlation between those situations where information 
asymmetry is a significant problem, and the predominance of non-profits.118   
 
2.4.1.2 Gap filling or increasing options?   
We can now state more clearly what role the ‘market failure’ theory claims for non-
profits. It is essentially two-fold. First, many non-profits, and particularly those that are 
largely reliant upon donations, play a significant role in filling the gap in the 
commercial market, where profit-based institutions are simply unable to secure the trust 
of donors, for reasons identified already. Again, we can concede that non-profits may 
also sometimes prove untrustworthy, as many recent headlines attest: the collapse of 
Kid’s Company amid allegations of financial mismanagement,119 the suicide of Olive 
Cooke,120 and other charities’ fundraising practices121 In the Chinese non-profit sector, 
as we shall see later, has suffered its own fundraising scandals (e.g. the Guo Meimei 
scandal, 122  the corruption scandals following the Wenchuan earthquake, 123  and the 
Smile Angle Foundation scandal124). Nevertheless, the ‘gap filling role’ for non-profits 
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The second role for non-profits, according to the market failure theory, is subtly 
different. It is not to fill a gap where for-profits cannot operate. Rather, it is to increase 
the choice available to consumers. So, in some sectors, the problems of market failure, 
and lack of trustworthiness, are not so great as wholly to prevent for-profit enterprises 
existing. 126  Here, for-profits will exist alongside non-profits, providing more 
purchasing options for consumers. 127  Profit-based firms and (usually commercial, 
rather than donative)128 non-profits may thus coexist in some industries, producing a 
competitive relationship of different forms.129   
 
2.4.2 Weisbrod’s ‘Governmental Failure’ theory 
We now turn to the second of our three theories, which focuses upon ‘government 
failure’. In essence, the theory goes as follows. Like the market failure theory we have 
just examined, it accepts that there may be failings in the ‘market’ – in the ability of 
for-profits to satisfy consumers’ demands (although it tends to emphasise the problem 
of ‘public goods’, which are explained below, as a key instance of such failure).130 
However, the government failure theory then asks why the government – the state – 
does not intervene to ‘fill the gap’ where for-profits are unable to do so. Where non-
profits thrive, then, they must do so not only because the market fails, but also because 
government fails too in meeting consumer demands.131 Table 2.3 sketches out this basic 
idea, noting the sources of this governmental failure, and reasons for the comparative 
superiority of the non-profit sector.    
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Table 2.3 Non-profits and the public sector 
 
 
As noted, this theory places heavy emphasis on the concept of ‘public goods’. We 
should begin by clarifying their meaning and significance. Weisbrod describes their 
two key features. 132  First, their consumption is ‘non-rivalrous’: ‘one person’s 
consumption of the good does not preclude another person’s consumption’.133 Indeed, 
the cost of producing a public good would not change significantly with the quantity of 
the good or the number of consumers. Clean air and national defence are good 
examples. Second, usage is ‘non-excludable’; it is not easy to prevent someone who 
refuses to pay for the good from nevertheless consuming it.134 Once air quality in 
Birmingham or Beijing has been improved, it would be impossible to restrict the 
benefit to those residents who somehow pay for the privilege. Another less obvious 
example of a public good is, according to Slavinski, ‘material aid to the indigent, from 
the point of view of the non-recipients of that aid.’135  
 
The upshot of the foregoing is that for-profit providers will prove reluctant to supply 
public goods. Given their non-excludable quality, for-profit providers will doubt that 
anyone will actually pay for them. The market, in other words, will fail. In response, 
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government-supply has often been seen as the obvious solution to this market failure.136 
Government can provide clear air, national defence, or aid to the impoverished, and 
then compel people to pay for them, through compulsory taxation.137  In this way, 
Government can overcome the non-excludability problem of public goods.   
 
Weisbrod, however, questioned this assumption that Government always could, and 
always did, solve the public goods problem in this way.138 He argued that there are 
limits to what Government can (and does) provide, and that non-profits are sometimes 
able to make up these shortcomings, filling the gap left by governmental failure.139   
 
Within his theory, the concept of ‘heterogeneity of demands’ is the ‘core feature’ 
behind the governmental failure). 140  Heterogeneity of demands here refers to the 
different levels of demand different sections of the public have for any public good 
(such as clean air, defence, policing, public broadcasting, and so on). The different 
levels of demand depend on population characteristics (age, education, diversity of 
religion, or race, and, significantly, wealth.141  
 
Given then, that some citizens may prefer, say, high levels of expenditure on public 
service broadcasting, or on universities, whilst other voters prefer less expenditure, how 
might government respond? Weisbrod argued that, at least in democracies, they are 
likely to make the provision that satisfies the ‘median voter’.142 This will be more than 
some voters would prefer but, crucially, less than others want.  
 
This inevitably leaves unsatisfied the demands of all those voters who preferred a level 
of provision in excess of that favoured by the ‘median voter’ – who favour, say, more 
expenditure on the arts, or more overseas aid, than the Government is willing to fund. 
In response to this gap, four potential solutions have been identified by scholars such as 
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Weisbrod, Anheier, Young, Salamon and Toepler.143 First, dissatisfied consumers could 
migrate to another new government that might better represent their interests. Second, 
those wanting more provision could form a lower-level, and more ‘generous’, tier of 
government. Apparently these two are not reasonable and practical choices as there are 
too many uncertainties within the solutions: the government would not ensure that the 
interests of both the over-satisfied and under-satisfied people were considered.144 A 
third alternative is for the private sector to step in, but this merely takes us back to 
where we began: the reluctance of for-profit providers to deliver public goods, given 
the non-excludability problem.145   
 
The fourth solution focuses upon the non-profit sector. Non-profits can step in to meet 
the demands of ‘supra-median’ voters which the government, and for-profits, refuse to 
satisfy.146 For in doing so, non-profits have advantages compared both to government, 
and to for-profits. So, they do not have the political constraints upon them which force 
governments to ‘play’ to the median voter. And they are better able than are for-profits 
to persuade others to pay for the goods or services they supply, even when the goods 
are technically ‘non-excludable’.147 To be sure, non-profits cannot compel payment: 
they do not have the power to tax. But they can use their higher moral standing, their 
mission, the sense of community they foster with their donors, and so on, to pressurise 
and encourage others to pay for what they do.148   
 
This median voter explanation predicts ‘a greater abundance of not-for-profits where 
communities are more heterogeneous (and thus have more diverse demands for public 
goods)’.149 The USA, with its relatively diverse population, and rich heritage of non-
profits, seems to support this prediction. Whether it explains other countries 
experiences is less clear. Riley, for example, suggests that ‘it is legitimate to criticise 
the limited significance of the median voter explanation for not-for-profits (especially 
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for the UK)’.150  However, it is also argued that, whilst the median voter explanation 
may not fully explain why governments tend to undersupply public goods, there are 
nevertheless other compelling reasons why governments fail to do so, and why non-
profits prove more effective in filling this gap.151 So, governments face problems of 
inefficiencies when delivering public goods or services. They are big and complex. 
They often struggle to incentivise their employees.152 By contrast, as Frumkin notes, 
non-profits do not coerce participation, thus creating a reservoir of goodwill which 
often attracts and sustains broad involvement. 153  Non-profits, as relatively small 
organisations, are often able to make their goals more specific and flexible, which 
demonstrate an obvious advantage to the commercial context. Clark posited conceiving 
the non-profit organisation as a ‘mini government’, with more diverse objectives.154 
Accordingly, scholars such as Hood, Kettl, and Osborne & Gaebler155 have suggested 
that a ‘third sector’ is needed to introduce a better market orientation in the delivery of 
market goods, in order to enhance its effectiveness; a coincidence considering that the 
non-profit sector is already often regarded as the ‘third sector’.  
 
2.4.3 Participatory and expressive role (supplier-side theory) 
The third theory we shall address arises out of a criticism common to each of the two 
preceding theories. Each explains why consumers or donors may demand the outputs of 
non-profits, but neither explains why anyone would choose to form, or sustain, non-
profits so that they are able to meet that demand.156 Why do social entrepreneurs form 
non-profits? Why do employees choose to work for non-profits, even when their salary, 
as well as other monetary forms of compensation, is much less in non-profit 
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organisations, compared with the commercial market. Indeed, a great proportion of 
volunteers in non-profit organisations choose to work without any monetary return at 
all. Becchetti’s research indicates that in the non-profit sector, ‘a large share of 
voluntary movers do not end up with higher wages but, surprisingly, do have higher job 
satisfaction’.157  
 
The answer, according to this theory, is to be found in two important aspects of the 
relationship which those who create or support such organisations have with it – their 
‘participatory’ and ‘expressive’ roles within the organisation’s activities. 158  The 
participatory value means ‘any close involvement in the life of the organisation. It 
includes taking part in company decision-making (through whatever organ of the 
company), but would extend beyond this to, say, a personal relationship between a 
donor and a not-for-profit under which the former makes repeated gifts to the latter’.159 
Leete and Sen insist, in spite of the less attractive wages, a great portion of people are 
more willing to work in non-profits for the reason that ‘they have a stronger correlation 
between the goals of the organisation and their moral motivations’.160 To be sure, this 
type of participation does not occur only in the non-profit sector. For instance, 
employees and investor/suppliers might sometimes also participate in for-profits. 
Nevertheless, the value of the participation will vary between different sectors. Riley 
believed that, ‘the claim here is only comparative. On average, participation is more 
significant to those who say, donate to, or consume the output of, not-for-profits than it 
is for those who consume the goods or services of for-profits. And the same for those 
who work for not-for-profits compared to those who work for for-profits’.161  
 
Participating in the governance process of a non-profit enables suppliers to have a 
sense of belonging and existing within given communities, proximate to their sector or 
the organisation in question. In the case of non-profits, with common interests and 
preferences, being part of a team will mean members may work collectively to manage 
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their institutions, and to chase or achieve their goals.162 Whether one is a volunteer, 
donor, manager or other type of stakeholder, every contribution is likely to be better 
valued in this sector.163 By contrast, stakeholders are likely more apathetic, and their 
opinions more easily marginalised, in for-profits. 164  Whereas, in non-profits, 
participants’ expressions and opinions are probably more likely to be appreciated.  
 
In terms of the expressive value, it could be defined as ‘the project of making sense of 
the self’.165 Through people’s decisions/behaviours, they attempt to express themselves 
to the public about their cherished values, ‘and thus the sort of people they are’.166 
Indeed, once suggestions and thoughts by stakeholders are taken seriously, then they 
will more likely get the feeling of control over, and involvement in, their organisation’s 
governance. As Frumkin has noted, ‘the not-for-profit sector can be seen as valuable 
because it allows individuals to express their values and commitment through work, 
volunteer activities, and donations.167 By committing to broad causes that are close to 
the heart or by giving to an effort that speaks directly to the needs of the community, 
non-profit and voluntary action answers a powerful expressive urge’.168 In addition, as 
research by Weisbrod and others note, joining in the activities of non-profits could help 
them develop the sense of honour and achievement they seek.169 Supporting non-profits 
thus enables them to release their minds, and at the same time gain the respect of their 
friends and neighbours. 170  People feel proud to tell others that they support and 
participate in non-profits.171 Participants in non-profit organisations can thus benefit 
from ‘the gratitude, esteem and plaudits of his neighbours and fellow citizens—rewards 
which to some extent even show up as financial returns and act to internalize what 
would otherwise be external benefits to the donor’.172  
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2.5 Synthesis and Implications 
We have completed our survey of the three leading theories of the role of non-profits. 
Two tasks remain. The first is to explain how these theories ‘fit together’. The second is 
to make explicit their relevance to, and implications for, the governance of non-profits 
(since, recall, that was why we began this theoretical exploration).  
 
So far as the first task goes, I noted earlier in the chapter that these three theories 
should be seen as complementary. I can now make clearer why this is indeed the case. 
First, insofar as the market failure and government failure address the demand for non-
profits, whilst the participatory/expressive role theory addresses the supply of non-
profits, they offer different, and non-competing, pieces of the jigsaw. Identifying why 
there is a demand for non-profits does not deny that the supply of non-profits matters 
too, and requires explanation. Showing why people are prepared to form and sustain 
(thus, supply) non-profits does not deny that non-profits will only flourish if there is a 
demand for their outputs, and that the basis of that demand needs explaining. Second, 
although the market failure theory and the government failure theory do seem to 
address the same phenomenon – the demand for non-profits – and in doing so might 
seem to offer rival explanations, we should not overstate the conflict between them. For 
whilst each seeks to show how non-profits may have advantages over alternative 
providers of goods or services, each also tends to demonstrate this comparative 
superiority in respect of different alternative providers. For the market failure theory, 
the priority is demonstrating the superiority of non-profits over for-profit providers. For 
the government failure theory, the priority is demonstrating the superiority of non-
profits over governmental provision.   
 
What, now, about the governance implications of these complementary theories of the 
role of non-profits? Each theory has significant implications. Those implications are, 
like the underlying theories, largely complementary, rather than competitive.173 But in 
one respect at least, a degree of tension creeps in. The market failure theory suggests 
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two governance consequences deserve emphasis. First, since the core feature of non-
profits that generates their superior trustworthiness is their reduced incentive to exploit 
consumers’ or donors’ relative ignorance, it is essential that non-profits are indeed 
subject to an effective non-distribution constraint. This must ensure that the assets – 
including income derived from consumers or donors – is devoted to the organisation’s 
mission, and cannot be appropriated by those who might cause the organisation to act 
opportunistically.174   
 
Second, the non-distribution constraint is essentially negative. It prevents 
misappropriation of assets, and the incentive this might create to act opportunistically 
to consumers or donors. But it does not, positively, ensure the non-profit will be well 
run, and achieve its objectives fairly and efficiently. Governance has, then, also a role 
to play in ensuring that the non-profit is managed, and operated, in a way that delivers 
those things too. 
 
The government failure theory largely supports these prescriptions. Non-profits may 
step in where government fears to tread, but non-profits must still overcome the non-
excludability problem. They cannot compel citizens to support their activities. They 
must rely on trust and persuasion, and an effective non-distribution constrain remains 
essential to that. And they are unlikely to outperform government if they are 
incompetent and ineffective in their operations; good governance, in the sense of 
ensuring operational effectiveness, remains as important under this theory too.   
 
The participatory and expressive theory would find much of that entirely persuasive. 
However, with its focus on the motivations and interests of those who sustain non-
profits, its governance emphasis would change a little too. Most significantly, whilst 
operational effectiveness is important, so too is ensuring that non-profits deliver on the 
desires for participation and expression that members of non-profit communities seek. 
This does not automatically mean board participation, but nor can we rule out the board 
as the best organ to fulfil these participatory demands. And herein lies the tension. A 
board composed, structured and functioning to ensure the effectiveness of the 
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organisation, in delivering the outputs its consumers and donors demand, may look 
somewhat different from a board designed to fulfil participatory demands.   
 
2.6 Conclusion 
We can summarise our journey quickly. We have focused on three theories which seek 
to explain the role of non-profits: as a response to market failure, grounded in problems 
of information asymmetry; as a response to government failure, understood both 
narrowly in terms of a desire to satisfy only the demands of the ‘median voter’, and 
more widely in terms of the various inefficiencies which compromise the state’s 
provision of public services; and as a means of satisfying the desire of human agents to 
express their values and participate in communities with which they identify. 
 
We noted that these three theories do, in large measure, offer complementary, rather 
than rival, explanations for the role of non-profits, helping us to see a fuller picture of 
what non-profits do, and why they exist. This complementarity was further evidenced 
when we considered the governance implications of the theories. They stood together in 
prescribing a governance regime that would reassure the public that the organisation’s 
assets would be protected, and devoted to the organisation’s mission. They advocated a 
governance regime that would ensure organisational effectiveness in delivering on that 
mission. And at least one of the theories emphasised the necessity of ensuring that the 
governance regime (although not necessarily the board) would meet the participatory 
expectations of those who create and sustain the organisation.  
 
With this journey into the role of non-profits complete, we can now turn our attention 
to the role of their boards, the subject of Chapter 3.     








Chapter 3 | Theories guiding board governance in non-profit organisations  
3.1 Introduction  
In this chapter we now turn to examine the role of the board itself. Understanding this 
role is paramount to the functional design of effective governance.175 It is only by first 
understanding the role of the board in a non-profit that we can then begin to determine 
what its size should be, what its composition should look like, what processes it should 
follow, and so on — all of which form the key ingredients constructing the suggested 
‘blueprint’ for a non-profit board. 
 
In spite of its fundamental importance, there exists no unanimity within the literature as 
to what the role of the board should be. This is true in the case of both profit based and 
non-profit organisations. Rather, a number of theories speculate on, but typically come 
to different and apparently conflicting prescriptions for, the role of the board within the 
modern corporation. 176  Accordingly, in this chapter, we shall focus on four such 
theories, namely agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependency theory and 
stakeholder theory. As such, the first purpose of this chapter shall be to describe the 
basic content of these theories, and to identify the respective prescription each offers 
for what it argues to be the most appropriate role of a non-profit board. In doing so, we 
will draw back on the analysis presented in Chapter 2 about the role of non-profits 
themselves. I will, in other words, seek to bring together current theorising about the 
role of boards with my theorising about the role of non-profits. This discussion shall be 
presented through sections 3.2-3.4.  
 
The second, and equally important, purpose of this chapter, achieved in section 3.5, is 
to offer a synthesis of these four different theories about the board’s role. Too often, 
these different theories of the role of the board are presented as ‘competitors’ or 
‘rivals’, with their respective proponents arguing that one theory, above all others, is 
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correct and should be favoured at the expense of the others.177 There are echoes here, of 
course, of how the three theories of non-profits themselves, discussed in Chapter 2, are 
sometimes presented. However, I shall argue that, just as our best understanding of the 
role of non-profits was achieved by combining all three theories, so too, as we now turn 
to the role of the board, our best understanding is achieved by combining elements of 
all four board-theories. Each theory details important features of the role of boards. 
And the role of the board must therefore incorporate elements of each of these theories, 
and the role each theory prescribes. For obvious reasons, this shall be called the 
‘integrated model for board governance’.178 
 
I should immediately concede that a potential problem with adopting such an 
‘integrated model’ may be that it attempts to be ‘have the best of all worlds’. However, 
it may be argued against me, if there exist unavoidable conflicts between the different 
roles each theory puts forward, then surely no board can simultaneously pursue all of 
them.179 I address this potential criticism of my argument in section 3.5 itself. I concede 
that there are indeed some conflicts between the different board roles which the 
different theories prescribe, but these conflicts can to some extent be managed by 
appropriate forms of board design. 180  Of course, this will not remove all the 
incompatibilities presented.181 However, I shall argue that the remaining conflicts are a 
price worth paying for the clear advantages in having the board play or fulfil multiple 
functions.182  
 
Finally, it is worth stressing one final point. Proponents of each of the four theories 
sometimes present their theory as a descriptive (or ‘positive’) account of the board, and 
sometimes as a prescriptive (or ‘normative’) theory.183 So, descriptively, each theory 
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argues what the role of boards currently is. Accordingly, the descriptive validity of each 
theory depends on empirical evidence: whether it is indeed true that boards generally 
adopt the role described by the theory. 184  The normative validity of each theory 
depends on whether the arguments in favour of the board playing the role prescribed by 
the theory are indeed compelling.185 In this chapter, we are concerned only with the 
normative aspects of each theory. We are, remember, seeking to offer a blueprint for 
how boards ought to be designed, and to do that, we are focusing our theorizing upon 
what the role of the board ought to be.186 As such, we are not concerned, here, to 
provide the most compelling account of how boards currently behave.  
 
3.2 Agency theory and stewardship theory  
This section explains, and seeks to combine elements of, agency theory and 













184 Tsang, (n183) 80 
185 Coule, (n181) 82; R Caers and others, 'PrincipalAgent Relationships on the StewardshipAgency 
Axis' (2006) 17 Nonprofit Management and Leadership 25, 33; P De Andrés-Alonso, V Azofra-
Palenzuela and M E Romero-Merino, 'Determinants of Nonprofit Board Size and Composition: The Case 
of Spanish Foundations' (2009) 38 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 784, 798 
186 The blueprint shall be further discussed in Chapter 4.  
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Table 3.1 Agency theory and stewardship theory 
 
Theory Objective Principle Approaches to deal 
with agency problem 
Difficulties and advantages in non-
profits 
Relationship with each other  
Agency 
theory 










3, reduce agency 
costs 






agent and principal 
 
1, boards monitor 
agents with harsh 
means (sanctions)  
 
2, less trust, more 
control 
Difficulties: 1, more acute agency 
problems because of  
less external assistance (e.g. law, 
commercial market mechanism) 
2, more internal governance difficulties 
(e.g. uncertainty of non-profit principal) 
 
Advantage: agents focus less on 
monetary incentive, more on self-
fulfilment/dignity 
Interactions between two theories 
 
1, share similarities  
 
2, stewardship theory is a 








2, agents are Homo-
sociologicus 
1, more trust, less 
monitor 
 
2, motivate agents 
with intrinsic rewards 
  




3.2.1 Agency theory  
Jensen and Meckling characterised a principal-agent relationship as referring to ‘a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principals) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent’.187 Such relationships are ubiquitous within any 
economy in which there is a substantial ‘division of labour’. They do, of course, exist 
in companies, including non-profits.188 For us, the agents that are of interest are the 
non-profit’s employees (and especially its more senior managers). It is slightly more 
difficult to identify, in the case of the non-profit, who should be understood as ‘the 
principal’. 189  We can, however, for now, sidestep this difficulty and view the 
organisation itself (say, the separate legal personality that is the company, assuming the 
non-profit operates through a company) as the principal, although we will subsequently 
need to return to this issue (see section 3.4 below). 
 
The central problem raised by agency relationships is this: ‘[h]ow the owners/principals 
ensure that managers/agents run the organisation in a way and with the results that 
benefit the owners?’190 Agency theory argues that, given both parties’ objectives are to 
maximize their own utilities, when there exists a conflict of interest between principals 
and agents, agents are likely to pursue their own goals rather than those of the 
principal’.191 In other words, self-interested agents will act in an opportunistic manner 
that imposes costs (‘agency costs’) upon those for whom they are working, the 
principals.192   
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However, given this potential for agency costs, organisations can then seek to devise 
appropriate governance mechanism that will control agents in a way that will best 
reduce these potential agency costs. And, importantly, the board becomes one such 
mechanism for control — with a role that is understood as the reduction/control of 
agency costs.193 As Fama and Jensen argued, ‘… [t]he board of directors assumes 
responsibility for ratification and monitoring of decisions that have been initiated and 
implemented by the management of the organisation’. 194  In this way, risk-bearing 
functions are separated from decision structures, and so principals are assured that their 
organisation is using its resources as they intend.195 Thus, to clarify, on this theory the 
central role of the board is not to manage the organisation. Employees and managers do 
that. Rather, the board’s role is to control those who do manage the organisation, and 
thereby reduce the agency costs that would otherwise be inflicted by these self-
interested, and potentially opportunistic, agents.196 
 
This prescription for the board’s role seems quite consistent with the theoretical 
account of the role of non-profits developed in Chapter 2. We noted that each of the 
theories requires that the assets of non-profits be devoted to the objectives of the 
organisation, and not ‘syphoned off’ into the pockets of those running them. We noted 
that non-profits must be operated effectively, and with competence, so that they 
actually deliver on their objectives. Agency costs are a threat to all of that. Giving the 
board the role of controlling such costs, by controlling the non-profit’s agents, is 
consistent with these different theories’ accounts of the role of non-profits.   
 
3.2.1.1 How great is the agency problem in non-profits?  
Since the task of this chapter is only to identify the appropriate role of the board, we 
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don’t need to discuss in any depth, at this stage, how a board should be designed to 
fulfil this agency-cost reducing role; this comes later, in Chapter 4. We might however 
note, in passing, that boards may struggle to fulfil this role if they are radically less 
informed than the agents (employees and managers) they are supposed to control. Once 
again, the ubiquitous problem of information asymmetry raises its head.197  
 
What is more relevant to address immediately, however, is this: just how intense is the 
agency problem in, specifically, non-profits? I shall argue that the answer to that is 
actually somewhat complex, and requires a combination of two different factors. One 
of these factors suggests that non-profits are more susceptible to agency costs than are 
for-profits.198 The other factor, which is given to us by stewardship theory, points in the 
opposite direction, suggesting non-profits are less susceptible to agency costs, and that 
the board’s role in controlling such costs can and should, therefore, be a more 
modest/limited one.199 I’ll take the first factor in this section, and the second factor will 
be addressed in the next section, when we turn to stewardship theory.   
 
Why might agency costs be greater in non-profits? Some have argued that non-profit 
agents have a greater number of opportunities and incentives to shirk.200 By contrast, in 
for-profits, there are more ‘external’ barriers (i.e. barriers other than the board itself) to 
prevent agents from shirking.201 Specifically, economists argue that the threat posed by 
the capital market, in matters such as takeover, bankruptcy and capital market 
competition, provide a strict discipline to control the power of the executives of for-
profits.202 As Manne argued, ‘only the takeover scheme provides some assurance of 
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competitive efficiency among corporate managers and thereby affords strong protection 
to the interest of vast numbers of small, non-controlling shareholders’.203 By contrast, 
non-profit agents generally do not need to take on or bear the risks of an enterprise 
being bought or sold in the marketplace.204 This would suggest they have therefore 
increased opportunities to pursue their self-interest.205 Similarly, it is arguable that, 
compared to for-profits, external legal regulations on non-profits are also less 
intense.206 For instance, the legal requirement for information disclosure in non-profits 
(annual financial reports, for example) is not as strict as in for-profits (especially where 
the for-profit’s shares are listed).207  
 
3.2.2 Stewardship theory 
3.2.2.1 Introduction 
As should be clear from above, agency theory takes a rather negative – perhaps 
‘jaundiced’ – view of agent motivation and behaviour. It assumes pervasive self-
interest. Since its disciplinary home is economics, it is no surprise it views agents as 
examples of homo economicus – with all its assumptions of human behaviour.208  
 
But these assumptions are of course criticised by many. Such criticisms are evident in 
stewardship theory, which offers a different perspective to the pessimism of agency 
theory.209 An agent is no longer to be understood as homo economicus, but rather as 
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homo sociologicus.210 Instead of self-interested agents, ready to act opportunistically to 
promote their self-interest, it places a much higher value on goal convergence between 
principals and agents, and defines ‘situations in which managers are not motivated by 
individual goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives 
of their principals’.211  
 
3.2.2.2 Stewardship theory’s approach to the agency problem  
Stewardship theory does not deny that agency costs may arise in agency relationships. 
It does not deny that agents’ and principal’s interests may conflict. But it suggests the 
extent to which the goals of agents and principals conflict arises not because of the 
inherent self-interest of each, but rather depends on a manager’s social ideology and 
personal worldview, which include various social factors such as motivation, 
organisational culture, and organisational commitment.212 It argues that the risks of 
agent opportunism are correspondingly less than predicted by agency theory. And it 
warns that the strategies employed to control agency costs must be sensitive to the 
reality (as stewardship theory sees it) of the agency relationship.213 So, it opposes the 
use of governance mechanisms designed to control agents that could destroy the 
cooperative and harmonious features of agent-principal relationships, and thus ruin the 
organisational culture and working atmosphere aimed for. 214  In place of excessive 
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distrust of, and control over, agents, it emphasizes ‘collective, pro-organisational, and 
contractual behaviours’ between the parties,215 noting how, as Slyke argues, agents are 
motivated by intrinsic rewards, for example trust, stability, tenure and mission 
alignment.216  
 
Fundamentally, the core value in stewardship theory is the initial trust disposition 
between principals and agents. 217  Encouraging trustworthiness can serve towards 
minimizing the side effect of information asymmetry between the board and the 
agent;218  too intrusive a monitoring role by the board can destroy the trustworthy 
relationship between two parties.219  
 
3.2.2.3 Applying stewardship theory in the non-profit context  
Although stewardship theory provides a challenge to the prescriptions of agency theory 
in respect of all organisations, there are good reasons for thinking that its challenge is 
especially relevant to, and successful in respect of, non-profits in particular. The model 
of homo economicus on which agency theory is built fails to explain why agents who 
choose to work for non-profits seem often to sacrifice their personal interests by doing 
so – by foregoing the much higher salary and other compensation benefits they might 
earn in a for-profit).220 The principle of Homo economicus is that no selfish and rational 
actor would do so, without expecting some form of return, or gain.221  
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That stewardship theory is especially compelling within non-profits is also supported 
by my analysis in Chapter 2, and especially my emphasis upon the 
participatory/expressive role that non-profits fulfil. As noted there, to explain fully 
what role non-profits perform, we must understand why individuals create, or 
collaborate to sustain, non-profits. We stressed that they do so because of their desires 
to participate in the life of the organisation, and to express their support for the values 
the organisation represents. All of this is consistent with the sociological view of 
human action which stewardship theory employs.    
 
3.2.3 The relationship between the two theories and implications for the non-profit 
board’s control role?  
Much literature insists that agency theory and stewardship theory hold contradictory 
views/attitudes towards a board’s controlling role. However, I shall argue that these two 
theories are neither completely distinctive nor mutually exclusive. 222  Rather, they 
interact and complement each other. Agency theory in fact shares important similarities 
with stewardship theory, and the distinction between the two can be blurred. 223 
Caers224, Slyke225, Eisenhardt226 and Klein et al.227 argue that stewardship theory can 
potentially be viewed more as a limiting case of the agency framework.228 Thus, ‘[o]n 
an axis of ascending agency conflicts that start from zero at the left-hand side, 
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On this view, there is no obvious reason for us to have to adopt either of these two 
theories to the exclusion of the other, or to have to decide which one is the more 
suitable in order to guide the performance of non-profit boards. Instead, different 
strategies in the light of both these two theories may be taken on a case-by-case basis. 
For instance, supposing the non-profit organisation is well-developed with a good 
reputation, with employees who are taken care of and develop within a well-cultivated 
organisational culture.230 In such a situation, the relationship between principals and 
their agents is likely to be more friendly and trustworthy, which in turn will mean 
monitoring in this specific non-profit context may be stewardship-oriented or led.231  
 
Conversely, sometimes, in some non-profits, there may be more intense problems of 
information asymmetry, less experienced/professional directors, or other factors which 
undermine agents’ goal alignment with their non-profits. In such cases, the harder-
monitoring advocated by agency theory may be more appropriate. 232  In short, I 
conclude that the combined use of agency theory and stewardship theory, and a 
flexible, situation-sensitive, combination of their prescriptions for the role of the board, 
is essential.  
 
3.3 Resource dependence theory  
3.3.1 Resource dependence theory and the board’s service role  
Resource dependence theory (‘RD theory’) has found itself well-entrenched in 
academic discussions over the last few decades. It addresses ‘the ability [of 
corporations] to acquire and maintain resources’.233 In essence, as we shall explain 
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more fully below, it prescribes what might be called a ‘service role’ for the board. This 
role includes representing organisations’ interests in society, linking organisations with 
their external environment, and securing critical resources.234  
 
The theory attempts to advance the board’s service role in two ways. First, the value 
and importance of outside resources to the board is emphasized. Whilst traditional 
corporate governance, enlightened by agency theory, insists that the most fundamental 
mission of the board is to monitor agent behaviours, the survival and development of 
organisations cannot be determined only by the principal-agent relationship. 235 
Resources outside the organisation are important. A single organisation cannot secure 
all of the resources it may require for its survival alone.236 Most organisations rely 
heavily on resources supplied by others; failure to secure those resources leave 
organisations vulnerable to risky externalities in a competitive market.237 To facilitate 
the organisation’s daily operation, improve its long-term prosperity and stability, and 
reduce its social-environmental uncertainty and transaction costs, the board to any 
corporation has to take on the role in promoting resource exchange.238  And, as a 
descriptive matter, Pfeffer,239 and Pfeffer & Salancik,240 developed a set of propositions 
predicting that, where the organisation was dependent on the environment for resources 
it needed to survive, boards would indeed tend to focus on external roles.241  
 
Second, RD theory also addresses why the board is the most appropriate organ in an 
organisation to play this crucial service role.242 As Pfeffer and Salancik argued, ‘[w]hen 
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an organisation appoints an individual to a board, it expects the individual will come to 
support the organisation, will concern himself with its problems, and will variably 
present it to others’.243 All of these requirements can be satisfied where the individual 
holds an appointed position on the board.  
 
3.3.2 RD theory in the non-profit board 
There is good reason to think that RD theory has particular relevance to non-profits, 
and therefore to think that the inclusion of the ‘service role’ may be especially 
important in non-profits. 244  The reason concerns non-profit financing, which has 
always presented challenges.245 As noted in Chapter 2, the essence of non-profits is the 
non-distribution constraint to which they must be subject. But this means that non-
profits cannot fund their activities through issuing share capital, since providers of such 
capital would typically expect to receive the residual profits of the organisation.246 
Consequently, a great many non-profits – and especially those defined as donative 
ones, in Chapter 2, depend heavily on external financing from supporters – 
philanthropic donors, volunteers, government, and so on – to maintain their daily-
operations. This dependence often leads to the organisations’ operational instability. 
Indeed, it is arguable that the non-profit financial situation in the UK has worsened 
over recent years, since national governments, who are among the primary funders of 
such bodies, have gradually withdrawn their support.247 RD theory therefore acts as a 
platform offering a variety of approaches to facilitate the board’s boundary spanning 
role.248  
 
On the other hand, it must also be noted that there are risks in non-profit boards 
embracing too fully the service role. Two such risks deserve emphasis. First, there is 
the risk that non-profits may sometimes sacrifice their organisational objectives and 
principals in exchange for resources. 249  Attracting resources may be allowed to 
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override pursuit of the organisation’s true mission. 250  Non-profits’ boards may be 
tempted to target activities in which funding is easily accessed, for example, 
irrespective of its organisational and core value.251 Indeed, substantial evidence exists 
suggesting that non-profits may change their goals and their services to take advantage 
of available funding opportunities. 252  In choosing between mission, and resource-
accumulation, non-profit boards’ decisions may become short-sighted and money-
oriented.  
 
Second, the diversity of those who provide resources to non-profits, together with the 
often obscure objectives of non-profits, can make RD theory difficult to operationalise 
in the non-profit sector. Anheier notes that the complexity of managing (or governing) a 
non-profit is partly due to the diversity of those on whom the organisation depends for 
its resources.253 Therefore, the board’s boundary-spanning role will entail coordinating 
with a broad array of constituents, in order to achieve consensus.254  
3.4 Stakeholder theory  
3.4.1 Stakeholder theory and the board’s role 
Stakeholder theory focuses on the relationship between organisations and their so-
called ‘stakeholders’ (defined below). It has spawned a huge literature, spanning many 
areas of organisational governance, business ethics, strategic decision-making, and so 
on.255 It was developed initially with a particular focus on for-profits, where it strongly 
opposed the assumption of shareholder dominated governance mechanisms, instead 
demanding a broader view of corporate responsibility.256  In doing so, it addressed 
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‘morals and values in managing an organisation in the traditional view of the firm’,257 
often with the explicit goal of seeking ‘… to achieve a more equitable distribution of 
the benefits of corporate activity for non-shareholders relative to shareholders’.258 
 
We shall begin by noting the discussion around the very definition of ‘stakeholders’, 
before then turning to the heart of the debate around stakeholding itself. Here, we shall 
compare and contrast two competing conceptualisations of stakeholding: the 
instrumental, and the normative. Finally, we shall apply this thinking to non-profits.   
 
3.4.2 A definition (and a typology) of stakeholders   
Who counts as a ‘stakeholder’ of an organisation? This definitional question has long 
proved troublesome. 259  The most commonly quoted definition was given by 
Freeman.260 It is broad and inclusive, and considers stakeholders as ‘any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s 
objectives’.261 Theorists have then offered different accounts or typologies of those 
groups which may be considered to ‘affect’,262 or to be affected by’, the achievement of 
the organisation’s objectives.263 To be sure, neither of these groups are ‘self-defining’. 
Controversies exist over who should be included,264 and this often results in a lack of 
consistency and clarity. Other theorists have held that this lack of consistency and 
clarity in the scope of stakeholders may eventually prevent the application of 
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stakeholder theory in board governance,265 since it fails to specify stakeholder identities 
and thus leaves a great deal of space for a dramatic expansion in the number of 
potential stakeholders.266  
 
Beyond these definitional controversies, we might note a further point of interest in the 
distinction Freeman makes between, on the one hand, those who can affect and, on the 
other hand, those who may be affected by, an organisation. For this distinction suggests 
two rather different reasons why an organisation may be concerned with different 
stakeholder groups. Organisations may be concerned with those who can affect the 
organisation for essentially self-interested reasons; it may want to consider its impact 
on those groups because they, in turn, can impact the organisation, for better or 
worse.267 By contrast, an organisation may be concerned with those groups which the 
organisation itself affects for essentially moral reasons; because the organisation may 
be responsible for the impacts, and especially any negative impacts, it inflicts upon 
them. This distinction is flagged up here because it corresponds to the division between 
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3.4.3 Two approaches to apply stakeholder theory 
3.4.3.1 Instrumental stakeholding  
The instrumental stakeholder approach defines real stakeholders as those ‘whose 
relationship with the firm is economic or those that are able to yield power over 
firms’.269 Taking care of the interests of these stakeholders can bring certain strategic 
and commercial benefits to an organisation.270  Stakeholder theory in applying this 
approach thus attempts ‘to identify the connections between stakeholder management 
and the achievement of traditional corporate objectives’.271 To be sure, the connection 
between stakeholders’ and organisations’ interests is unlikely to be straightforward.272 
Here, ‘[i]nstrumental uses usually stop short of exploring specific links between causes 
(i.e. stakeholder management) and effect (i.e., corporate performance) in detail, but 
such link is certainly implicit’.273 But the implications for the role of the board are 
reasonably clear. The board must ensure good relationships with stakeholders, but only 
with those stakeholders it pays the organisation, instrumentally, to treat well. Another 
way of putting this is that, according to this instrumental approach, the board will treat 
some stakeholders well, but only as a ‘means to some other end’ – the end of achieving 
the organisation’s true goals.274 
 
It might be noted that those organisations who adopt the instrumental application of 
stakeholder theory do not necessarily thereby adopt an immoral or irresponsible 
attitude to their stakeholders. Rather, they may be regarded as being merely ‘morally 
neutral’, putting ethical issues beyond their consideration.275  
 
3.4.3.2 Normative stakeholder approach 
Compared to the instrumental approach, the normative stakeholder approach 
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concentrates on “what the ‘function’ of companies should be and the ‘moral or 
philosophical guidelines’ they should follow with regard to their ‘operation and 
management’”. 276  It holds that, regardless of their instrumental value to the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives, organisations must still protect 
stakeholders’ interests, but for moral (not instrumental) reasons.277 When applying this 
approach to secure stakeholder’s interests, an organisations’ behaviour should, in 
general, reflect moral sentiments with respect to board governance, identifying the 
moral entitlements of each stakeholder, and protecting his/her rights from 
expropriation.278  
 
This, again, has clear implications for the role of the board, a role that now differs from 
that envisaged by instrumental stakeholding. The board’s role is no longer restricted 
merely to identifying those groups that may affect the organisation, and working out 
how well or badly they should be treated in order to maximise the organisation’s 
achievements of its own objectives. Now, the board must engage in moral reasoning. It 
must work out what the morally responsible way is to treat the organisation’s 
stakeholders, and it must ensure they are treated accordingly. Another way of putting 
this is, the board’s role is to treat stakeholders' interests as ‘an end in itself’.279 They 
must protect stakeholders’ interests just because it's the right thing to do, even if this 
means some reduction in their ability to achieve their organisation’s goals.280 Research 
by Freeman employs the term ‘stakeholder synthesis’, in a six-step process that 
examines how the normative stakeholder approach affects a board’s decision-making 
performances.281   
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3.4.3.3 Choosing between these two approaches 
Having set out the two theories of stakeholding, which is more appropriate for non-
profits? This question is clearly a difficult one. There is no clear consensus in the 
literature favouring one or the other. And, before I develop my own answer, I want to 
complicate the issue a little further still. For the choice between instrumental and 
normative stakeholding is, in fact, related to an issue which we put ‘on hold’ earlier, 
when discussing ‘agency theory’, about the identity of the ‘principal’.  
 
In that discussion about agency theory, and in the discussion just above about 
stakeholding, we have continuously referred to ‘the interests of the organisation’, or 
‘the organisation’s objectives’. But what exactly are these? Whose interests count as 
those of the organisation? What are an organisation’s objectives?   
 
Are the interests of the organisation simply the interests of donors? Some writers, such 
as Fama and Jensen, have argued just that; they see donors, who provide capital, as 
equivalent to the shareholders in the for-profit sector. 282  Their interests, therefore, 
become the interests of the organisation. Others, however, such as Puyvelde et al., take 
a broader view of non-profits’ organisational objectives, identifying them with a wider 
range of constituencies.283 On that conception of the non-profit’s interests, the interests 
of some stakeholders may already become part of the very objectives of the 
organisation (leaving the interests of others to count only in either an instrumental, or a 
normative, way).   
 
One way to make at least some progress in resolving these related controversies—about 
the objectives/interests of the organisation, and the choice between normative and 
instrumental stakeholding – is by reference to the theories of the non-profit that were 
developed in Chapter 2. We saw there that part of the role of the non-profit is to provide 
the reassurance to consumers, or to donors, that their interests will not be sacrificed by 
an organisation that exploits their comparative ignorance. On this view, then, the 
interests of consumers (in commercial non-profits), or of donors, in donative non-
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profits, form the core objective of the organisation. However, we also saw that non-
profits cannot be understood solely in terms of their comparative superiority in meeting 
the demands of consumers or donors. That pays no regard to the supply of non-profits. 
Non-profits also function as participatory and expressive communities. This necessarily 
requires the objectives of non-profits to be conceived of more widely – more 
inclusively – than just the interests of consumers or donors. Part of the very objective 
of a non-profit is indeed to provide a means for some stakeholders to participate in the 
organisation and express their core values.    
 
Acknowledging this means that some stakeholders’ interests are already taken into 
account in thinking about the very objectives of the organisation. For others, however, I 
think the existing state of our knowledge simply precludes us from insisting that 
organisations must adopt either an instrumental, or a normative, version of 
stakeholding. There cannot be a one size fits all approach to this. It should, instead, be 
left to boards themselves, armed with more local knowledge about the circumstances of 
their own organisation, to determine which version of stakeholding they favour.284  
 
3.5 Compatibility of different board roles 
3.5.1 Roles of non-profit board under different theories  
Thus far, Chapter 3 has sought to capture the essence of different theories, and how 
each of these prescribes different board roles. To develop this in a more comprehensive 
manner, this section will now recapitulate three fundamental board roles (control, 
service and strategic role), following which their connection with relevant theories will 
be made clear. Thereafter, I shall argue that non-profits boards should not, and do not 
need to, choose between these different roles. Rather, as mentioned in the introduction 
to this chapter, our best understanding is achieved by combining elements of all these 
roles. As noted, I shall call this the ‘integrated model for board governance’. Having 
done that, I shall finish, in sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 by addressing certain criticisms that 
might be made against the practicality of expecting boards to fulfil multiple roles 
simultaneously.   
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3.5.1.1 The control role  
The control role of the board grew out of our analysis of agency theory and stewardship 
theory. It focuses on the need to control agency costs, through appropriate mechanisms 
to monitor the performance of the organisation’s agents, and intervene where necessary. 
It has been fully explained already, and requires no more discussion here. 
 
3.5.1.2 The service role  
The service role refers to the board’s institutional function, which includes representing 
an organisations’ interest in society, linking organisations with their external 
environment, and securing critical resources. 285  Two theories (RD theory and 
stakeholder theory) have prescribed this service role. RD theory formulates this role in 
terms of boards reflecting their organisations’ existing environment and directors 
securing the provision of important resources for their organisations.286 Stakeholder 
theory travels a similar path, but focuses more clearly on the interests of stakeholders, 
either from an instrumental or a moral point of view.287  
 
3.5.1.3 The strategic role 
The board’s ‘strategic role’, which is sometimes labelled visionary leadership, is 
essential to the organisation’s effectiveness. 288  This strategic role focuses on the 
formulation, analysis, and ratification of corporate strategy.289 Although Chapter 3 has 
not, so far, linked this role to any of the four considered theories, each of these theories 
have in fact implied the importance of the strategic role in an organisation’s 
governance. Indeed, it is implicit in almost every aspect of an organisation’s 
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governance. This may be reflected in the process of management control (the board’s 
control role), and the fiduciary responsibility vested in directors, which requires 
attention to be paid to strategic concerns.290 Executive performance cannot be evaluated 
reliably, without an appreciation of strategic issues as a whole. 291  Moreover, the 
boundary spanning role, which itself is linked to visionary leadership, can help broaden 
the board’s strategic vision.292 Directors who have access to information, vital to the 
diagnosis of opportunities and threats, can aid managers by mapping or reviewing 
strategic actions. 293  Instrumental stakeholder theory also posits that, protecting 
stakeholder’s interests depends upon an organisation’s strategic objective both in the 
short-term and long-term perspectives.294  
 
3.5.2 Justifying the integration of different board functions 
How, then, can we justify expecting boards to address, simultaneously, each of the three 
roles summarised above? The first point is that, if each of the four considered theories 
does indeed provide compelling arguments about what boards should be doing, there is 
no obvious reason to reject the prescriptions of any one of them. The fact that agency 
theory tells us something important about the (control) role of the board does not mean 
that, say, resource dependency theory must be telling us nothing useful.   
 
Much of the evidence presented has proven that in highly institutionalized and 
management-based organisations, it is unrealistic to expect the board to perform just a 
single role. Indeed, the work of Hans et.al. has argued that ‘[n]o single theory 
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adequately describes, encompasses, or explains the nature of consequences of 
strategically involved corporate boards’.295The assessment of board effectiveness will 
be more convincing if each of the board roles can be fully considered in a 
comprehensive point of view.296  
 
Taking the board’s controlling role as an example here, traditional corporate 
governance would suggest that the existence of a board is to fulfil its control role, in 
which to monitor the agent’s (or managers’) performance and reduce costs 
accordingly.297 However, within modern corporate governance theory, this ‘control role 
primacy’ stance has been strongly challenged ‘in respect of its scope, organisational 
view, moral implications and units of analysis’.298 It fails to effectively appreciate the 
board’s contribution, in many other aspects, such as co-opting the external environment 
and encouraging stakeholder interaction. Both empirical and theoretical evidence has 
indicated that board performance does not solely rely on an agent-principal paradigm, 
rather, many other elements may be at play and can thereby work as complements.299  
 
This is by no means a rejection of the contribution of agency theory, rather just the fact 
‘each theory paints an incomplete picture of a highly complex phenomenon because it 
focuses on different sets of functions’.300 Therefore, to achieve board effectiveness, it is 
of utmost importance to adopt an intensive overview through the synthesizing of these 
different theories.301 In doing so, the following section will strive to explain how board 
performance is affected by the operation of multi-faceted roles when viewed in the 
frame of organisation governance. This reconceptualization is essential here, since it 
will enrich our understanding of the board’s function, and help the non-profit board 
achieve its overall objective.302 
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3.5.3 Challenges to establishing an integrative model 
Whilst establishing an integrative model seems logically coherent, and demanded by 
the foregoing theoretical analysis, it does face some difficult practical challenges. Are 
these different board roles compatible with each other? Is there any conflict between 
those multiple tasks that directors are being asked to undertake? How could non-profit 
boards deal with the operation of multi-tasking in this context?  
 
Multi-tasking has already become an essential part of modern society. 303  How 
efficiently we are able to deal with multi-tasking depends not only on an individual’s 
capability, but also the approach we choose to take.304 Perrow argued that multi-tasking 
could be managed if ‘it involves things that you do routinely in your life’. 305 
Nevertheless, when the issue to be dealt with involves ‘deeper cognitive thinking’, 
multi-tasking may reduce working efficiency.306 However, theorists do not deny the 
possibility of multi-tasking.307 What we really need is the technique in order to utilize 
it; for example, to avoid mistakes. The following part will explore whether directors in 
non-profit boards can effectively manage multi-tasking in the board context, and Table 
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1, Directors time 
limit 
2, Directors skill 




3.5.3.1 Board challenges with multi-tasking 
There are three principal difficulties here. We shall consider each briefly, then note why 
these difficulties are not, in fact, insurmountable.  
 
3.5.3.1.1 The director’s time limit 
In the non-profit context, there has always been a challenge to directors to deal with 
multiple tasks and manage their already limited time in a productive way. When 
compared to profit-based enterprises, the problem with non-profits has the potential to 
be more acute. Mechanisms facilitating profit-based board governance, such as capital 
investment, takeover markets and compensation packages are absent in non-profit 
organisations.308 Without these incentives, non-profit directors have to take on much 
heavier workload within a certain length of time, usually in return for a less 
competitive package. 309  Studies have repeatedly found that overloading tasks was 
likely to reduce the working efficiency of company staff.310 This is especially the case 
among part-time directors in non-profits as they may already serve on a number of 
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boards or have their own careers alongside their directorship.  
 
3.5.3.1.2 Skills requirements 
To address multiple tasks, non-profit directors need to be equipped with a variety of 
skills given those three board’s roles we addressed.311 Whilst all those skills are crucial, 
it is unreasonable to expect every director to possess every required skill. Recruiting 
directors who possessed all required skills would be challenging, and perhaps only 
possible if accompanied by massively increased salaries. Yet, as a matter of fact, a 
majority of board members in non-profits receive token or little payment. 312  The 
earnings data company Research provided the comparison of payments between 
charities and enterprises from all sectors across the UK.313 In 2015, the data indicate 
that CEOs in charities were paid ‘25 percent less than the total for all sectors’, and 
charities pay their other directors about 17 percent less.314  
 
3.5.3.1.3 Role conflicts  
Multi-tasking may present a number of role conflicts to non-profit directors.315 Role 
conflicts arise where there is a lack of consensus on a role between the role actor and 
others, or when there are incompatibilities among or within roles.316 In the non-profit 
context, incompatibilities among various board roles may arise where directors attempt 
to fulfil all their different roles simultaneously.317 The work of Belcher, for example, 
works out two 'syndromes' to characterize ‘… two sharply contrasting work patterns - 
referred to as low-discretion and high-discretion syndromes’.318 The monitoring role of 
the board belongs to the low-discretion situation, because a director’s task is following 
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the order of a supervising manager’s performance, which is largely more a matter of 
conformity than performance.319 Indeed, it is a feature of low discretion syndrome that 
the close supervision and bureaucratic rules that generate a mutually reinforcing cycle 
often leads to a situation of declining mutual trust.320  
 
However, by contrast, high-discretion syndrome works in the opposite way.321 This 
knowledge-based view of a corporation, which has increasingly gained support over the 
last decade or so, suggests that competitive advantage is to be found in organisations 
where employees have high discretion, and in which business knowledge can evolve.322 
The important point, for my argument and analysis in this section, is that the roles of 
resource collector and stakeholder representative tend to prefer the high-discretion 
context, as directors are required to be creative in solving relevant problems during the 
process of task performance.323 Therefore, the evidence presented above would suggest 
that governance is best ‘concentrated on those who are not encumbered by any other 
functions on the board’. 324  A particular consequence of role conflict means that 
undifferentiated roles fulfilled by several directors can often provide a relatively 
weaker incentive for board members to fully play their roles. As Riley has suggested, 
‘[i]f a director is responsible for a series of roles [at any given point in time], then she 
[might] convince herself that her poor performance in one results from her devoting her 
attention to others’.325 
 
3.5.3.2 Why multi-tasking is nevertheless feasible 
As the evidence outlined above would appear to suggest, there are many factors that 
prohibit non-profit boards from adopting a multi-task approach in the integrative 
framework. Accordingly, this section attempts to identify strategies and mechanisms 
that non-profits could adopt to cope with multi-tasking. (This part is merely a brief 
overview of the relevant approaches, these points of view shall be further revisited in 
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3.5.3.2.1 Division of labour and specialization  
The most obvious solution is to permit a division of labour amongst directors, allowing 
some directors to specialise on certain roles, whilst doing little in respect of others. 
Indeed, a recasting of a director’s responsibilities will enable directors to assume 
liability for their own specific, delegated functions, and thus improve working 
efficiency. Accordingly, the problems caused by multi-tasking, such as role conflicts, 
time management and skill requirement, can be reduced considerably.  
 
Directors’ expertise will also be improved by an appropriate labour division, since they 
may then concentrate on one or two particular tasks, undertaking repetitive activities, 
which they may improve upon as already familiar with them. 326  This particular 
advantage proves to be even more prominent in non-profit organisations, because 
directors are in most cases unpaid ‘amateurs’ in the management of their boards.327 
Moreover, by allocating different tasks to particular directors, non-profits can broaden 
their scope in recruiting adequate directors.328 Finally, specialization may have the 
effect of reducing conflicts that simultaneous arise between the performance of 
different roles, which may concern the potential incompatibility of board roles.329 Once 
board roles are assigned to different directors, there may be a very small chance for a 
single director to be able fulfil various conflicting roles at the same time. As a result, a 
well-balanced board should ideally be built up, taking account of the requirement for 
the different roles of directors.330  
 
3.5.3.2.2 Establishing connections between different board roles  
By reviewing multi-tasking in an overarching perspective, it is not difficult to identify 
that every board’s role, task, and function can be influenced by each other. Rather than 
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seeing multitasking as a burden to the non-profit board, the interaction between 
directors’ tasks and the board’s roles is likely to boost director’s multi-tasking skills and 
thus enhance the working effectiveness of the entire board. Chapter 4 will demonstrate 
relevant strategies and approaches that could boost directors’ multi-tasking skills.  
3.5.3.2.3 Improving personal skills  
At the individual level, a director’s ability can determine how well they could deal with 
multiple tasks. To accomplish a large job in a small amount of time, different people 
will choose different strategies.331 This brings out the topic of time management and 
selection of directors. In time management theory, issues relevant to time consuming 
tasks can be solved by a set of major time management themes and strategies, which 
we will specify in 4.6 (board process). At the organisational level, time management 
has increasingly become an organisational issue embedded in the corporate structure 
and culture. For the best time usage, both managers and directors can help arrange 
directors’ time more systematically. This matter is linked with the board culture that we 
shall address in 4.4.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the role of the board in governing non-profits. Building on 
the foundations established in Chapter 2 about the role of non-profits themselves, it 
examined four essential theories (agency, stewardship, resource dependency and 
stakeholder theory). From those, it identified three fundamental roles (control role, 
service role, and strategic role) that a non-profit board should play. In doing so, it was 
careful to modify and tailored the four chosen theories to the distinctive qualities of 
non-profit organisations, and especially to the distinctive nature of the roles of non-
profits, as elucidated in Chapter 2. Furthermore, the chapter also attempted to 
synthesize these different roles, and the theories which support them, into an 
‘integrated model for board governance’. In so doing, we acknowledged the difficulties 
and challenges such an integrated model presents, but argued also that, through careful 
board design, non-profit boards would be able to cope with these challenges. However, 
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this defence of the integrated model is clearly based on a fairly 'general' or 'undetailed' 
assessment of board design. On a case-by-case basis, there may be tensions between 
different board’s elements: the perfect board membership to fulfil the control role may 
fail to collect resources, or to guarantee the interests of stakeholders, etc. There may 
well, in some situations, have to be compromises and trade-offs. Since, as is often said, 
‘the devil is in the detail’, we must now examine much more carefully what a non-
profit board should look like if it is to fulfil the demands of the integrated model. To 



























Chapter 4 | Designing a blueprint for non-profit boards 
4.1 Introduction 
Having identified the roles played by non-profits (Chapter 2), and the roles that should 
accordingly be played by their boards (Chapter 3), we are now, finally, in a position to 
develop the appropriate design of a board that might best fulfil these roles – what I 
referred to above as the ‘blueprint’ for non-profit boards. Zahra and Pearce identified 
four board attributes that are most relevant to determining a board’s likely success and 
effectiveness when attempting to achieve its prescribed role.332 These were its size, its 
‘characteristics’, its structure, and the processes it follows. Section 4.2 briefly 
introduces each of these four attributes. Thereafter, sections 4.3 to 4.6 examine each 
attribute in much greater detail, in the light of my integrated model for a non-profit 
board.   
 
4.2 The four key board attributes introduced 
4.2.1 Board size 
Board size refers to the number of directors who serve on the board.333 This is fairly 
self-explanatory, and requires little further introductory explanation. However, one 
point might be made here. Whereas for-profits are often fairly constrained in the size of 
their boards (whether for legal or commercial reasons),334 the same tends to be less true 
for non-profits. Thus, there tends to be more flexibility around the size of non-profit 
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4.2.2 Characteristics  
Second among the attributes is what I refer to as the board’s characteristics. These will 
be examined from both an individual, and a collective perspective. By individual 
perspective, we shall mean the characteristics (such as the independence, or the skills) 
of individual directors.336 The collective perspective looks at the nature of the board as 
a whole, as a separate organisational organ in its own right, and having its own 
features, distinct from those of its individual member directors.337 These collective 
characteristics must therefore be ‘enduring’ – they are not merely a summary of the 
characteristics of the current membership, and they do not change just because one 
director happens to leave or a new one joins the board.338 Rather, the board’s own 
characteristics will change only when there is a ‘significant quantum change in board 
composition and directors’ background variables’.339  
 
4.2.3 Structure  
Board structure concerns ‘the dimensions of the board’s organisation’,340 in terms of 
such factors as ‘the number and types of committees, [sorts of] committee membership, 
the flow of information among these committees, board leadership, and patterns of 
committee membership’. 341  Non-profit directors typically come from a wide and 
diverse array of backgrounds, and with limited time the use of a committee structure 
will often be essential to improve board effectiveness.342  
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4.2.4 Process 
The process concerns the manner – the procedures – by which the board operates. 
Zahra and Pearce summarized five elements of board process: ‘the frequency and 
length of meetings, CEO board interface, levels of consensus among directors on issues 
at hand, the formality of board proceedings, and the extent to which the board is 
involved in evaluating itself’.343 On non-profit boards, decision-making processes are 
often less formal than those adopted by for-profits.344 Thus, this part will concentrate 
only on the frequency and formality of board meetings.345  
 
4.3 Board size  
Here we shall examine how board size can affect board performance in terms of each of 
the board roles identified in Chapter 3, namely the control role, service role and 
strategic role. Table 4.1 briefly summarizes the discussion we shall make about the pros 
and cons of the large/small board in non-profits. The overall argument goes as follows. 
Given that the boards of non-profits must play a larger number of roles than do for-
profit boards, there are a number of advantages in non-profit boards, generally, being 
somewhat larger. However, the arguments do not go entirely in one direction: there are 
some counter-veiling concerns about the efficiency of larger boards, and some practical 
problems for non-profits, in particular, in being able to recruit sufficient, high-quality, 
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Table 4.1 A summary of the arguments concerning the relationships between 
board role and board size 
Board role Large board  Small board 
Control role  
(monitoring directors and 
reduce agency costs) 
Challenge manager’s 
dominant position 






Service role  
(Resource collection and 
satisfy stakeholders’ needs) 





Stakeholders can have 
intensive involvement  
Strategic role 
(long-term views and 
strategies) 
 




Less distracted by 
overwhelming views 
Practical problem Non-profits have no ambition to expand 
Small non-profits are difficult to recruit directors 
 
4.3.1 Board size: legal and empirical perspectives 
Many studies have considered the relationship between board size and organisational 
performance in for-profit enterprises. In one such study, Yermack found that ‘smaller 
boards were more adept at monitoring the firm’, whereas those with a large board size 
[have] a negative effect on the company’s market value.346 However, this connection 
seems to be more complex in the non-profit sector. Current studies fail to reach an 
agreement on the ideal size of a non-profit board.347 The arguments around the idea 
board size in a non-profit seem less consistent, and more dependent on local variables 
concerning individual non-profits. It is worth noting, for example, that the UK Charity 
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Commission does not provide any particular requirement or suggestions on the number 
of directors in non-profits.348  
 
4.3.2 Board size and board performances  
The following part will explore some of the advantages and disadvantages that have 
been associated with either large, or small, boards.  
4.3.2.1 Control role 
In this section, the relationship between board size and its control role will be evaluated 
by reference to the power balance between managers and board of directors. As Zahara 
and Pearce have stated, ‘[t]he number of directors frequently serves as an indicator of 
CEO domination of the board’. 349  That is to say, a large board can challenge its 
managers’ dominant position, while the larger the board is the more easily the 
managers’ misconduct can be identified and controlled.350 However, it does seem to be 
the case that having a larger board may be especially advantageous in a non-profit 
context, given the larger number of roles that non-profit boards are, according to my 
account, to be expected to play.351 A smaller non-profit board might likely find that too 
much of its time would be taken up with other, non-control, roles, and would 
accordingly have too little time to oversee managers.352 Moreover, by increasing their 
board size, non-profit boards can also increase their specialization, through a further 
division of labour across different jobs, 353  again facilitating better monitoring of 
managers and thus a better power balance.354  
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Furthermore, as Cornforth notes, within small boards, managers, armed with an 
abundance of ‘knowledge, enthusiasm [and] time’ may outnumber, and will be more 
likely to ‘intimidate’, the few remaining directors.355 Relatedly, he argues, a small 
board could be too ‘heavily dependent on the work and commitment of a small number 
of key individuals’.356 In this situation, the loss of one or two key individuals may have 
far-reaching consequences for the stability of the board.357 
 
4.3.2.2 Service role  
Turning now to the service role, again we can see how a larger board can bring about 
more opportunities to establish and secure external resources, and thus facilitate the 
board’s external, ‘boundary spanning’, activities.358  Research by Callen, Klein and 
Tinkelman suggested that fund-raising was positively associated with an increase in 
board size.359 Bai also supported this view, suggesting that a larger board can build 
more outside contacts, and thus operate more effectively at obtaining resources.360 By 
contrast, smaller boards fail to span boundaries so well. Non-profits with smaller 
boards are often financially vulnerable, becoming over-dependent on a single and 
unstable financial source (usually the local government).361 This is hardly surprising: 
given that establishing and maintaining external resources is particularly time-
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Similarly, the board’s ability to provide a forum for stakeholder participation within 
non-profits also seems to be better served if the board is somewhat larger than might be 
the case in a for-profit. The expansion of non-profit boards could provide more space 
for stakeholders to participate in the governance of non-profits, with all the benefits 
which we noted above where stakeholder participation is facilitated.363  Of course, 
merely increasing the number of stakeholder-representative directors does not 
guarantee their full participation in the organisation. Stakeholder-including boards will 
likely need more adept leadership to ensure the increased participation of each 
stakeholder, and this will be even more true the larger the board becomes.364 Some of 
these challenges are addressed further below.  
!
4.3.2.3 Strategic role  
Finally, large boards may also be more capable of performing the strategic role.365 
Golden and Zajac found that introducing more directors with different backgrounds and 
experiences is influential in shaping the orientation of a board toward strategic 
changes.366 If a non-profit board is only constituted of one type of director (such as 
legal or financial professionals, for example), there is a likelihood it will become a 
‘homogenous group of experts who are cut from the same cloth’.367 To be sure, merely 
having a larger board does not guarantee greater ‘director heterogeneity’.368 Even a 
large board could be entirely composed only of very similar individuals. But a larger 
board seems to open up possibilities for diversification of directorial identities. For one 
thing, what has come to be called ‘absorptive capacity theory’ suggests that introducing 
stakeholder representatives may encourage boards to diversify the information sources 
and perspectives shared at board level, as to make for a more creative or innovative 
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discussion.369 And, as we have seen, facilitating stakeholder representatives is easier 
with larger boards.    
 
4.3.2.4 Some concerns about larger boards 
So far, have suggested that larger boards may be better at performing both each 
individual role which non-profit boards must address, and the totality of those different 
roles. However, it must be conceded that there are some counterveiling arguments. 
First, even if a larger board is, overall, better able to perform the board’s role, perhaps it 
does so much less efficiently than would a smaller-board. Its outputs might be greater, 
but at an even higher cost. Smaller boards are themselves cheaper to run. In this way, 
smaller boards may be better at constraining management costs. 370  Why would a 
smaller board tend to operate more efficiently? The thinking here is that ‘[t]he smaller 
the group, the better abled everyone is to really delve into issues and the less likely that 
anyone will be able to shirk his/her responsibility’.371 A larger board is more likely to 
fall prey to the problem of ‘social loafing’ – that that ‘people exerting less effort to 
achieve a goal when they work in a group than when they work alone(e.g., pulling a 
rope), resulting in lower motivation levels’. 372  Furthermore, the Ringelmann effect 
demonstrates that the more people are involved in a task, the less efficient they often 
become.373 
 
There are also some arguments that suggest a large board may have a ‘limited 
effectiveness in directing strategic change during periods of environmental 
turbulence’.374 It may be time-consuming for a large board to reach a consensus, for 
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example, as more people will mean drawing upon a range of perspectives and 
diversified opinions, particularly with controversial/radical plans.375  
 
 Finally, there also exist some practical barriers which constrain the size and operation 
of a large non-profit board. 376 In practice, simply recruiting as many directors as the 
non-profit may need – of the right sort, expertise and involvement – may constitute a 
challenge in itself.377 Recruitment problems may be especially intense for smaller non-
profits. Empirical evidence suggests that most applicants to boards prefer to choose 
relatively larger non-profits, as large non-profits are more likely to have good 
reputations, a desirable work environment, and systematic governance.378 Larger non-
profits usually offer more specific job descriptions and better induction and training for 
new board members’. 379  
 
4.4 Board characteristics  
4.4.1 Introduction 
Board characteristics – as defined above – may positively or negatively affect a 
board’s performance in a variety of ways. 380  This section examines board 
characteristics in two parts: collective (in 4.4.2) and individual (in 4.4.3). Collective 
characteristics concern ‘the personality of the entire board’.381 Thus, it encompasses 
the distinctive way that it operates, or what is sometimes referred to as the board’s 
‘culture’.382 Hence, in addressing collective characteristics, the aim is to identify a 
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Individual characteristics focuses on individual directors, and such features as his/her 
age, educational background, values and experiences.384 Naturally, these qualities will 
manifest themselves in the directors’ choices.385 Similarly they may act as a source of 
guidance on how to find the most appropriate directors and improve their skill set. 
Table 4.2 provides a snapshot of the various types of board characteristics, and the 
following section shall therefore investigate these types of characteristics that a non-

















Openness and transparency  






Professional knowledge and skills 
Types of stakeholder representatives 
Resource collection skills 
 
4.4.2 The collective characteristics: board culture 
4.4.2.1 How can it affect board performance? 
To help facilitate our understanding as to how board culture is formed, and how it 
affects a director’s performance, we shall introduce the concept of ‘herd mentality’ 
here. Herd mentality is, in short, a term used to describe ‘how people are influenced by 
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their peers to adopt certain behaviours, follow trends and purchase items’, among other 
things.386  This understanding supposes that most people’s behaviour abides by one 
particular rule, and so following the group’s behaviour is likely to appear a sensible 
strategy in the relevant context.387  Adopting this logic then, herd mentality theory 
insists that the more an individual stays in the same context, then the more likely they 
are to be influenced and follow similar trends.388 Consequently, it follows that board 
members are usually more likely to share the same belief or organisational culture.389  
 
Research carried out by Schein defines organisational culture as ‘a pattern of shared 
basic assumption that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid 
and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and 
feel in relation to those problems.’390 Schein further argues that although the concept of 
‘culture’ appears to be abstract in this context, it has strong power to shape individual 
and group behaviour and therefore influence the effectiveness of the organisation as a 
whole.391  
 
Board culture can also affect board performance in other ways, such as securing its 
stability. Lynch observes that ‘…board personality is believed to be more enduring than 
the characteristics of individual directors’ because it can shape different aspects of the 
board’.392 Within the boardroom setting, directors’ performance follows the course of 
environmental changes/turbulence.393 By contrast, a well-established culture tends to be 
long-lasting and cannot easily be changed.394 However, once a board has properly set 
the ‘tone’ for its operation and conduct, its effectiveness it is likely to be enhanced 
accordingly.395  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
386 It heavily affects organisations’ governance in this approach: when things are uncertain/unpredictable, 
normally individuals’ first and best decision is to follow along; see J Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds 
(Anchor 2005) 44-46 
387 Bolton, Brunnermeier and Veldkamp, (n382) 
388 See Surowiecki, (n386) 43 
389 Bolton, Brunnermeier and Veldkamp, (n382) 
390 E H Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (John Wiley & Sons 2006) 117 
391 ibid 119 
392 Lynch, (n381)  
393 K Desson and J Clouthier, 'Organizational Culture–Why Does It Matter' (Symposium on International 
Safeguards Vienna, November 2010) 3 
394 ibid  
395 ibid  
! 79!
 
4.4.2.2 Factors influencing collective characteristics 
Cultivating and maintaining board culture could prove to be more pressing than 
expected.396 NICVA listed a range of problems that non-profits could commonly meet 
in the process of governance.397 There are ‘mistrust between partners due to poor or 
weak relationships; lack of transparency—failing to share important information with 
each other; lack of strong agreements which clearly set out roles, responsibilities; and 
selecting the wrong partners in the first instance, and not recognizing it until it is too 
late’. 398  All of these governance pitfalls could be closely linked with a poor 
collaborative culture.  
 
First, non-profit boards should, by virtue of their sector, encourage an open and 
genuine working environment by improving transparency. 399  Second, as our prior 
discussion of stewardship theory has emphasized (see section 3.3) a director’s 
motivation and commitment towards their duties or board tasks is likely to significantly 
affect board culture and vice versa.400 Finally, a collaborative working environment is 
vital to the success of a non-profit board, as the vast majority of board members are 
geographically dispersed, part-time and unprofessional, insofar as this is not their job or 
specialism.401  
 
4.4.3 Individual characteristics  
We now turn to consider some of the most essential elements that may relate to the 
individual characteristics that may affect board governance in non-profits. At the same 
time, this part shall explore approaches that can be adopted by non-profit boards to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
396 L Guiso, P Sapienza and L Zingales, 'The Value of Corporate Culture' (2015) 117 Journal of Financial 
Economics 60 
397 NICVA, Advice to Boards on Collaboration (NICVA, 2014) 
<http://www.nicva.org/sites/default/files/d7content/attachments-resources/advice_to_boards9.pdf> 
accessed 12 March 2016 
398 ibid  
399 L T Christensen and others, 'Organizational Transparency as Myth and Metaphor' (2015) 18 European 
journal of social theory 132 
400  M Van Herpen, M Van Praag and K Cools, 'The Effects of Performance Measurement and 
Compensation on Motivation: An Empirical Study' (2005) 153 De Economist 303 
401 Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, (n396) 
! 80!
improve their effectiveness. We shall follow the ‘integrative theoretical framework’ 
addressed in Chapter 3, and explore the connection between these individual 
characteristics and those three board roles (control, service and strategic role) that have 









How could individual 
characteristics improve 
board governance 
Concerns in the 
non-profit sector 
Solutions 
Control role Director’s 
independence 
Ability to challenge/monitor 




Independent thinking ability 
is more important than the 







attribute attracts less 
attention from legal 
regulations  
Attract skilled candidates by 







1, Represent stakeholders 
2, Improve resource 
collection 
3, Adding strategic point of 
view 
Too many 
stakeholders to sit in 
the boardroom 
Stakeholders should be 




1, Fund raising 




4.4.3.1 The control role requirement  
A number of individual characteristics seem relevant to the directors’ ability to perform 
their control role. We shall focus here on their independence and their professional 
knowledge and skills.   
 
4.4.3.1.1 Director independence  
Increasing sensitivity towards a manager’s misbehaviour, combined with a strict 
requirement on information disclosure, has indicated the importance of a director’s 
independence.402 Once directors risk losing their independence, then the controlling 
power of the director or the board per se can easily succumb to the dominance of 
professional managers. Directors will often end up as little more than a ‘rubber-stamp’ 
in a company’s administration.403 Independence in this context is commonly defined as 
the capability of ‘exercising objective judgment’, which encompasses both an 
independent relationship and independent thinking ability. 404  In other words, the 
director’s independence requires both the exercise of independent judgment towards 
governing issues, and being absent or unaffected by relationships or connections which 
have the potential to influence his or her judgment.  
 
In understanding the importance of a director’s independence, we cannot consider their 
relational independence alone, and in isolation. Rather, it is vital to begin by examining 
the correlation between the independent relationship and independent thinking 
ability.405 Although these concepts are interrelated, their relationship is not necessarily 
positive. 406  For relational independence can, in fact, have a negative impact on a 
director’s ability to think independently. On the one hand, laws strictly require directors 
to keep an independent relationship with managers of the corporation, in order to 
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achieve a clear monitoring of operations. 407  On the other hand, a completely 
independent relationship is likely to lead to a lack of fluid or more informal 
communication and information exchanges between managers and directors, which will 
weaken a directors’ independent thinking ability and eventually result in ineffective 
monitoring.408 To demonstrate this further, one might note that directors have the power 
to hire and dismiss company managers, primarily through the use of information from 
managers themselves.409 Yet the more arms-length and adversarial directors are, from 
the managers’ point of view, the less readily may managers share information with 
directors. Research by Adams supports this by showing that directors who had a 
stronger monitoring role often perceived that they received less information from the 
manager.410  
 
Thus, rather than concentrating the focus on the independent relationships of directors’, 
this work argues more emphasis ought to be focused on directors’ independent 
thinking. In the face of conflict between an independent relationship and one’s own 
thinking ability, directors should be allowed to sacrifice one relationship in exchange 
for another, as long this improves board effectiveness.411 For example, in order to share 
organisation-specific information, and to create a harmonious working environment, 
directors are encouraged to keep a good connection with managers. As this work has 
argued above, whether managers are willing to trade-off information with the board 
largely depends on an assessment of their relationship with directors: too independent a 
relationship may threaten the manager’s position, and thus discourage collaboration.412 
This suggestion is consistent with an argument advanced in section 3.2; that is over-
regulating the director’s independent relationship, on the thinking of agency theory, 
would seem ‘flawed’, since it fails to ‘capture social relations between directors and the 
CEO that may impair a director’s independent judgment’.413 By contrast, stewardship 
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theory is more capable of facilitating a director’s independence, as this places a much 
higher value on the benefits and achievement of cooperation.414  
 
4.4.3.1.2 Professional knowledge and skill 
Board effectiveness also seems to require that directors possess appropriate knowledge 
and skills.415 According to the work of Forbes and Milliken, the knowledge and skills 
most relevant to the governance of boards can be divided into two parts, as follows:416  
(1) functional area knowledge and skills;  
(2) firm-specific knowledge and skills   
 
Functional area knowledge and skills span traditional domains of business, including 
accounting, finance, marketing and law, for example.417 Clearly, it is impossible for 
directors to hold professional expertise in every field. Nevertheless, being equipped 
with sufficient relevant knowledge, particularly in the area of law and finance, is often 
essential to fulfilling the board’s controlling role effectively. To the non-profit board, 
financial and legal experts have proven to be even more important than its for-profit 
counterpart. As noted in 4.3, because managers often have the time, skills, knowledge 
and resources to take control of the organisation as a whole, if directors, by contrast, 
lack such professional knowledge and skills, they may be unable to challenge the 
authority of their managers.418   
 
Similarly, firm-specific knowledge and skills refer to detailed information directors or 
managers may know about the firm, and with this an intimate understanding of its 
operations and internal management.419 Naturally, boards often require this type of 
‘tacit’ knowledge in order to deal effectively with strategic issues.420 For example, the 
board may require a deep understanding of how new and existing businesses within the 
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corporation would complement one another.421 
 
4.4.3.2 The service role and strategic role requirement  
 This part shall be divided into two sections —RD theory requirement (examining 
director’s skills of boundary-spanning), and selecting stakeholder representatives 
(choosing the most appropriate stakeholder representatives to enhance board 
effectiveness). 
4.4.3.2.1 RD theory requirement 
Both sections 3.3 and 4.2.2 have demonstrated the importance of maintaining internal 
and external relationships. If directors are to serve effectively as the organisation’s 
‘boundary spanners’, they need to possess a range of skills necessary for building 
successful partnerships. 422  In this context, this encompasses not only the personal 
qualities of ‘negotiation, mediation, assimilation, coaching and institutional 
engagement amongst others, but also imagination, empathy, optimism and modesty’.423 
Softer skills as part of this requirement also components of what is known as 
‘emotional intelligence’ (EI), which is becoming increasingly more recognized as a key 
factor in management success stories.424  
!
4.4.3.2.2 Selecting stakeholder representatives 
As section 3.4 will have already outlined, stakeholders are crucial to the non-profit 
board, be this from an instrumental or ethical perspective.425 However, as discussed in 
4.3.2.3, involving too many types of stakeholder entities will inevitably impact upon 
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the effectiveness of decision-making.426 Accordingly, to better establish the blueprint 
with respect to the stakeholders, here we shall narrow the range of stakeholders, and 
define ‘who and what really counts in stakeholder management’ and which type of 
stakeholder representatives should sit on the non-profit board.  
 
Before introducing a selective approach, we shall initially remind ourselves how 
stakeholder participation could add value to the effectiveness of non-profit board 
governance. From the instrumental stakeholder’s point of view, there are two essential 
contributions. First, an ostensible benefit arising from stakeholder participation and 
representation is that resource collection may be reinforced. Many stakeholders within 
the boardroom are either potential donors, or have sufficient external networks which 
may be able to bring about necessary resources for business or corporate 
development. 427  Second, as we have addressed in 4.3.2.3, introducing stakeholder 
representatives is likely to provide diversified opinions and creativity to the board, and 
thus add value to its long-term strategic leadership.428  
 
Given the discussion above, this work shall discuss an attempt to provide a selective 
approach, based on Stakeholder Identification and Salience Theory (herein Stakeholder 
Salience).429 The notion of Salience in this theory may be defined as ‘the degree to 
which managers may give priority to competing stakeholder claims’.430 Three variables 
were chosen by my research to be the criterion to prioritize stakeholder groups. The 
more the stakeholder is perceived to have, the higher their salience is, and the better 
priority/opportunity they can get to sit in the boardroom. The three variables in this 
context are: 
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1.! Power431 (through which one may influence the firm); 
2.! Legitimacy432 (of the stakeholders’ relationships with the firm), and; 
3.! Urgency433 (of the stakeholders claim to the firm).  
Correspondingly, according to the three variables above, Table 4.4 lists particular 
groups of stakeholders satisfy this requirement and take priority in the boardroom: 
 
Table 4.4 stakeholder variables and selection 




have the power to 
benefit, add interest to 
the board’s performance 
Legitimacy Communities437 
Employees438 
have the legitimacy to 
form part of the board, 
to ensure the decision-
making process 
considers their own 
interests 
Urgency Other groups in case of 
Emergency  
in any special/urgent 
situation, this group can 
respond to the need 
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4.5 Board structure 
Turning now to the question of the board’s structure, the main issue we shall address 
here is whether non-profit boards should adopt a ‘committee structure’ to enable 
directors better to fulfil their role. Again, table 4.5 provides a snapshot of the arguments 
that we shall advance.  
Table 4.5 Board committees in non-profits 
Committee 
types  
Pros of committees in NPOs Concerns in NPOs  
1, Executive  
2, Audit  
3, Fund-raising  
4, Membership  
5, Ad-hoc  
1, Better multi-tasking through 
specialization 
2, Avoid free-riding 
3, Improve meeting efficiency  
4, Relieve tension between 
conformance and performance role  
1, Committee’s task 
lack of certainty 
 
2, Power balance and 
conflicting authorities 
 
4.5.1 Value for the existence of sub-committees in the non-profit board 
The advantage of the committee structure flows directly from the analysis of the role 
each director plays (and, especially those performing multiple-roles), which I have 
already argued not-for-profit boards should play.439 By using sub-committees, different 
board members should enjoy more specific, narrowly defined and focused tasks.440 To 
build on this, this section will identify a number of ways in which the committee 
structure approach may offer a number of advantages and improve upon board 
effectiveness.  
 
Firstly, the advantage of a committee structure is that it enables the board to deliver 
upon a multiplicity of roles, some of which are core, legally defined roles, others of 
which I have suggested should supplement this but nevertheless need to be fulfilled by 
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the board.441 Committees may efficiently match the most appropriate board resources to 
the essential priorities of the organisation.442 Indeed, committees provide opportunities 
to involve more people in the board’s management, and may incorporate volunteers to 
use their specialized skills or interests to contribute to areas of importance or 
development.443 Secondly, by delegating functions to subcommittees of the board, the 
free-rider problem discussed in previous chapters is less likely to occur and thus 
reduce.444 Through the use of sub-committees, individual accountability is also more 
likely, since individual decisions are more likely to be identifiable by the public, which 
therefore makes it more difficult for directors to disguise incompetence or act behind 
colleagues.445  
 
Thirdly, various meeting procedures can be improved through the use of committees. 
First, full board meetings can be held less frequently if committees are productive 
between board meetings and in dealing with issues of importance. 446  Second, an 
appropriate committee structure can help the board manage the flow of information, so 
directors are not over-burdened with unnecessary material that can hinder rather than 
facilitate good decision-making.447 Naturally, this relates to the issue of specialization 
and time-management, discussed in Chapter 3. Given the context, the confidentiality of 
information can also be improved.448 Directors may feel more comfortable and free to 
discuss sensitive issues (e.g. salary requirements) which they may otherwise be 
reluctant to propose were it aired at a full board meeting.449 However, the issue relating 
to confidentiality may be more acute in non-profit organisations than in profit-based 
companies.450 A profit-based board typically has more homogenous membership. A 
non-profit organisation, by contrast, may contain a more diverse membership, for 
reasons we have already explored.451  
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Lastly, committees allow the board to relieve the tension between conformance and 
performance roles which are common issues for the non-profit board.452 This work has 
argued that the board should not be tempted to interfere excessively in the management 
of the organisation, but should instead restrict itself to those roles which are its proper 
remit – controlling agency costs, representing stakeholders and building relationships 
with resource providers. Indeed, even where the board successfully avoids the 
temptation of ‘micro-managing’ the organisation, there remains the question as to 
whether it should dwell on ensuring conformance by management, or focus instead on 
the performance of the organisation. Research by Cornforth and others explains the 
distinction in the following terms: the board may sometimes over emphasize a 
conformance role, first, simply because as implied by agency theory would prescribe, 
directors distrust company staff and executives, and would rather closely monitor them, 
the company and every aspect of executive management.453 Second, non-profit boards 
in the UK are externally accountability to the Government, which also tends to 
emphasize the conformance role over a performance one.454  
 
Notwithstanding, there exists a growing tension between conformance and performance 
roles – with the conformance role often threatening to swamp boards’ focus on its 
strategic role.455 If the Government wants boards of non-profits to play a greater role in 
strategy, then it may need to ensure that it does not over-burden boards with other 
requirements.456 As the discussion has noted above, a single board cannot accomplish 
everything alone, and an increased focus on conformance would likely mean a reduced 
focus on performance issues. To mitigate the tendency of non-profit boards to focus on 
conformance matters at the expense of performance, greater use of the committee 
structure may offer one solution. Use of the committee structure will enable the board 
to reduce conformance to the committee, and eventually, the board will take back 
control of its performance role. For instance, the risk assessment committee is 
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responsible for accurate calculation and evaluation and should be cautious of every 
single risk, whilst the whole board should also remain open to change and risk rather 
than being tempted to maintain the status quo.457  
 
4.5.2 Committee types  
We now turn to consider the types of committee that may prove appropriate for a non-
profit. Naturally, the choice of committees should be driven by those roles set down by 
the board, that is: what tasks need to be assigned to committees and what committees 
are therefore required to fulfil those tasks.458 Typically there exist set guidelines for 
non-profits, describing which committees are appropriate and ought to be adopted. By 
contrast, for profit-based companies, there is a long history and well-accepted list of 
committee types to perform board related tasks.459 In terms of non-profit boards, the 
relevant code shall be referred to and discussed in Chapter 5. The chapter shall now 
consider each committee in turn.  
 
Executive committee: dependent upon the size of the board, it may be advantageous for 
the board to form an executive committee, which may be authorized to meet and take 
action between board meetings when it is impractical to get the full board together for a 
special board meeting. The executive committee is usually charged with oversight of 
the organisation’s manager. Moreover, it can also serve as an advisor to the manager 
and liaise between the manager and the full board.460 
Audit committee: an audit committee’s key function is liaison between the company 
accountant, auditor and its financial manager.461 The mandate of the audit committee 
may be largely limited to matters pertaining quarterly reporting, annual financial 
reviews/reports, or closer supervision of accounting practices.462  Similarly, the risk 
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assessment and evaluation role of the board usually is the reserve of the audit 
committee.463  
Fundraising committee: it is the job of the fundraising committee to create a plan that 
will guide the organisation in seeking out and securing funding from an array of outside 
sources. The committee must identify and communicate with potential donors to 
support the work of the organisation.464 
 
Membership committee: the membership committee is often tasked with the developing 
criteria for membership, assessing prospective members for admission, overseeing 
election, as well as developing and delivering programs for the members.465 
 
Ad hoc committees and task forces: ad hoc committees are formed when they are in 
need and often disbanded when their work is complete. One such example may be the 
development of bylaws, strategic planning or new program development.466  
 
4.5.3 Potential difficulties and solutions 
As 4.5.1 has already demonstrated, a variety of benefits may be derived from the 
introduction and use of committees on non-profit boards. Although, overall, the 
advantages of committees in non-profits outweigh their deficiencies, in this sub-section 
we explore some of the potential difficulties when non-profits use the committee 
mechanism on their boards, and also offer some suggested solutions.467   
 
4.5.3.1 Committee tasks’ lack of certainty  
One of the primary difficulties arising from a board committee may be that the role or 
‘remit’ of each committee may be imprecise, causing a number of problems. First, 
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committees can sometimes facilitate the very issue of ‘shirking’ that the committee 
structure itself was designed to overcome. The reality in the non-profit sector at present 
is that board members usually sit on more than one committee.468 However, this can 
often mean directors are able to hide behind different tasks being undertaken in each 
committee, and thus claim that they are unable to fulfil the expectation of one 
committee because they are too busy with commitments to another. This problem may 
not be caused only by the imprecision in defining each committee’s role, but such 
imprecision makes it easier for directors to escape their duties or responsibilities 
through the multiplicity of memberships. 469  Second, the problem of imprecise 
definition within each committee goes beyond enabling committee members to ‘shirk’; 
even conscientious committee members may work less effectively if they fail to 
understand their tasks, owing to imprecision in the specification of their committee’s 
role.470  
 
In order to address the issues discussed above, committee members should ideally 
receive more guidance, addressing specific aspects of their role. First, it is crucial the 
committee clarify each individual director’s role and tasks, as to enable them to 
understand their job and the committee on which they are sitting.471 According to the 
Good Governance Code, an effective board should ensure that all board members 
‘understand their relationship with and responsibilities towards committees’. 472 
Moreover, non-profit boards can divide their committees into board and non-board 
levels. Board level committees may be responsible for governance matters and 
decision-making, while non-board level committees (e.g. advisory panels) merely work 
alongside the board, supplementing their role. This classification requires the board to 
clearly declare directors’ roles, particularly those governing and non-governing roles, 
within different committees.473  
 
Building upon this, in order to help directors better comprehend their tasks, proper 
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training, education and feedback is essential. Board educational programs could be 
taken in a variety of forms and cover a range of topics, and should include updates on 
different occasions when necessary.474 Moreover, self-evaluation can provide directors 
with measures by which to review existing practices and plan future approaches.475 
Second, to address the prospective issue of directors shirking from connected 
committees, the board may also opt to take care of those committees with conflicting 
interests, and avoid engaging the same individuals.476 To this end, the development of 
company policy on each individual member’s independence and diligence may prove 
an additional resource.  
 
4.5.3.2 Power balance and conflicting authorities  
The process of allocating tasks to different committees may result in a power 
imbalance. This imbalance may result in a relatively heavier workload for one 
committee than for others, which can sometimes become the source for governance-
conflicts.477 For instance, a power imbalance primarily exists between the executive 
committee and other committees.478 Typically, the executive committee is responsible 
for a much heavier workload, such as planning board meeting agendas, coordination, 
and nomination, to name just a few. As such, this may lead some directors to refuse to 
serve on the executive committees, owing to commitments and liability exposure, 
which other committee members may not thereby face.479  
 
In order to address the prospect of conflict, committee members should have a clearly 
prescribed understanding of their role and powers. It is recommended that once 
organisations have, or are considering, an executive committee, the board as a whole 
should formally decide how much power the committee has. Typically such a 
committee focuses on effective governance, and is therefore likely to take on the 
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leadership role.480 By contrast to the executive committee, the advisory committee to a 
board has no power to act on behalf of organisations. Members of an advisory 
committee are expected to give professional or technical advice, as may be required.481 
In addition, it should be noted that each committee only has power over their 
committee tasks, and they must use their powers to further the interests of the board as 
a whole.482  
 
4.6 The decision-making process of non-profit boards 
4.6.1 Introduction 
Of course, the board meeting remains the primary vehicle for decision making by 
directors. 483  It provides an opportunity to actively review the organisation’s 
performance and build upon strategy for the future.484  Among a variety of means 
available to directors today, ‘physical’ meetings remain one of the most effective 
means through which people share and exchange information and make 
decisions.485 Accordingly, well-organized meetings will help directors’ better use of 
working time and improve board effectiveness.486  When compared to those in the 
profits-based sector, the need to ensure effective meetings is even more pressing in the 
non-profit sector, and for two main reasons. First, improving the effectiveness of a 
board meeting can help time-constrained directors save time for more important 
issues.487 Second, inefficient meetings waste money and resources.488   
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According to Robert’s Rules of Order, a meeting will be ‘productive, inclusive and 
participatory’ when it follows a set of proper rules.489 In the proceeding section, we 
therefore consider what type of rules non-profit boards should adopt in advance of their 
meeting process. Following discussion in section 4.2, I will narrow my scope to two 
attributes – the frequency and format of the board meeting.  
 
4.6.2 Frequency of the board meeting 
Since the amount of business that has to be considered by a board is often extensive, 
over frequent board meetings can be a drain on board productivity. 490  However, 
research carried out by Conger et al. observed that increasing meeting frequency may 
prove to be a fairly inexpensive way to increase an organisation’s value.491 This has 
been furthered by Vafeas, whose research held that more frequent meetings could boost 
the board’s control role, as it led managers to work in line with the interests of the 
board’s decisions.492 Since the core mechanism for informing and involving directors in 
a non-profit is the board meeting, reducing the frequency of board meetings may also 
prevent directors from seizing the most significant opportunities to becoming informed 
on governance information, exchanges of opinions, and challenges to the manager’s 
authority.493  
 
Nevertheless, some would argue that the result of the board meeting cannot always be 
as desirable as we imagined. 494 For instance, in many cases, managers set the agenda 
for board meetings, and routine tasks absorb much of the meetings. In turn, this limits 
opportunities for many directors to exercise meaningful control over management, and 
board meetings could fail to ‘serve as a proactive measure for improved 
governance’.495  
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4.6.3 Format of board meetings  
Alongside the frequency with which board meetings take place, the degree of their 
formality can also affect the board’s effectiveness.496 The format of a meeting can vary 
largely depend on board characteristics. Generally, they can be divided into two types, 
formal and informal board meetings.497 Formal meetings and votes can help to avoid 
legal challenges. However, it may not be appropriate for small organisations to follow 
this format, and organisations with fewer than a dozen members should consider 
adopting less formal rules to govern meetings.498 Conversely, the informal meeting may 
be used to address daily operational and policy issues. Similarly, modern technology 
provides in person alternatives to the conventional face-to-face meeting, such as virtual 




In summary, this chapter has critically analysed four attributes of the non-profit board 
(size, characteristics, structure and process) in an integrative framework. Each of these 
essential four attributes encompasses ‘several pertinent elements that may contribute to 
non-profit performance’.500 The blueprint I have built up has therefore been established 
through framing all different attributes into an integrative model. Nevertheless, we 
should always bear in mind that trade-offs have to be made when applying these 
attributes to the board and deciding which measures can facilitate its performance. 
Characteristics that help the board fulfil its control role may be associated with a 
weaker ability to raise resources.501 We also found that no single attribute offers a 
complete explanation of the board roles, but rather the elements of each attribute can be 
applied in different circumstances; each board feature has a contribution to make to the 
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governance debate. We could accept the fact that variables do influence board 
performances from different perspectives, either positively or negatively. It appears to 
be impossible for us to design an ideal blueprint suitable for every non-profit board. 
What we are trying to do is take account of every possible influencing factor to review 
every attribute of non-profit boards from a normative perspective, and synthesize them 





























Chapter 5 The regulation of non-profit boards in the UK 
5.1 Introduction 
Having set out the proposed blueprint for the non-profit board, Chapter 6 will consider 
how this might be applied in the context of China. Before doing so, however, this 
Chapter 5 will consider the extent to which the principles that make up our blueprint 
are already reflected in the UK’s legal/regulatory regime governing non-profits.   
 
Since my primary focus in this thesis is non-profit board governance in China, this 
pause to consider the UK’s regulatory framework requires a few words of justification. 
There exist three main, and interconnected, reasons for undertaking an analysis of the 
UK regulatory regime. Firstly, the UK benefits from a fairly well-developed 
legal/regulatory regime governing non-profits.502 Such a regime includes provisions 
that specifically address matters pertaining to non-profit management, including how 
the governance of non-profits should operate through such boards. There is, then, a 
wealth of experience and ‘institutional wisdom’ in the UK’s engagement with non-
profits. 503  For anyone interested in non-profits, that knowledge is intrinsically 
interesting, in its own right.   
 
However, and more to the point of this thesis, given the UK’s longer experience in this 
area, it is also useful to consider how far the UK’s regulatory regime does, specifically, 
conform to, or depart from, the blueprint I have put forward. Insofar as the UK regime 
includes regulations or laws that correspond with the thrust of my blueprint, then this 
supports the credibility of the proposals put forward. Conversely, the opposite is also 
true here: if the UK approach fails to accord with important aspects of my blueprint, 
this would at least give me cause for concern. It might not fatally undermine my 
argument, but it would require me to put forward reasons why the theoretical blueprint 
departs from practices adopted by the UK. Consequently, the approach within this 
chapter shall be to point out and discuss where such ‘departures’ are to be found.     
 
Thirdly, and finally, there is widespread interest, in other countries, in the UK’s 
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legal/regulatory approach towards the management of companies generally and non-
profit companies in particular. China shares that interest.504 Indeed, as China seeks to 
develop its own non-profit sector, including its regulation of the governance of such 
bodies and boards, then the UK is likely to be one country whose experience China will 
draw upon directly.505 Since my own research hopes to influence the Chinese approach 
to regulation and practice, then showing the extent to which my proposals correspond 
to the UK model will likely add to the plausibility of my blueprint and might increase 
the likelihood of it being persuasive in future Chinese reforms.     
 
It will be useful to begin by identifying the most commonly adopted corporate legal 
forms for non-profits in the UK. The UK’s approach has largely been to ensure 
company structures act as ‘appropriately constructed vehicles’, specifically tailored to 
the different, distinctive, needs of different types of non-profit.506 I shall focus on two 
such types of corporate legal form that a non-profit might choose to operate through.  
These are:  
•! Company Limited by Guarantee (CLG) 
•! Charitable Incorporated Organisation (CIO).  
 
Additionally, two other types are available, but will not be considered here. A brief 
explanation as to why is necessary. First, non-profits can also operate through the legal 
form known as the Industrial and Provident Society (‘IPS’). However, although this 
form is often adopted by ‘co-operatives’, it is much less often used by non-profits,507 
and therefore its treatment of boards is less significant for us. The other type of legal 
form I shall not consider here is the ‘Community Interest Company’ (‘CIC’).508 In fact, 
although the CIC was only introduced in 2004, it is a little more widely used than the 
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IPS. However, it is not truly a non-profit form. It is in fact aimed at ‘Social 
Enterprises’. It is not, for example, entirely precluded from distributing some part of its 
profits to its members. And a charity cannot constitute itself as a CIC (although some 
charities, constituted through a different legal form, can create a CIC as a separate 
trading arm if they so wish). Given all this, I shall not address the CIC here either. 
 
The two forms we are considering – the CLG, and the CIO – are both ‘corporate 
entities’. A non-profit could, of course, choose to operate not through these two, or 
indeed any of the other, corporate forms. It could choose to operate as an 
unincorporated association, or alternatively as a ‘trust’. However, there are several 
reasons why very many non-profits, especially those of a medium size, do opt for 
incorporation in one of the above forms. An incorporated entity may enter into 
contracts and hold property in its own name, since the company itself forms an entity 
which is recognized as possessing a ‘special legal personality’.509 Members of the 
company are not parties to the contracts the company makes, and are therefore not 
liable under those contracts. Rather they are only ever liable to contribute the amount 
they have committed to the company. 510  That is the ‘limit’ on their liability. An 
auxiliary benefit of being incorporated is that a corporation can create a ‘floating 
charge’ over its assets.511 As such, this makes borrowing money easier when compared 
to unincorporated organisations.512  
 
To be sure, these advantages do not always mean non-profit organisations are 
recommended to adopt incorporation. Indeed, many non-profits may opt to maintain 
their organisation’s unincorporated status, since incorporation entails meeting a wider 
range of legal obligations which, depending on the organisation’s size, may also entail 
cost, time and resources.513  
 
Before turning to consider the two identified legal forms in turn, a final explanation of 
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the sources of UK regulation relevant to UK non-profit boards, in these two legal 
forms, is appropriate. Each legal form is governed by a particular statute, which 
prescribes many of the legal rules applicable to that legal form. For CLGs, that statute 
is the Companies Act 2006. It is supplemented by a number of ancillary statutes that 
deal with specific aspects of the company’s affairs,514 and with ‘secondary legislation’, 
in the form of ‘statutory instruments’, that deal with more technical aspects of the 
creation and operation of CLGs.515 For CIOs, the relevant statute is the Charities Act 
2011, which again is supplemented by statutory instruments dealing with more 
mundane or technical issues regarding the creation or operation of CLGs.516 
 
The statutory rules that apply to, say, the CLG applies to any organisation which 
chooses to operate as a CLG. They are, in that sense, ‘form specific’: they apply only to 
those organisations that choose to operate through that legal form (the CLG). The same 
point applies to those statutory provisions, mentioned above, which apply to (but only 
to) the CIO.   
 
However, there are also some provisions that we need to note in our discussion that are 
not ‘legal form specific’. We shall note two such types of provision. The first relates to 
‘charities’.  In the UK, the ‘charity’ is not a legal vehicle, in the way that, say, a 
company is. Rather, it describes a certain sub-set of organisations whose activities 
qualify as being ‘charitable’, and who wish to register as charities with the Charity 
Commission. All charities will be non-profits (an organisation could not register as a 
charity if it were not); but not all non-profits will be charities. And an organisation 
whose activities are charitable, and which registers as a charity, may operate under 
either of the two legal forms we are considering here (either as a CLG or as a CIO). 
Nevertheless, any organisation that chooses to register as a charity thereby becomes 
subject to another tier of regulation imposed by the Charity Commission as the ‘price’ 
for the advantages of securing that charitable status.   
 
The other source of regulation that is relevant here is certain ‘soft law’ provisions that 
exist in the UK. In some instances, where the law itself makes no provision dealing 
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with some matter, these ‘gaps’ in the law may be filled by ‘voluntary’ codes of practice, 
encouraging those the code is aimed at to adopt examples of ‘best practice’. We shall 
consider one important example of such a code, applicable to non-profits, known as the 
Good Governance Code 2010.517 With this sense of the different sources of rules in 
mind, we can now turn to consider each of the two legal forms in turn.  
 
5.2 Company limited by guarantee (CLG) 
5.2.1 An overview of the CLG 
The CLG, a legal structure formed under the Companies Act 2006, is a private 
company in which the ‘liability of its members is limited by a nominal amount’.518 The 
limit itself is set out in the constitution of the company, and essentially requires 
members to contribute the specified amount (usually, £1) ‘in the event of the company 
being wound up insolvent’.519 Section 5 (3) of the Companies Act 2006 prevents a 
company being formed as a CLG with a share capital by stating that ‘any provision in 
the constitution of a company limited by guarantee purporting to divide the company’s 
undertaking into shares or interests is to be treated as a provision for share capital’.520  
 
A CLG may be considered a desirable choice for non-profits, as it presents as a suitable 
vehicle for a broad range of purposes.521 Firstly, unlike companies limited by shares, 
the admission and expulsion of members within CLGs is dealt with through provisions 
detailed in the memorandum or articles. No transfer of assets is required when ‘a 
person involved (either as a member of the company or director) decides to, or is made 
to, leave the company’.522 This is important, especially where the company is likely to 
have its membership drawn from a wide pool of individuals. Secondly, the simplicity of 
those procedures employed to change the membership of the company means there are 
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considerable advantages for those corporations adopting a CLG where the members 
may have several other motives, other than mere investment.523  
!
5.2.2 Reviewing the board of CLGs  
5.2.2.1 Board size  
As to the requirement of board size, the Companies Act 2006 stipulates no specific 
requirement as to the number of directors a CLG board should have.524 Section 154 of 
the Act holds that ‘a private company must have at least one director’, but there is no 
upper limit.525 Although, then, the Companies Act 2006 does not require non-profits to 
have the larger boards that we have suggested may often be more appropriate for non-
profits, nor does it prevent them doing so. It leaves it up to each company CLG to 
determine for itself what its optimal board size may be.   
 
5.2.2.2 Board characteristics  
Insofar as board characteristics are concerned, UK law has very little to say about 
board culture. Rather, the law’s focus is on individual characteristics, which are 
explored further below.   
 
5.2.2.2.1 Directors’ independence  
Concerning directors’ independence, two essential points were established in the 
blueprint developed in section 4.4. Firstly, the law should indeed insist upon directorial 
independence. That is to say, even if all directors are subject to a legal duty to act in the 
best interests of the company, this in and of itself does not guarantee directors’ 
independence.526 Secondly, the blueprint (4.4) divided director’s independence into two 
separate aspects – relational independence and independent judgment skills – and then 
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argued that the law should lay greater emphasis on independent judgment skills than on 
relational independence.527  
 
The Companies Act 2006 does address issues of directorial independence, but in a 
sense only indirectly. Thus, it does so through not through any substantive rules which 
require directors either to be relationally independent, or to have independent 
judgement skills. Rather, it imposes duties on directors which, indirectly, require them 
to act as if they were independent.  In particular, s 172 Companies Act 2006 requires 
directors to act in good faith to promote the success of the company, whilst s 173 
Companies Act 2006 holds that a director must exercise independent judgement.528 
Accordingly, a director may not ‘commit himself to defer to someone else’s opinion 
without exercising his judgment, or put the interests of another employer ahead of those 
of his company’.529 Additionally, s 174 (1) Companies Act 2006 regulates the director’s 
independent judgment through stipulating a requirement detailing the director has a 
clear duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence.530 Indeed, directors who are 
found to fail in their exercise of reasonable care, skill and diligence in their 
management of companies and later become insolvent may find themselves subject to 
proceedings under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.531 
 
5.2.2.2.2 Professional knowledge and skills  
We have seen, then, that UK law does not insist on directors actually having those 
characteristics which, it was argued above, are likely to ensure their independence. UK 
law merely requires a certain standard of behaviour which, indirectly, encourages a 
degree of independence in action. A similar picture emerges when we turn to consider 
what the law has to say about directors’ professional knowledge and skills. Again, the 
Companies Act 2006 does not impose any pre-entry requirements in terms of directors’ 
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knowledge or skills.532 Put differently, contrary to my blueprint, directors do not have 
to possess any particular qualification, knowledge and skills as a precondition to their 
being eligible to be appointed as such. Instead, the same general duties which apply to 
the behaviour of directors may, indirectly, encourage directors to obtain those skills in 
order to lessen the chances of their breaching their duties. Or those duties may 
encourage companies themselves to insist on their directors having such skills, either 
by setting standards within their constitution, or by selecting appropriate candidates 
during any given recruitment process. Of the general duties that apply to directors, s174 
Companies Act 2006 (the director’s duty of care, skill and diligence) is most likely to 
have this effect. Also relevant here is the threat of disqualification against those who 
have been directors of companies which have become insolvent, and who have proved 
themselves to be ‘unfit’ to manage a company.533   
 
Set against this background of the law’s reluctance to require particular knowledge or 
skills of company directors, soft law has stepped in and done a little to fill the gap. In 
particular, we might mention here the Good Governance Code 2010, which highlights 
the importance of professional knowledge/skill/experience to the board governance and 
lists relevant knowledge/skills that non-profits require.534 But, to repeat the point made 
already, this Code is indeed merely ‘soft law’. It carries no compulsion on CLGs, or 
their directors, to observe its terms. No sanction exists for non-compliance.   
 
Compared, then, to the standard set out in the blueprint (section 4.4), the UK regulatory 
framework falls somewhat short of what is truly desirable here, with its primary 
reliance on the use of soft law (voluntary regulation). 535  This does too little to 
encourage a company or its directors achieving the professional knowledge and skills 
that may be required, and may therefore lead to directors shirking from their 
responsibilities in three ways. The first involves the self-selection process in which 
prospective directors may perceive themselves as competent to take on the role of 
director, even where they do not possess the professional knowledge/skills required.536 
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The silence of relevant legal regulations, might well give a false impression to 
candidates and boards that professional knowledge/skill is less important than, as the 
blueprint argues, is in fact the case.537  
 
Second, it may in fact enable directors to avoid liability for breaching their duty of care 
and skill (in section 174 Companies Act 2006), the very provision that was intended, 
indirectly to encourage directors to be more skilful or more highly qualified. Section 
174 has both an ‘objective’ and a ‘subjective’ standard built into it.538 In other words, 
all directors must be as competent as a ‘reasonable’ director (the objective test) but 
those who possess a richer array of skills or professional qualifications, that enable 
them to perform to a higher standard, are judged against that (subjective) higher 
standard. But in a sense this dulls the incentive on a director to acquire greater skills or 
qualifications, for that results in her being judged more strictly – against the higher, 
subjective, standard. And it allows those who could acquire those skills, but choose not 
to do so, to be judged only against the lower, reasonable, standard of an ‘average’ 
director.  
 
Third, from a recruiters’ perspective, without reference to, and use of, a consistent 
benchmark, the selection of potential directors could become more dependent upon 
recruiter discretion (that is to say, their personal judgment and preference), which often 
proves to be inaccurate and a poor guide for recruiters to follow.539  
 
5.2.2.2.3 Stakeholder representatives  
5.2.2.2.3.1 Which type of stakeholders should sit in the boardroom? 
It would appear the law has clearly demonstrated a supportive attitude towards the 
involvement of stakeholder representatives on CLG’s boards, which is conforming with 
the blueprint addressed in section 4.4. For example, s 172 of the Companies Act 2006 
enshrines the director’s duty within the decision-making process to consider the 
interests of their stakeholders. 540  However, on the question as to which type of 
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stakeholders should sit in the boardroom, if at all,541 then the law seems to offer an 
answer which slightly departs from the blueprint. The blueprint developed two points 
(see section 4.4) concerning the stakeholder identities of the non-profit board. First, 
there exists a conflict between encouraging greater stakeholder involvement in the 
board’s governance, and securing the working effectiveness of the board itself.542 This 
conflict may be explained with reference to the distinction between the ‘instrumental 
stakeholder’ and ‘normative stakeholder’. Second, the instrumental stakeholder 
proposal would seem to be most desirable in this context, as it prioritises boards’ 
effectiveness.543  
 
5.2.2.2.3.2 Stakeholders and board effectiveness  
Section 172 is clearly consistent with the blueprint’s advocacy of instrumental 
stakeholding.  Although, as noted, section 172 does require directors to have regard to 
the interests of a range of stakeholders, they must do this ‘in good faith’ and in order ‘to 
promote the success of the company’. Thus, section 172 does not require directors to 
treat the interests of stakeholders as ‘ends in themselves’, or to give equal weight to 
each stakeholder’s interests.  Rather, boards must consider those interests 
instrumentally, as a means to better promoting the success of the company itself. 
 
For for-profit companies, the ‘success of the company’ is usually to be understood in 
terms of the interests of its members (shareholders). This is captured in section 172(1) 
itself, which declares the duty to be ‘to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members’.544  However, section 172(2) provides that:  
‘Where … the purposes of the company consist of or include purposes other 
than the benefit of its members, subsection (1) has effect as if the reference 
to promoting the success of the company for the benefit of its members were 
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to improve its efficiency, and thus to generate maximum corporate value. However, the moral 
stakeholder value insists that ‘a wider range of interests can be served as subordinate to the overall aim 
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2009) 70 
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to achieving those purposes’.545 
 
Thus, section 172 does indeed require only an instrumental version of stakeholding. 
Including stakeholders is a means to an end, but in the case of non-profits, that end is 
the purpose of the organisation, not the wealth of its members.   
 
Building upon this, as the blueprint (section 3.4 and 4.4) has already discussed, 
consistently requiring the board to assume responsibility for all stakeholders will 
inevitably have the effect of reducing its working efficiency and effectiveness. 
According to the blueprint outlined at sections 4.4 and 4.5 the potential to improve 
board effectiveness is that the board can follow the approach of Stakeholder Salience 
Theory; as to prioritize and select the most important stakeholder representatives 
sitting in the boardroom.546 Section 172 is consistent with this approach.    
 
5.2.2.2.3.3 Conflicts of interests  
Involvement of stakeholder representatives also brings a separate concern, namely that 
of fulfilling the role of nominee director.547 Nominee directors may find that the wishes 
of their nominating body conflict with their duties to the company.548 UK regulation 
addresses this already. Thus, as we noted above, section 173 requires a director to 
exercise independent judgement. And section 175 Companies Act 2006 requires a 
director to avoid any situation ‘in which he has, or can have, a direct or indirect interest 
that conflicts or may possibly conflict with the interests of the company’. 549  In 
Boulting, Lord Denning warned that: 
‘No one who has duties of a fiduciary nature to discharge can be allowed to enter into 
an engagement by which he binds himself to disregard those duties or to act 
inconsistently with them… take a nominee director… there is nothing wrong in it … so 
long as the director is left free to exercise his best judgment in the interests of the 
company which he serves. But if he is put upon terms that he is bound to act in the 
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affairs of the company in accordance with the directions of his patron, it is beyond 
doubt unlawful’.550 
 
5.2.2.3 Board committee 
As the blueprint argued (section 4.5), the board committee acts as an effective vehicle 
for task allocations and specifications. However, UK law is subject to two difficulties – 
two ways in which it fails to fulfil the requirements of my blueprint. The first is that 
there is no requirement in the Companies Act on companies to employ a committee 
structure in their boards.551 Equally, there does not appear to exist any regulation that 
prescribes a detailed board structure, which requires directors to act in or fulfil a 
number of different roles at board level.552 Once again, the silence within the law itself 
has been filled by soft-law. For a more specific description regarding the use and 
function of board committees has been identified in a number of influential codes of 
practice. 553  For instance, the Good Governance Code declares that ‘in all but the 
smallest organisations, the board will need to delegate parts of its work to others in a 
clear, practical and legal manner. Delegation may be made to sub-committees…’.554  
 
Second, not only does UK law not require companies to adopt a committee structure, it 
also makes it rather difficult for companies which choose to adopt a committee 
structure to then engage in the sort of delegation that such a structure logically requires. 
Admittedly, at first sight it can seem that UK company law does in fact permit and 
facilitate delegation by directors. The case of Re City Equitable Fire Assurance Co 
Ltd555 is usually taken as authority for the rule that directors may delegate tasks to 
others, and are not ‘vicariously liable’ for the mistakes of the person to whom they have 
delegated. Moreover, directors do not seem to have ‘collective responsibility’: each 
director is judged by what he or she did or failed to do – not because they were part of a 
board that collectively made a mistake.    
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Nevertheless, whilst directors who delegate are not ‘vicariously liable’, ‘delegation 
does not absolve any director of a duty to supervise those to whom particular tasks 
have been delegated’. 556  Thus, the division of labour that delegating tasks to a 
committee is supposed to achieve can be undermined by the need to monitor the work 
of that committee. Moreover, it has been pointed out that ‘…neither the wrongful 
trading provision in s214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 nor the statutory duty of care and 
skill in s174 of the Companies Act 2006 expressly require the courts to take into 
account, when determining what a director ought to have done, the functions actually 
allocated to that director’.557 These regulations fail to delegate the functions of the 
board to ‘individual directors in an efficient manner’.558 
 
The uncertainties and deficiencies in the law itself are, on this point, compounded by 
the content of the Good Governance Code. It declares that ‘[a]ll trustees are equally 
responsible in law for the board’s actions and decisions, and have equal status as 
trustees’,559 which implies that ‘a director to whom some activity is delegated has 
neither a greater nor a lesser responsibility than any other member of the board’.560  
 
To sum up here, the inconsistency apparent within these regulations, combined with the 
unspecified requirement pertaining to the labour division appropriate for the board’s 
functioning, would seem likely to encourage or incentivize directors to ‘hide behind 
their colleagues’.561 It would be far preferable if, in accordance with the blueprint 
(section 4.5) the law spelt out the directors’ duties with regard to delegation ‘with 
sufficient clarity and specificity so that those who take on these roles, or wish to 
enforce the duties of such directors, understand what they entail’.562  
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5.2.2.4 Board process 
UK law is generally permissive so far as board process goes. In other words, apart from 
a few general provisions in sections 248-249 Companies Act 2006 pertaining to the 
operation of the board and its meeting processes, the Act says little to mandate 
companies to adopt one board process or another.563 Thus, the law largely leaves space 
for companies to develop their own approaches, say through constitutional provisions. 
This, again, is consistent with the terms of our blueprint.   
 
5.3 Charitable Incorporated Organisations 
5.3.1 An overview of the CIO 
Unlike CLGs, which may be used by both charitable and non-charitable organisations, 
CIOs are specifically designed for charitable use. They constitute a legal form that 
gives the benefits of incorporation, but for organisations that ‘do not want to fall within 
the legal regime applicable to companies registered under the Companies Act 2006’.564  
 
The use of CIO status became available to charities in England and Wales on 4 March 
2013.565 The introduction of this relatively new legal form, designed specifically for 
charitable use, offers a number of benefits. First, the charity using a CIO is able to 
avoid the issue of double-regulation.566 A charity operating as a CLG must comply with 
two bodies of rules: those contained in the Companies Act 2006, and which apply in 
virtue of being a CLG, and those imposed by the Charity Commission and which apply 
in virtue of being a registered charity.  But this clearly causes duplication of regulation 
and associated costs.567 For instance, ‘a charity operating through a CLG must submit 
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accounts both to the Registrar of Companies at Companies House and to the Registrar 
at the Charity Commission’. 568  This duplication could lead to ‘a confusing clash 
between the two bodies of rules’. 569  The CIO avoids this duplication: since it is 
available only for charities, all organisations operating as CIOs will, inevitably, be 
subject to the rules imposed by the Charity Commission: there is no need to have 
similar rules as part of the law of the CIO.   
 
A second advantage for the CIO is that it is a more ‘bespoke’ legal form. A CLG may 
be used by many charities, but it was not designed specifically for charities. Its rules 
must therefore satisfy a wider range of organisational types that choose to use it. The 
CIO is a legal vehicle specifically designed for charitable organisations. Its rules, 
therefore, are tailored solely to the distinctive needs and circumstances of such 
organisations.570  
 
The ability for non-profits to create this new form of corporate entity can now be found 
in the Charities Act 2011.571 Part 11 of the Act sets out the bare structure of legal rules 
governing CIOs, whilst more detailed regulations may be found across a number of 
sources.572 The first of these are the regulations that supplement the Charities Act 2011. 
The most important of these are the Charitable Incorporated Organisations (General) 
Regulations 2012 (hereafter the ‘General CIO Regulations’); the Charitable 
Incorporated Organisations (the Insolvency and Dissolution Regulations) Regulations 
2012 and the Charitable Incorporated Organisations (Consequential Amendments) 
Order 2012.573 The Insolvency Act 1986 and Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 
1986 may also be applied to the CIO as well.574 Each of these provide a considerable 
number of rules governing the regulation and administration of CIOs, and cover at least 
some of the ground covered by the Companies Act 2006 in respect of registered 
companies, such as CLGs.575 
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The second source of rules for CIOs are those to be found in the CIO’s own 
constitution. Much like a registered company, a CIO must also register a 
constitution. 576  The Charities Act does not prescribe what the content of such a 
constitution must provide, so to this extent the constitution is not restricted by having to 
adopt a set of state-imposed, mandatory rules, governing the way in which the CIO 
should operate. Nevertheless, the Charities Act does specify certain areas the 
constitution must, at the very least, address, though the content of this is left to be 
determined.577 The Act provides that the constitution must comply with any regulations 
made either under the Charities Act 2011, or by the Charity Commission. In practice, 
although the content is not prescribed by law, it will tend to closely follow one578 of the 
two model constitutions (hereafter ‘the Model CIO Constitutions’) that have been 
prepared by the Charity Commission for CIOs. Following one of these ensures that the 
Commission is unlikely to object to, or delay, the incorporation of the CIO.579 In what 
follows, then, as we consider whether the law governing CIO’s respects the blueprint 
for the board developed in chapter 4, we will consider rules found not only in the 
Charities Act 2011 and the General CIO Regulations, but also those in the Model CIO 
Constitutions.  
 
Before proceeding, we need to make a point in relation to terminology and charity law. 
Although company law uses the familiar concept of a director when, for example, 
imposing legal duties upon those controlling companies, charity law has never followed 
that approach. It could not target its obligations on ‘directors’ because not all charities 
would operate as companies, and therefore not all charities would have directors. 
Instead, then, charity law applies its rules to the so-called ‘charitable trustee’. They are 
defined in s177 of the Charities Act 2011 as ‘the persons having the general control and 
management of the administration of a charity’, and they are subject to a range of 
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duties and obligations which echo those applied by company law to directors.580  
 
The CIO follows this charity law approach. It uses the label ‘charity trustee’ to refer to 
those running the CIO. Hence, in the following discussion, when describing or 
discussing the rules governing CIOs, many of these will be couched in terms of the 
requirements applying to ‘charity trustees’. But the reader should bear in mind that the 
‘charity trustee’ of a CIO will be the equivalent to a director of a CLG.   
 
5.3.2 Reviewing the board attributes of CIOs  
5.3.2.1 Board size  
In terms of board size, the Charities Act 2011 merely states that a CIO must have ‘one 
or more’ trustees.581 The Charities Act is, then, as non-prescriptive in relation to CIOs 
as was the Companies Act 2006 in relation to CLGs. And once again, the gap in the 
(charity) law is filled in, to some extent, by the Good Governance Code 2010, with its 
suggestion that the board should be ‘big enough to provide the skills and experience 
needed, but not so large that decision-making become unwieldy’.582 However, the CIO 
Model Constitution is more prescriptive. It states that ‘there must be at least three 
charity trustees’,583 and ‘the maximum number of charity trustee is 12’.584 Indeed, the 
Charity Commission itself will not register a charity which applies for admission with 
fewer than two trustees.585  
 
Overall, the legal approach to addressing matters concerning CIO’s board size has 
essentially been similar to the position outlined in the blueprint. Such an approach 
appreciates the potential value of a large board, but recognises there cannot be a ‘one 
size fits all approach’, and that sometimes smaller boards may be acceptable. The law 
then provides enough space and flexibility for CIOs to determine their size, as 
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5.3.2.2 Board characteristics 
Discussion within section 4.4 divided board characteristics into matters pertaining to 
collective board culture and individual director’ characteristics. This section continues 
that distinction. 
 
5.3.2.2.1 Board culture 
Notwithstanding the essential role that board culture plays, the statutory provisions 
concerning CIOs have remained silent on this matter. By contrast, the Good 
Governance Code 2010 addressed board culture in some detail, outlining its importance 
in building-up ‘synergistic team-production relationships’ among trustees. 587  CIO 
boards are encouraged to invest ‘sufficient time in developing positive working 
relationships amongst themselves and between the board and senior staff’.588 Moreover, 
through providing a broad range of approaches,589 the Good Governance Code 2010 
emphasizes the importance for the board to be ‘open and accountable both internally 
and externally’.590 According to such regulations, as discussed above, it can therefore 
be concluded that board culture is more greatly appreciated by CIOs and in keeping 
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587 Charity Commission, ‘Good Governance: A Code for the Voluntary and Community Sector’ (Code 
Steering Group, 2010) 
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5.3.2.2.2 Individual characteristics  
5.3.2.2.2.1 Management versus governance in CIOs 
We have noted already that the Charities Act employs the term ‘charity trustee’, rather 
than director. What role does that Act envisage such trustees playing? Chapter 4 has 
already extensively explored the role of individual directors of non-profits, and thus the 
role of the board. Core to this was the idea that non-profits need some directors who 
will be there to monitor those managing the company, so that the board becomes, in 
part, a monitoring body.  
 
However, charity law gives little acknowledgement to this distinction and separation 
between managing and monitoring the organisation. According to the Guidance of the 
Charity Commission, trustees include not only those who control/govern charities, but 
also those who are responsible for many other tasks such as the management and 
administration. In other words, the charity trustee, in many cases, is effectively the 
same as an executive director.  The law has nothing to say about the need for a 
distinctive governance/monitoring role for charity trustees, separated out from the 
management of the CIO. It may develop the concept of a charity trustee as equivalent 
to the director, but it has no concept equivalent to, specifically, the non-executive 
director.    
 
Although the Charity Commission and the Good Governance Code 2010 591  have 
distinguished between trustee’s governance and management in their guidance,592 they 
do not develop the concept of a board which will monitor managers, because the 
Charities Act 2011 does not even think in terms of such directors or such a board in the 
first place. There are neither rules requiring some directors to act as monitors over 
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others, nor regulations specifying the role of the board as monitoring rather than 
managing, representing stakeholders or being resource collectors, and so on. Thus, the 
CIO regulations fail to specify the role of CIO boards, and also fail to distinguish the 
organisation’s governance from management. 
 
5.3.2.2.2.2 Trustee’s independence 
Given that the CIO regulations do not develop a model of a monitoring board, it is 
unsurprising that those regulations also fail to mention anything about the trustee’s 
independence from management. Instead, the law in question seeks to specify trustee’s 
independence from monetary related matters, and stop trustees (or those connected 
with them) from receiving inappropriate benefits by virtue of their position in, or 
relation to, the CIO. For example, s 188 of the Charities Act 2011 attempts to ensure 
the charity’s money goes to ‘independent’ people by defining ‘connected persons’.593 
Similarly, s178-180 of the Charities Act 2011,594 the Charity Commission guidance 
discussed above,595  and the CIO Model Constitution all outline examples of those 
situations in which trustees are most likely to get involved in payment matters.596 Thus, 
the CIO legal framework does not require trustees to be independent of the 
management they are monitoring. Such rules do not grapple at all with the points made 
in the blueprint in 4.4, which is to ensure that some trustees/directors are sufficiently 
independent to be able to monitor management. 
 
5.3.2.2.2.3 Professional knowledge and expertise  
Turning to the regulations concerning trustees’ knowledge and skill, none of the CIO 
relevant statutory provisions provide a specific standard pertaining to the professional 
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payments to trustees has been provided in the Charities Act 2011; see Charities Act 2011, s188 
594 As described in s 178 to 180 of the Charities Act 2011, a person is disqualified by law from acting as 
trustees if he ‘has entered into a composition or arrangement with their creditors which includes an 
individual voluntary arrangement (IVA)’. Charities Act 2011, s 178 to 180 
595 The essential trustee: what you need to know, what you need to do (Charity Commission 2016, ref 
CC3) 8 
596 No charity trustee or connected person may: ‘ 
(a)! buy or receive any goods or services from the CIO on terms preferential to those applicable to 
members of the public; 
(b)! sell goods, services, or any interest in land to the CIO; 
(c)! be employed by, or receive any remuneration from, the CIO; 
(d)! receive any other financial benefit from the CIO’. A CIO Model Constitution, art 6 (1) 
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knowledge, expertise and qualifications a trustees should have to hold office.597  
Once again, addressing the knowledge and expertise of trustees is left to soft law. The 
Good Governance Code provides that ‘when charities recruit new trustees, they should 
think about the skills and experience the current trustees have, and whether there are 
any gaps’.598 The Charity Commission proffers a number of recommendations, which 
include ‘building on the skills of your existing trustees, training your existing trustees, 
working or sharing expertise with other charities, and recruiting new trustees to meet 
specific skills gaps’.599 In addition to this, based upon the constraint with respect to the 
remuneration of trustees in this context, CIOs are advised to build on public confidence 
and that of their organisations, to attract more trustees.600 For example, the Private 
Action, Public Benefits (PAPB)601 report attempted to encourage public learning about 
non-profits as ‘the citizenship element of national curriculum’. 602 
!
5.3.2.2.2.4 Board composition—stakeholder representatives 
Advancing upon the discussion in section 4.4, we shall investigate the law concerning 
stakeholder representatives in the CIO’s board. Indeed, it is a common practice for 
CIOs to appoint stakeholders as trustees, with a view to ensuring their increased 
involvement in facilitating governance/management of the company. According to the 
Charity Commission, a well-run charity will continuously attempt to encourage the 
involvement and participation of stakeholders in improving the organisation’s efficient 
management,603 which has been considered among one of the best ways to obtain a 
wider selection of views and perspectives on a given topic.604 However, similar to the 
argument we have advanced in relation to CLGs, the increasing inclusion of 
‘stakeholder’ trustees in the administration of a CIOs also brings with it two challenges 
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597 Morgan, (n126) 
598 Charity Commission, ‘Good Governance: A Code for the Voluntary and Community Sector’ (Code 
Steering Group, 2010) 
599 The Charity Commission, ‘Trustee board: people and skills’ (Charity Commission for England and 
Wales, May 2014) <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/trustee-board-people-and-skills> accessed 12 
November 2016  
600 Dunn and Riley, (n506) 642 
601 G Britain and T Blair, Private Action, Public Benefit: A Review of Charities and the Wider Not-for-
Profit Sector (Cabinet Office Strategy Unit 2002) 
602 ibid  6.45-6.47 
603 Users on Board: Beneficiaries Who Become Trustees (Charity Commission 2012, ref CC24)  
604 The essential trustee: what you need to know, what you need to do (Charity Commission 2016, ref 
CC3) 8 
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– the conflict of interests between the stakeholder representing entity and the CIO,605 
and a likely reduction in the board’s working effectiveness.606  
 
First, concerning the matter of working effectiveness, in addition to the legal 
regulations 607  we have discussed in section 5.2.2.2.3.2, to improve stakeholder’s 
working effectiveness, some of the more feasible solutions have been outlined by the 
Charity Commission to facilitate the application of the instrumental stakeholder 
approach in CIOs. For example, inductions and trainings come as highly recommended, 
where it is noted, ‘effective training for all trustees will help to consolidate a person’s 
strengths, to minimize weakness and to make up for any lack of knowledge and 
experience’.608  
 
Second, in terms of conflicts of interests between the stakeholder representing entity 
and the CIO organisation itself, the statutory provisions governing CIOs often fail to 
address this conflict specifically, whilst some of the soft law provisions are relevant 
here. According to the CIO Model Constitution, a trustee must ‘declare the nature and 
extent of any interest, and absent himself or herself from any discussions of the charity 
trustees in which it is possible that a conflict of interest will arise between his or her 
duty to act solely in the interests of the CIO and any personal interest’.609 Trustees must 
take all relevant factors into account, and be ready to explain their approach if asked.610  
 
5.3.2.3 Board committee 
Both the CIO Model Constitution and the Good Governance Code 2010 note the 
advantage of board committees in enabling a division of labour division and job 
specification for directors’ or trustees’ roles.611 However, as we have argued in section 
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605 According to the Charity Commission, ‘a trustee’s duty to the charity may compete with a duty of 
loyalty they owe to another organisation or person’. The Charity Commission even lists a range of 
possible situations; see Conflicts of interest: a guide for charity trustees (Charity Commission 2014, ref 
CC29) 9 
606 As noted in section 4.4, stakeholder representatives and resource collectors (or fundraisers) may 
reduce the working efficiency of CIOs as they lack governance skills and knowledge.  
607 Companies Act 2006, s172 
608 Users on board: beneficiaries who become trustees (Charity Commission 2012, ref CC24) 4 
609 A CIO Model Constitution, art 7 (1) (2) 
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4.5, in spite of these benefits, there remains the possibility that trustees will attempt to 
shirk away from their responsibilities within the CIO, and free ride on others’ efforts. 
Research also indicates that in a group situation (even a small group like a committee), 
in which ‘either individual inputs are indistinguishable or monitoring costs are 
prohibitive’, an individual is likely to have ‘a negative incentive to free-riding and a 
positive incentive to supply less effort (shirking)’.612 Accordingly, we shall now turn to 
consider how the CIO regulations deal with the issue of trustees’ free-riding within 
board committees. The law essentially employs two approaches, which are the trustee’s 
duty of care, skill and diligence and trustees’ use of delegated authority. 
 
First, the Trustee Act 2000 codified the trustee’s duty of care, skill and diligence. 
Meanwhile, s 1 of the Trustee Act 2000 further indicates that trustees must consider 
getting external professional advice on all matters where there may be material risk to 
the charity or; where the trustees may be in breach of their duties.613 In addition, the 
Model Constitution outlines a range of particular circumstances in which trustees must 
exercise their duty of care, skill and diligence.614  
 
Second, the Good Governance Code 2010 clearly indicates that the voluntary sector, 
including CIOs should have ‘clear written terms of reference for committees of the 
board … which provide sufficient delegated authority and clear boundaries’.615 It also 
stresses that trustees’ use of delegated authority should be properly supervised to avoid 
the abuse of their power.616  Furthermore, in order to assist each trustee in clearly 
understanding his or her role, the CIO Model Constitution declares that the CIO 
trustees ‘shall from time to time review the arrangements which they have made for the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
612 Upadhyay, Bhargava and Faircloth, (n341) 
613 Trustees Act 2000, Chapter 29, part1, s1 
614 ‘These circumstances have regard in particular to: (i) any special knowledge or experience that he or 
she has or holds himself or herself out as having; and (ii) if he or she acts as a charity trustee of the CIO 
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and Community Sector’ (Code Steering Group, 2010) 19 
616 Charity Commission, ‘Good Governance: A Code for the Voluntary and Community Sector’ (Code 
Steering Group, 2010) 
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delegation of their powers’.617 At the same time, the power of delegation could be made 
subject to a requirement that ‘at least one member of each committee must be a charity 
trustee’ in CIOs.618 This is to ensure that the trustee-delegate can monitor what his or 
her co-delegates are doing, and ‘take steps to prevent any acts or decisions that may, for 
example, be a breach of trust’.619  
 
These regulations conform with our blueprint, attempting to list and avoid the potential 
situations leading to trustees’ shirking behaviour. Compared with the CLG’s 
regulations, they are more specific and can be more effective in preventing those 
trustees’ deliberate misconduct. However, as argued in relation to section 5.2 above, it 
is important to appreciate the legal rules that permit a delegation of power do not also 
entail a delegation of responsibility.620 Although all of the written rules referred to 
above are concerned with the clear delegation of tasks and power, they fail to define 
trustee responsibility according to individual powers or tasks. Indeed, according to 
research published by NCVO: ‘…while the court may in certain circumstances 
conclude that a delegate should be liable for any failure to exercise a delegated power 
properly in much the same way as the charity trustees by whom the power is delegated 
to him or her, the charity trustees will, as a general rule, remain personally responsible 
for the acts and defaults of the delegate’.621 
 
5.3.2.4 Meetings and proceedings of charity trustees  
In the CIO Model Constitution, the use of meetings is highly recommended. 622 
Meanwhile, the use of electronic communications is included in the provision which 
discusses how to improve the meeting procedure.623  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
617 Furthermore, the constitution emphasizes that the power of delegation could be made subject to a 
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Model Constitution, s18 (1) (2) 
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621 A Moynihan, The Good Trustee Guide (NCVO 2015) 154 
622 A CIO Model Constitution, art 19 
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5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have examined the rules governing the two principal corporate legal 
vehicles available for non-profits in the UK, namely the CLG and CIO. Whilst this 
examination has been interesting in its own right, we have also used it to explore how 
far the regulation applicable to these two legal forms corresponds with, or departs from, 
the blueprint developed in Chapter 4.   
 
What have we learnt? We have seen that there is indeed a general correspondence 
between my blueprint, and UK regulation. However, this is more true in the sense that 
the UK rules permit the board design my blueprint has advocated. The UK rules rarely 
prevent companies from adopting that board design. However, less often do they 
actually compel companies to follow precisely the model I have described. In other 
words, the UK law is largely ‘permissive’ or ‘facilitative’: it allows, but does not 
mandate. But even this permissive approach is backed up by ‘soft law’ provisions – in 
the Good Governance Code for all non-profits, or in the publications of the Charity 
Commission for charitable non-profits – that recommend many of the board features 
my blueprint also favours.  
 
The UK regime puts a heavy emphasis and value on retaining flexibility for non-
profits. It acknowledges that there cannot be a ‘one size fits all’ approach, and that to 
legislate prescriptive rules on board size, directors’ characteristics, board structure, and 
so on, would restrict unnecessarily some non-profits. Again, my own blueprint has also 
emphasised the importance of retaining flexibility. However, the precise mix of hard 
and soft law must likely vary from country to country. What works well in one country 
may be less effective in another. It will depend, for example, on features of the legal 
system that determine how intrusive legal rules governing board size, character, 
structure and process become. It will depend on how widely mere ‘soft law’ is 
respected by those whom it addresses. Having reminded ourselves again that good 
board design will always be country specific, that leads neatly into our next chapter, 




Chapter 6 | The nature of non-profits in China 
6.1 Introduction  
The existence of a vibrant and reliable non-profit sector may be viewed ‘not as a 
luxury, but as a necessity, for [many] people throughout the world’.624 The argument 
advanced in Chapter 2 suggested that non-profits may often successfully act as an 
intermediary, weaving the social, cultural, environmental and economic fabric of 
communities in most industrialized countries where state provision may not. 625 
Similarly, China has witnessed a proliferation in the number of non-profits that have 
come into operation over the past two decades,626 which has helped generate revenue 
for the Chinese Government, increase the number of jobs in this sector and deliver a 
wide variety of useful services.627  
 
Indeed, the growing number of non-profits in China may be attributed to the increasing 
attention paid to social issues in various respects.628 These social needs have become 
increasingly more prominent over recent years, since social and culture developments 
have often lagged behind the much faster economic development that has been 
witnessed in China.629 Finally, there may be said to be several social issues that have 
arisen that are unique to the Chinese context, and which shall thereby form the focus of 
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624 L M Salamon and H K Anheier, 'Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the Nonprofit Sector 
Cross-Nationally' (1998) 9 Voluntas 213, 225 
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627 C Guo and others, 'Civil Society, Chinese Style: The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector in Post-Mao China' 
(2012) 19 The Nonprofit Quarterly 20<http://non-profitquarterly.org/2012/10/25/civil-society-chinese-
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628 Owing to China’s opening up and rapid economic transition, unique political structure, immense 
population, and the widespread minority ethic groups, there has been a significant growth in the number 
of social issues. These issues could range from matters affecting gender inequality to child abuse and 
abandonment, to those relating to elderly nursing care and food safety; environmental damage and 
political injustice; see P Zabielskis, 'Environmental Problems in China: Issues and Prospects' in Zhidong 
Hao and S Chen (eds), Social Issues in China (Springer 2014) 42  
629 ibid  
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discussion in the following chapters.630   
 
By contrast to the urgent social needs discussed, the development of the Chinese non-
profit sector has only now begun to show signs of growth. Certainly research would 
suggest the potential social value of the Chinese non-profits sector has yet to be fully 
recognized. 631  Indeed non-profits in this context often have to confront various 
difficulties, which include establishing a place within the sector’s overall identity, 
‘building its capacity’, and ‘earning the public trust’, to name just a few.632 Therefore, 
before investigating the non-profit governance in the Chinese context (Chapters 7-9), 
Chapter 6 deals with the nature/social functions of non-profits in China. The particular 
focus of our discussion will be to distinguish whether, and if so how, the nature and 
functions of non-profits in China differ from the account of Western non-profits 
developed in Chapter 2. Doing this is a precondition to tailoring our blueprint for non-
profit governance to the peculiarities of China. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, without a 
comprehensive understanding of the nature of non-profits in the particular country in 
which they operate, we are unlikely to be able to formulate the most appropriate 
governance blueprint.  
 
We have seen that the UK and USA benefit from an abundance of academic literature 
addressing non-profit governance. By contrast, the position remains very different for 
China, where even the term ‘non-profit governance’ is poorly defined, and was only 
effectively distinguished from the term ‘government’ in 2003 through the work of 
Yu.633 Moreover, the non-profit governance literature in China is frequently dominated 
by a focus on the traditional patron-client model, ‘involving respect and obedience’ to 
the authority of their governance community.634 The appropriateness and effectiveness 
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government/businesses due to unfair treatment, etc. See P Wang, 'The Increasing Threat of Chinese 
Organised Crime: National, Regional and International Perspectives' (2013) 158 The RUSI Journal 6  
631 Han, (n37) 36 
632 L Feng, C P Advisors and Y Zhang, 2014 Observation Report on China’s Third Sector (Huamin 
Research Center, 2014) 
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633  Yu firstly proposed and used the term in the mid-1990s. During that period of time, the term 
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of this model has been doubted, however.635 It fails to embrace the many fundamental 
functions of a governing board, which are identifiable within Western non-profits 
organisations, and may, as we have seen already, entail monitoring an agent’s 
performance, providing strategic direction and encouraging a growth in public trust and 
credibility.636 Indeed, to the majority of non-profits in China, the presence of a board is 
merely to satisfy the legal requirement of registration.637  
 
In light of the discussion so far, Chapters 7-9 will address the functions of a non-profit 
in Chinese society, as well as the interplay between board governance and social 
determinants in the Chinese context, especially politically (i.e. Chinese Government), 
where through analysis of different legal regulations, we may then acquire a deeper 
understanding of non-profit board governance in China.638 For the remaining chapters, 
Chapter 7 attempts to identify social determinants that may affect the operation of non-
profit governance in China. Given the unique contextual elements, we shall then 
properly modify the blueprint we have developed in Chapter 4 to fit the Chinese 
context. Within this chapter, we shall then tailor the board’s four attributes (size, 
characteristics, structure, and process) to fit with the factors (social determinants) 
affecting the Chinese context.  
 
Chapter 8 builds on this to look at regulations in the three legal forms of non-profits in 
China (Foundations, Social Organisations and CNIs). During this process, the 
advantages and deficiencies apparent within these legal rules shall be investigated in 
light of our modified blueprint. Chapter 9 then supplements the discussion by 
addressing the recent enactment of the Chinese Charity Law 2016 (Charity Law 2016 
hereafter) in March 2016. Within this chapter, we shall identify the differences between 
the Charity Law 2016 and the previous three sets of non-profit regulations in China. 
That will allow us to critically analyse the value of these reforms, predicting how this 
Act will likely be implemented and the impact this will have upon non-profits in China.  
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6.2 An overview of non-profit organisations in China 
The existence of the non-profit sector in China is largely thought to have been triggered 
by a number of social gaps in the provision of state or private services.639 As we saw in 
Chapter 2, viewed from the ‘demand’ perspective, commercial markets may lack 
appropriate incentives to deal with activities in fields where they cannot predict a 
profitable return. Yet, even in the face of overwhelming social needs which commercial 
markets fail to fulfil, governments remain more likely to satisfy only the ‘average’ 
citizens’ demand and the most pressing social needs through public services and goods. 
Often government-run agencies can prove to be bureaucratic, and incur high operating 
costs. Considering this from the supplier’s perspective, then similar to its Western 
counterparts, non-profit organisations in China not only exist to fulfil a function that 
has been cast aside by government or the commercial market, but also to cater for a 
range of social benefits, such as individual self-fulfilment through participation in the 
non-profit.  
 
Although the social value of non-profits in the industrialized world has already been 
discussed in Chapter 2, there remains a clear distinction to be made between the 
organisational nature of non-profits in China and of Western countries. The nature of 
non-profits in the Chinese context has not been well identified by the academic world 
and requires much further investigation.640 Indeed, the less than satisfying performance 
of Chinese non-profits raises questions over the nature of non-profits in Chinese 
society. Does the non-profit sector merely grow to play the same function in China as 
their Western counterparts? Can non-profits in China effectively fill the gaps left by the 
failings of the commercial and governmental sectors? Table 6.1 summarises the 









639 D Smith, 'Guanxi, Mianzi, and Business: The Impact of Culture on Corporate Governance in China' 
(2012) Private Sector Opinion 1 
640 ibid  
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Table 6.1 Summary of Chapter 6 
!
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6.2.1 Definition of non-profits  
We begin by considering the definition and classification of non-profits in China. In 
contrast with the well-defined nature of non-profits in Western countries that we have 
discussed in Chapter 2, there remains no agreed definition of non-profit organisations 
in China.641  However, regulations issued by the Ministry of Civil Affair (MoCA), 
identify the three necessary and defining characteristics of a non-profit organisations 
(NPO) in China as follows: 
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! 129!
‘NPOs are not for profit purposes; resource providers making investments in 
NPOs are not allowed to receive an economic return; resource providers do 
not enjoy ownership of NPOs’.642 
 
Applying this description then, the non-distribution constraint would appear to be one 
of the defining features of a non-profit organisation in China. Indeed, academic 
literature on the Chinese context illustrates that the essence of a non-profit is ‘non-
profit distribution rather than the prohibition of non-profits from making money’.643 
However, it was only in 2016 that Chinese law (the Charity Law 2016) finally 
addressed what particular activities non-profits could engage in.644  
 
6.2.2 Classification of non-profits  
Much like non-profits in the UK, Chinese non-profits come in many shapes and sizes, 
and therefore fall into several categories. For example, non-profits in China may be 
registered as social organisations, foundations, educational institutions or 
corporations. However, many of these, perhaps most, operate as unregistered bodies or 
associations.645 To better inform this work’s understanding of such bodies, the different 
characters of non-profits are typically grouped according to the following classification, 









642 NPO Accounting System, art 2 (2)  
643 Non-profit Organisation Bureau of the Ministry of Civil Affairs [	]/Bureau 
for Politics and Law of the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council [] (eds.).  
644 ‘Charitable activities refers to the following public interest activities voluntarily carried out by natural 
persons, legal persons and other organisations through the donation of property’; see The Charity Law 
2016, s3 (1)  
645 In the Chinese context, the terms ‘non-profits’ and ‘NGOs’ could be used interchangeably. E Beijing, 
'Chinese NGO’s--Carving a Niche within Constraints' January 2003) < http://beijing.usembassy-
china.org.cn/report0103ngo.html> accessed 15 April 2015  
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Table 6.2 Non-profit classification in China 
 
 
6.2.2.1 Bottom up and top down non-profits  
Drawing upon the two categories positioned at the third level of the table, according to 
the relationship between the Government and non-profits (different state-society 
orientations) in China, non-profits may be classified into two major types—top-down 
non-profits and bottom up non-profits.646 Of the former category, top-down non-profits 
are officially registered under MoCA and are typically associated with the reform of 
the Chinese Government.647 Quite often, they are the product of government reform 
itself, and are therefore often called Government Organized non-profits (commonly 
abbreviated to GONGOs in China). Bottom-up non-profits (which may also be defined 
as autonomous non-profits) are more people-centric, and often do not have a close 
association or connection with the Government.648  
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6.2.2.1.1 Autonomous non-profits (bottom up non-profits) 
According to their legal status, bottom-up non-profits can be further sub-divided into 
registered and unregistered (or ‘grassroots’) non-profits. Organisations registered as 
bottom-up non-profits are entitled, by law, to operate under the supervision of the 
Chinese Government.649 Although their relationship with the Government is less close 
than in the case of GONGOs, permission for registration by the local Government 
agency/department has largely been seen as a form of Governmental acceptance, and 
one which renders them a legitimate type of organisation, compared to ‘Grassroots’ 
non-profits.650 ‘Grassroots’ non-profits, by contrast, often fail to register under the 
MoCA, and thereby fail to gain approval as legitimate or official non-profit, in keeping 
with Chinese law.651 Some exist as unregistered organisations, whilst others operate 
under the guise of a registered, but profit-based, organisation.652  
 
Those organisations that operate as unregistered grassroots bodies often attempt to keep 
out of the sight of, and control by, the Chinese Government.653 In doing so, they have 
often attempted to avoid any connection with the Government, aware that their 
existence was illegal before the enactment of the Charity Law 2016.654 Since such 
organisations cannot typically obtain official registration, they may encounter 
difficulties avoided by legally recognized bodies, since the latter enjoy a legal identity 
to undertake business activities, open bank accounts and holding public events in the 
organisation’s own name. Unregistered grassroots organisations mostly exist on the 
periphery of Chinese society, and so in a form where the Government fails to, or opts 
not to, deliver public goods/services.655  
 
Interestingly, the Government generally holds a suspicious and unsupportive attitude 
towards the activities of such organisations, which in turn contributes to a harsher 
environment for them and their operations. 656  Since the Chinese Government still 
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remains a dominant force affecting the majority of society in China, the lack of support 
by the Chinese Government restricts the size, performance and the public credibility of 
grassroots non-profits.657  Naturally, the otherwise ‘illegal’ status of grassroots non-
profits in China is such that this often causes an added difficult, as recording and 
obtaining empirical evidence is hard to achieve. For these reasons, we shall concentrate 
primarily on board governance in GONGOs and in registered bottom-up non-profits. 
However, having restricted our focus in that way, one interesting development that we 
might note here, which is found in the Charity Law 2016, is a degree of loosening of 
control by the Chinese Government over the Chinese non-profit sector generally, and 
traditional unrecognized grassroots non-profits in particular. Such non-profits have, for 
the first time, and since March 2016, become entitled to recognition and legal status to 
facilitate their activities. It is still too early to predict what impact this formal change 
will have, but we shall consider this latest development separately, in Chapter 9, when 
we turn to investigate the likely impact of the reforms contained in the Charity Law 
2016.  
 
6.2.2.1.2 Government Organized NGOs (GONGOs) (Top down non-profits) 
By contrast to bottom up bodies, the Chinese Government empowers those top-down 
non-profit organisations (GONGOs) to deliver services to local communities in society, 
who thereby carry out a number of partly government-based functions and service 
provision.658 Although they may claim to be independent from the Government, and 
therefore control their own administration, financial, employment, fund-raising and 
decision-making systems, many in fact do rely upon financial support and a range of 
other resources from the Government.659 In ‘exchange’ for such resourcing, GONGOs 
must usually compromise part of their independence/self-governing autonomy and 
therefore undertake a number of government appointed tasks.660 However, there has 
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been much controversy surrounding the issue of GONGO independence, which shall be 
explored in more detail, as relevant to this discussion in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. 
 
6.2.2.2 Foundations, SOs and CNIs (by legal regulations)  
One of the ways one might classify non-profits in China is according to the legal form 
such organisations adopt. According to the ‘Accounting System of Non-profit 
Organisations’ (NPO Accounting System) of the Ministry of Finance in 2004, 661 
officially registered non-profits can exist in one of three legal forms. These are social 
organisations (SO), civil non-business institutions (CNI), and foundations.662  
 
These three forms bear a range of different legal features, and are therefore often bound 
by a number of different legal regulations.663 This threefold classification according to 
legal form shall be employed frequently in Chapters 8-9 when we try to analyse the 
Chinese non-profit legal regime. Although this division of different types of non-profits 
is largely made on the basis of legal form, as discussed above, it would seem that such 
a classification of legal forms is also what is most commonly used within the academic 
analysis and by legal practitioners of non-profits in China.664  
6.2.2.3 Membership and non-membership non-profits  
Non-profits in China can also identify themselves as either membership-based, or non-
membership-based, organisations. Membership-based non-profits are considered to be 
‘associations of individuals’, which include academic institutions and trade unions.665 
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 [Accounting System of Non-profit Organisations], promulgated by the 
Ministry of Finance on August 18, 2004, effective since January 1, 2005 
662 Social organisations (shehui tuanti), civil non-business institutions (minban feiqiye danwei), and 
foundations (jijinhui); see NPO Accounting System, art 2 (1)  
663 Except the newly enacted Charity Law 2016 that is regulating all non-profits in a general way, each of 
the remaining three sets of non-profit regulations is targeting on these three types of non-profits 
respectively. 
664 Through a search of the CNKI database, it is possible to identify that the term ‘non-profit organisation’ 
(NPO) is much less used both in the academic and practice context across in China. “A search through 
the database ‘China Academic Journals’ (www.cnki.net) during the years 1999 to 2010 for articles with 
the term “non-profit organisations” in their title provides more than 200 hits, but reveals only two articles 
published in journals which have a focus on law. In none of the articles is a definition of the term given.” 
T Von Hippel and K B Pissler, 'Nonprofit Organizations in the People’s Republic of China' (2010) 
Comparative Corporate Governance of Non-Profit Organizations 428, 431 
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Non-membership non-profits do not elect members; they could include schools, 
hospitals, and social welfare agencies.666 According to empirical research, the Chinese 
Government seems to monitor and control more closely membership-based, rather than 
non-membership-based, non-profits.667 We shall explore this issue further in Chapter 8.  
 
6.3 Commercial market failure in China 
To understand better the nature/social function of non-profits in China, we shall firstly 
investigate the relationship between non-profits and the commercial market in China. 
As the discussion in Chapter 2 has already detailed, one essential reason for the 
existence of non-profits is to fill gaps in the provision of goods and services left by 
commercial market failure. To recap, ‘information asymmetry’ is one of the most 
important factors that lead to the occurrence of this failure.668 When compared with the 
commercial market, non-profits, because of the non-distribution constraint, are 
generally more able to establish trustworthiness and contract with their consumers, and 
then ensure their consumers’ interests can be well protected by this type of ‘trust-based 
contract’. 
 
To understand what relevance this theory might have in explaining Chinese non-profits, 
we need to examine the prevalence of these two conditions (information asymmetry 
and trustworthiness) in the Chinese context. We might begin by noting that building 
trust with consumers in China has always been a challenge, and this is true both in the 
commercial setting and the non-profit sector.669 However, it is at least arguable that the 
issue of information asymmetry is getting progressively worse, and especially in the 
commercial sector. In the Chinese commercial market, the vast majority of consumers 
harbour doubts over product quality, and distrust service suppliers owing to a series of 
commercial scandals and the inefficient implementation of any monitoring 
mechanism.670 Enormous food-related scandals, involving a wide range of domestic 
manufacturers, have brought the reputation of the food industry to the lowest point in 
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recent decades.671 Apart from the issue of food safety, incidents exist in almost every 
corner of the commercial market, which has severely damaged market credibility.672   
 
By contrast, with an ensuing crisis in trust apparent within the Chinese commercial 
context, the non-profit sector is indeed more likely to gain trust from its consumers. 
One such example of this may be healthcare and nursing homes, where in recent years 
the Chinese non-profit market has seen a soaring demand for elderly care services, 
matched by an ever more limited bed supply.673 Of those nursing homes who claim to 
be bound by a non-distributional constraint, these have tended to enjoy significantly 
higher occupancy rates, presumably reflecting a more popular demand for such services, 
especially when compared to those in the commercial context.674  
 
Indeed, empirical research indicates that this is mainly caused by lack of trust in the 
commercial market.675 Even without investigating this possibility themselves, Chinese 
consumers assume a public run nursing home is likely to have more reliable employees 
and a greater integration with local communities than might be true of a commercial 
run service.676 Interestingly, however, research has indicated many commercial nursing 
homes have a similar standard of living conditions (many even have better standards) 
as those which are run as non-profit organisations.677    
  
This is not to say that Chinese non-profits have entirely escaped this crisis of mistrust. 
Scandals in a number of GONGOs, such as Guo Meimei in Red Cross,678 the China-
Africa Project Hope,679 and the Henan Soong Ching Ling Foundation,680 have harmed 
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the reputation of non-profits’ nationwide. 681  Other similar cases have indicated 
corruption on the part of GONGOs and quasi-governmental organisations, adding to 
the lowering of public trust towards such bodies and this sector as a whole.682 As a 
result, there has been a sharp decline in both public donations and volunteers. 
Nevertheless, and as we noted in Chapter 2, the ‘trust’ argument does not depend on 
non-profits being entirely free of scandal, and enjoying complete public trust. It 
depends only on non-profits being comparatively more trustworthy than (or less 
untrustworthy than) for-profits. And, in China, the scale of mistrust in the commercial 
sector means that, comparatively, the non-profit sector is still more likely to gain 
consumer’s trust.  
 
6.4 Government failure in China 
What relevance does the ‘Government Failure’ theory have in China? Recall that this 
theory suggests that non-profits will arise in order to address the failure or inability of 
the Government itself to provide those goods and services which the commercial 
market fails to deliver. In Chapter 2, we explored the main reason for Government 
failure which this theory has emphasised, namely that Government tends to supply only 
the type and quantity of goods and services demanded by the ‘median voter’. 683  
However, I also then sought to develop this theory, by pointing to a number of other 
difficulties that face the Government: its ‘size’, complexity and remoteness from the 
people consuming its goods and services; its tendency to suffer from bureaucracy; its 
difficulty in incentivising its employees.684 Turning now to China, I shall argue here 
that these factors, and thus the problem of government failure, could be even worse in 
China than in Western countries. This is primarily because China is experiencing a 




681 ibid 167  
682 H Hong and J FlorCruz, 'Red Cross China in Credibility Crisis' (CNN, 7 July 2011) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/07/06/china.redcross/> accessed 23 March 2015 
683 As Chapter 2 explained, the extent of the ‘shortfall’ in Government provision will depend upon the 
heterogeneity of demands, which refers to different levels of demand triggered from variations in 
population characteristics (age, education, diversity of religion, or race, for example) and inequality of 
income.  
684 See section 2.4.2. 
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6.4.1 Increasing social problems 
China has a population of over 1.38 billion, across 31 regions, with a vast number of 
minority ethnic groups, and embracing a mix of religions. Its population is highly 
heterogeneous, and in consequence it is common to see different groups of people 
presenting very different, often competing, demands on the Government.685 To this end, 
the Chinese Government has more recently had to confront social pressures to act on a 
range of matters, such as unemployment, an aging population, insufficient health 
insurance for many, along with matters pertaining to migration and environmental 
deterioration. 686  To take just one example, income inequality often counts among 
China's most urgent social ills.687 The uniqueness of Chinese history, culture and the 
model of fast economic transition since the 1980s688 also bring to bear a number of 
other social issues, which shall be further explored in Chapter 7.  
 
However, as briefly mentioned above, the Chinese Government struggles to satisfy the 
enormous social demands placed upon it in the face of its relatively limited access to 
resources. The Government typically therefore opts to address only the most pressing, 
urgent or citizen-desired public issues.689 With its recently proposed slogan of ‘small 
government, big society’, the Chinese Government has sought to make clear that it can 
no longer be the sole provider of public services or goods, supporting every person in 
need, and the most prominent and productive reaction to this and to alleviate such a 
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On the other hand, Chinese non-profits often take advantage of this social development. 
Changes in the overall labour market,691 individual attainment of higher levels of social 
income,692 together with an increasing adoption of a variety of ‘Western ideas of civil 
society’ have provided more space, opportunity and vitalities, which makes the non-
profit sector in China indispensable forces, fulfilling functions left by the void and 
withdrawal of the Government. 693 A growing number of activists have thus established 
non-profit organisations, networking and expanding this sector.694  
 
6.4.2 Economic pressure on the Chinese Government 
In addition to the analysis of increasing social needs in China, this section explores the 
second cause of Government failure—the limited government expenditure. The Chinese 
non-profit sector is increasing in importance as the high powered Chinese economy has 
begun to lose momentum and required assistance with development. 695  China’s 
economic growth in 2015 is the slowest for 25 years.696 With ‘growing debt’ and ‘a 
housing and factory capacity’ stretched to its limits, economists predict that ‘Chinese 
officials project tougher years ahead’ for the Chinese economy.697 Indeed, economists 
have suggested that ‘the tools the government has traditionally used to revive growth, 
infrastructure spending, easy credit and ramped-up exports appear increasingly 
ineffective, which raises the question of how could the government make a more 
sustainable economic policy?’698  
 
In response, the Chinese Government has recently approved its next five-year plan, 
with the ultimate objective of significantly reducing poverty by 2020.699 In doing so, 
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officials have declared the essential role non-profits will play in achieving this goal. 
According to the official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, the primary objective of the 
Charity Law 2016 was not only to formalize law in this area, but also to ‘recruit help 
from good Samaritans in reaching the 2020 poverty alleviation target’.700 Li Jianguo, a 
senior official in the National People’s Congress (NPC) supplemented this by declaring 
that all non-governmental sources, in particular charity programmes, are ‘an 
indispensable part of achieving poverty alleviation’.701  
 
However, the truth behind the reality here may undermine this expectation, as the 
development of non-profits and the Chinese economy are significantly unbalanced. A 
study by the Charities Aid Foundation in 2015 indicated that the Chinese economy has 
grown to now be the world's second largest, while charitable giving has lagged far 
behind, with the country ranking 144th out of 145 countries for giving.702 According to 
the research conducted by the China Charity Information Centre, people in China only 
donated an equivalent of just $16 billion in 2014, which is even ‘less than 0.2 per cent 
of annual GDP’.703  
 
6.4.3 The Government’s need to choose between GONGOs and Grassroots  
The role of the Chinese non-profit sector in making up for limitations in Government 
supply seems very clear then. As noted in 6.2.2, there are two types of non-profits 
(GONGOs and Grassroots non-profits) which might fill this gap in Governmental 
provision, and the Government must determine which is the more appropriate one, a 
difficult decision to make. Accordingly, this section compares the advantages and 
pitfalls of GONGOs and Grassroots non-profits to the Chinese Government.  
 
Over the past two decades, the strategy employed by the Chinese Government has been 
to tolerate the existence of many non-registered grassroots non-profits, allowing them 
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to ‘operate on a tight leash’, and thereby ensuring they remain ‘small and local’.704 
However, the economic transition and slow pace of social development in China has 
led the Government to accept that there remain too many social areas in which it has 
been ‘tentative and restrictive’.705 From the Chinese Government’s perspective, both 
GONGOs and grassroots non-profits present a range of clear advantages and 
disadvantages. GONGOs are easy to control and monitor, which often make them more 
attractive to the Government. There are two major tasks which seem particularly 
suitable for GONGOs to fulfil. One is to take the lead on attracting philanthropic 
funding, particularly from international sources, which can include international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs).706 It is now common to see a great number of 
Government departments encourage the establishment of GONGOs with the obvious 
purpose of conducting resource exchanges/overseas study programmes with 
international organisations ‘in an unofficial capacity’.707  
 
The second task for which GONGOs seem especially well suited is in areas where there 
exist less public concern or support from the Government, such as ‘contraceptive 
advice for unmarried couples’ or ‘HIV/AIDS prevention programmes for sex workers 
and drug addicts’.708 In spite of the lack of public concern surrounding these issues, 
there remains an onus upon the Government to ensure these are dealt with and 
monitored effectively. However, interestingly, using non-profits to provide such 
services, in close collaboration with the Government, brings its own problems and 
controversy. It can be seen as threatening the social value/objective of non-profits. 
Non-profits, because they act as ‘agents of advocacy and contribute immensely to 
policy dialogue’,709 should typically work independently. Having such close ties to 
Government sits at odds with these values. According to research carried out by 
Thomas, the existence and operation of non-profits allow the government to become 
‘more of an enabler rather than a service provider’.710 Additionally, non-profits are 
supposed to be able to represent the interest group of those who they are working with 
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and ‘in this case ensure that such policies are adapted to aid real life situations’.711 
Finally, such bodies may play as ‘watchdogs’ and ensure, through the use of monitoring 
and research, that they could hold the Government accountable for their actions, 
thereby challenging the Government if necessary.712 There are a variety of approaches 
to achieve this role/function, which may include lobbying or offering support to 
particular groups, which may otherwise be adversely affected by Government policies 
or decisions.713 However, a difficulty here of course is that GONGOs tend to behave 
much like government-affiliated institutions. They in turn fail to effectively relieve the 
Government of any financial burden because GONGOs in most cases need the 
Government to provide funds to them rather than generate revenue by themselves.714 
Another side effect of this behaviour may be the reduction in public trust towards 
GONGOs as these non-profits are likely to give the impression to the public that they 
are following the Government’s order and representing the Government’s interests 
rather than working as an independent body for the benefit of their own stakeholders.  
 
Turning now to grassroots non-profits, although they may very well provide social 
services that are independent from the Government, and so alleviate pressure for 
Government itself to act, to some degree the Chinese Government has not been 
prepared to loosen restrictions over grassroots organisations, for many of the reasons 
we shall outline in Chapters 8-9. The most significant of the concerns expressed by 
Government have been that, once control over grassroots non-profits is lost, 
particularly those operating in politically sensitive industries, then the political and 
social stability of China itself will be threatened.715  
 
6.4.4 The case of Guo Meimei 
GONGOs, particularly those with high profile charities, have suffered the most serious 
scandals occurred in the past few years, which shows the deficiencies of GONGOs. 
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Among those scandals, the case of Guo Meimei in Red Cross has been at the center of 
public attention.715-1 A young woman named Guo Meimei, claimed to be in the senior 
position at the Red Cross of China, which is the largest charitable GONGOs in China. 
She constantly posted photos in the social media website showing her lavish lifestyle. 
Her photos immediately sparked widespread doubts and outrage about corruptions 
occurred in non-profits in China.  
 
Although both Guo and the Red Cross of China have denied having any ties to each 
other after this scandal, continuous disclosures of inside information and disputes over 
this incident attracted even more public attention. Guo and the Red Cross have been the 
most talked-about subjects throughout the society over the last several years. 
Furthermore, the scandal of Red Cross had a snowball effect. Not only the Red Cross 
Society of China, but also the whole non-profit sector in China had suffered an 
unprecedented crisis of trust and their reputation was seriously harmed nationwide. In 
addition to that, many other GONGOs such as the China-Africa Project Hope, the 
Henan Soong Ching Ling Foundation and the China Youth Development Foundation 
were repeatedly accused of corruption and misuse of funds, adding to the lowering of 
public trust towards this sector as a whole.716 
 
As a result of the reducing public trust, there has been a sharp decline in donations to 
GONGOs in China. When the scandal of Guo Meimei occurred in June 2011, the Red 
Cross faced the biggest financial challenge in its history. The official statistics by the 
Chinese Government indicated that the total amount donating to the non-profit sector 
drop dramatically from 6.26 billion RMB in May 2011 to 0.84 billion RMB in August 
2011.716-1 Zhao, as the vice president of the Red Cross of China admitted to the media 
that the scandal of Guo meimei had made people suspicious and unwilling to make any 
donation the the society.716-2 
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As a response to Guo’s scandals, the Red Cross of China attempted to transform its 
public image and reputation by introducing a variety of strategic approaches. Wang, as 
the secretary general of the Red Cross of China, held that ‘Guo Meimei incident makes 
us realize the problems and challenges in our project operation and fundraising. We 
sincerely welcome the public to oversee our work. If loopholes appear, we will spare no 
effort to probe and find the truth. However, we hope the public can treat the Guo 
Meimei incident in a more rational way’.716-3 Unfortunately, in addition to the statement 
above, the Red Cross Society failed to make any other effort to control the 
organization’s corruption, enhance its transparency of governance/donation procedures, 
and therefore improve its organization’s public reputation. Scholars such as Jie claimed 
that ‘the incident has triggered a collective outburst of long-time frustration about the 
Red Cross's murky bureaucracy and questionable governance. And faced with this 
crisis of trust, the Red Cross Society of China failed to give a reasonable explanation. It 
will lose its credibility completely if it does not learn lessons from the corruption 
scandals involving the overspending on meals and other spending irregularities’.716-4  
 
In terms of the legal punishment, the judgment from Dongcheng court of Beijing 
clearly stated that Guo was convicted of operating a casino illegally and sentenced to 
five years in jail and fined 50,000 RMB. Unfortunately, the court failed to show any 
evidence indicating the central issue that the public concerned most—whether Guo has 
any relationship with the Red Cross, nor does the procurator explaining the 
investigating process. Sentencing Guo in the name of running a casino illegally could 
by no means give a sufficient explanation about the corruption scandals in the Red 
Cross. As a response to the legal sentence, there were increasing critics in China 
criticizing that there was little regulation over the misconducts, especially corruptions 
in the voluntary sector.  
 
Wang, as the director of the most influential non-profit research institution at Tsinghua 
University, encouraged a better regulated environment for non-profits by stating that 
‘non-profits need to have a sense of crisis, to reform in an open and transparent 
environment where the public will question the credibility of these organizations all the 
time’ There should be a law regulating fund-raising process and improving 
transparency of the governance process in non-profits in China.716-5  
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Despite the obscure legal judgement towards the case of Guo Meimei, fortunately, the 
new Charity Law 2016 came into effect shortly after those scandals occurred in the 
non-profit sector in China. The enactment of the Charity Law 2016 is believed to be 
stimulated by Guo’s incident. As we shall demonstrate in Chapter 9, the law has made 
it clear that China had determined to amend regulations in relation to donations, 
transparency, and the registration of non-profits. There are basically three fundamental 
reforms of the non-profit sector in China, which are all rightly addressing issues in 
relevant to the public concern over GONGO’s scandals. For instance, the Charity Law 
2016 clearly indicates that those unregistered/grassroots non-profits have, for the first 
time, become entitled to recognition and legal status to facilitate their activities. As 
chapter 9 shall indicate, this reform clearly improves the independence of non-profits, 
and thus getting rid of the Government control. Furthermore, Article 60 of the law 
imposes a cap on annual management fees, with the purpose of restricting corruptions 
occurring in non-profits. There is a significant amount of emphasis within the law itself 
on the importance of transparency and information disclosure, with an entire Chapter of 
the act (Chapter 8, Article 69-76) devoted to this issue. Certainly, the Charity Law 2016 
does much to improve public trust aspect. A great many of its provisions are designed 
to enhance public trust towards non-profits, and thus encourage donors to contribute 
their money or efforts. All of these can be regarded as a response to those scandals 
occurred among GONGOs, and are expected to be a great improvement to non-profits 
in China. Detailed provisions and impacts shall be further investigated in Chapter 9.  
 
6.5 Participatory and expressive role of non-profits  
The third explanation for non-profits which we addressed in Chapter 2 focused on their 
participatory and expressive role. Recall, this looked at non-profits in terms of the 
reasons why people choose to supply them. It suggested that individuals – social 
entrepreneurs, volunteers, donors – do so because they satisfy participants’ sense of 
self-fulfilment, and thereby encourage their development of confidence and move 
towards greater personal achievement. Does this theory have relevance in explaining 
Chinese non-profits? We shall argue, first, that indeed it does but that, second, 
participants in Chinese non-profits have distinctive and unique individual 
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characteristics. Understanding these individual characteristics will help our attempt to 
develop strategies to facilitate the non-profit governance in the following chapters.  
 
There would appear to be two primary means by which individuals may get involved in 
the activities of a non-profit. The first, and most common, is to provide financial 
support through donations. The second is to work with the non-profit as a volunteer. 
This may involve any ‘altruistic activity where an individual or group provides services 
for no financial gain’.717 Interestingly, in China there has been an emerging tendency 
over recent decades for two different groups to become increasingly involved in the 
activities of the non-profit, both as donors and as volunteers. These two groups are, 
first, private entrepreneurs and, second, specifically young volunteers. These two 
groups can significantly affect the performance of non-profits in China. More 
importantly, they are the stakeholders/suppliers of non-profits whose 
interests/requirements should be carefully served. As such, our analysis shall build 
upon the discussion so far by examining these two groups and exploring their 
significance and social function in relation to Chinese non-profits.  
 
6.5.1 Private entrepreneurs 
To most Chinese non-profits, private entrepreneurs are among the most important 
financial supporters, and may sometimes even be the founders of a given organisation. 
The ever-growing number of private entrepreneurs, and the formation and growth of 
the middle-class, have made the re-emergence of ‘philanthropy’ all the more possible. 
Indeed, a vast number of individuals have benefited from the rapid growth in China’s 
economy, particularly those who have been able to enter the upper and middle classes 
as a result of this.718 Statistics from 2015 indicate that over 4.8 million new companies 
were registered in China in 10 months, ‘equalling to 10,600 new businesses per day or 
seven every minute’.719  
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Building upon the rise in new companies registered in China, the new boom would 
appear to include a large number of private entrepreneurs. Among them, two groups of 
entrepreneurs would appear most likely to participate in non-profit activities, with a 
particular view to seeking self-fulfilment. The first of these are rural entrepreneurs. 
These are in a sense the first generation of entrepreneurs, who may have otherwise 
started their business by themselves during 1980s-1990s.720 The second of these may be 
the post ’90s generation of entrepreneurs, who are young, innovative and particularly 
interested in business with high technology. 721  These two groups of entrepreneurs 
usually feel obliged to respond to problems that typically arise in a Chinese 
transformation economy, and help with non-profit development in China. Forbes listed 
115 billionaires in China in 2011, with a large number of these being interested in 
donating to the non-profit sector.722 One example of this is the Sichuan earthquake in 
2008, which led to a record $8 billion in donations to the rescue and recovery effort, 
mainly from upper and middle class, ‘a 380 per cent increase over the previous year’.723  
 
I would argue that there are two principal reasons why these groups are interested in 
assisting non-profit beneficiaries. Firstly, through donating to non-profits, they expect 
to achieve self-fulfilment and enhance their personal reputation in society. Most of the 
rural entrepreneurs are likely to have spent their childhood living in extremely poor 
conditions, especially during 1960s-1980s, one of the hardest times in Chinese 
history.724 This deprived childhood experience is likely to left them empathising with 
those who are living in poverty in modern Chinese society, and therefore render them 
more likely to donate to such a cause and to help those in need.725 Owing to a lack of 
time, this category of donor would most prefer to donate money rather than 
participating in person. 
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Secondly, the post ’90s generation, by contrast, usually tend to be ‘doers’. The will 
more often act as ‘social entrpreneurs’, setting up their own non-profits, or supporting a 
range of non-profits in their specialized businesses, many of which are concerned with 
cutting edge knowledge, international issues, environment, women/minority group 
protection and technology. 726  Von Hipple and Pissler give the example of Zhang 
Meijuan, a private businesswoman, who enjoyed considerable financial success, but 
lacked a sense of personal fulfilment.727 Establishing a non-profit foundation provided 
that. It did not bring material rewards, but did provide her with surprisingly high job 
satisfaction. Owing to the unique nature of non-profits that we addressed in 2.4.3, 
through collaborating with her colleagues with common interests and preferences, she 
could thus have a sense of belonging within a given community.728  
 
In spite of the efforts made by many individuals in China, there still remains an 
apparent philanthropy gap, especially compared to the United States, for example. 
Research carried out in 2013 illustrated that those top 100 philanthropists in China only 
donated an equivalent of 890 million USD, which is less than what the CEO of 
Facebook and his family gave in 2012.729 This big gap has obviously manifested itself 
by way of ‘the number of philanthropic foundations’ that exist in China. In 2012, China 
had only 2,961 foundations, less than 3 per cent of the number in the U.S.730 Some of 
this has resulted in upper-middle class members of society facing criticism that their 
enthusiasm towards non-profit contributions is merely impulsive, spontaneous and 
reactive behaviours.731 However, this cannot be explained only by the lack of the basic 
generosity among private entrepreneurs in China. The primary reason would appear to 
be that many of them still doubt the future and development of non-profits, due to over-
regulation by the Chinese Government. At the same time, they may be reluctant to 
constantly donate their wealth to a cause, for the fear that the money will merely end up 
being used by a corrupt non-profit organisation. 
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6.5.2 Student volunteers  
Research suggests that university students and graduates of the 1980’s and 1990’s are 
an increasingly significant group of contributors to the funding of non-profits in 
China.732 But unlike private entrepreneurs, this group tends to provide human resource 
support—as volunteers, even where there is no official government approval for their 
activities. Their extremely active involvement in non-profit activities can be attributed 
to their personal ideology, which may have been formed in the process of their unique 
life experiences during the Chinese Post-Reform Era.733 These ‘post ’90s youth’ are, on 
the one hand, often immersed in the monetary world, whilst on the other hand, are often 
more able to appreciate the non-monetary social value of sincere and pure connections 
between others, emotional communication and value spiritual self-fulfilment. A report 
by Guo and Saxton indicated that over 91.7 per cent of Chinese college students would 
like to take part in voluntary work taken in a variety of forms, and 83.1 per cent 
participant in volunteer work every year.734  Indeed, it was noted that even in the 
absence of remuneration, a substantial number of students are encouraged and 
sustained by the virtue of non-profit missions and vision alone.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter addressed the nature and role of non-profits in China. We saw many 
similarities with the Western non-profits. The same three explanations developed (in 
Chapter 2) to explain the role of non-profits also explained Chinese non-profits too. For 
instance, both the commercial market and the Chinese Government fail to act as the 
service provider due to a variety of reasons. Furthermore, the Chinese public, like their 
western counterparts, seek the rewards that come from participating in the life of non-
profits. Nevertheless, each of these three explanations required modification to take 
account of a range of distinctive features of Chinese society, and the role of the market 
and the Government within it. Contextualising our theory of non-profits in this way 
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will prove essential as we turn to develop and contextualise the blueprint for board 























Chapter 7 | The social determinants of non-profit governance and the impact on 
the blueprint 
7.1 Introduction 
A theme running through this thesis is that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to corporate 
governance cannot work. This is true when we consider the differences between 
different organisations – even those that are all non-profit. But it is also true when we 
consider differences between countries. What works in one country is unlikely to work 
perfectly in another. 735 As Caron and Richter argue, organisational governance reform 
in almost any market is ‘invariably an interplay between, on the one hand, the need for 
new international standards that facilitate transparency and trust, and on the other hand, 
an equally strong desire to maintain established customs and institutions’.736 This is 
particularly true of emerging markets, typically in the East, which differ fundamentally 
from developed Western markets.737 China, which is a widely applied example of the 
most recently developed and largest emerging market in the world, has endured a long 
battle between its unique contextual factors (such as collectivism, Confucianism, and 
guanxi) and the modern mode of corporate governance. As the discussion in Chapter 6 
made clear, China’s quick transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented one 
started with an environment lacking the most crucial factors of institutional 
infrastructure, such as a ‘well-defined legal system, rigorous law enforcement, and 
well-functioned financial markets, etc’.738  
 
In light of such a transition, a range of problems may arise, raising questions over how 
a culture might ‘change and adapt in the face of regional and international economic 
integration’.739 What are the contextual determinants of Chinese non-profits, and how 
could these elements be adapted to promote better governance practices in the Chinese 
non-profit sector? However, as will be apparent from the analysis so far, such 
contextual factors may not be the only determinant of non-profit governance behaviour, 
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even though these play a crucial role. A more nuanced understanding of the objective, 
addressing individual behaviours based on their social, culture, political, economic, and 
ethical environmental context is essential for designing an improved governance 
blueprint as this might be applied to non-profit organisations.740  
 
Recent research on the subject of corporate governance in China may broadly be 
divided into two streams. The first covers studies which analyse how to transplant 
Western governance practices to China by exploring a set of potential indicators of 
Chinese corporate practices.741 The second concentrates on the potential contextual 
factors influencing governance mechanisms in China.742 However, very little research 
has been undertaken to explore the issues surrounding governance mechanisms in the 
Chinese non-profit sector, and even less has sought to find a normative structure 
(blueprint) for non-profit governance in combination with its contextual factors.  
 
Nevertheless, developing the blueprint in this way would appear particularly important 
for non-profits in China, given the unstable legal and political environment, as well as 
the less developed governance mechanism in the non-profit sector, which we shall 
address in the following sections.743 More specifically, developing my blueprint for the 
Chinese non-profit sector could improve non-profit governance in China in two ways. 
Firstly, the blueprint itself essentially draws upon a variety of well-entrenched legal 
theories and practices, which can provide a wealth of experience to Chinese non-
profits.744 Second, given China is now seeking to develop its own non-profit sector, the 
blueprint attempts to provide viable solutions for non-profit governance, and thus 
influence the Chinese approach to regulation and practice. It is also a good opportunity 
for the Chinese Government and the legal system to self-reflect on the mechanisms 
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taken to regulate non-profits. Given these benefits, this chapter will tailor and modify 
the UK-based blueprint appropriate to the Chinese context.  
 
Chapter 7 begins (7.2) by considering the potential barriers to the process of ‘legal 
transplantation’ – of taking part of one country’s legal regime (such as its treatment of 
non-profits) and transplanting that into another country’s legal system. In addressing 
this, I will explain why it is essential to contextualize Western theories and approaches 
to the Chinese context. Thereafter, sections 7.3 to 7.6 look at the different attributes of 
non-profit board which the blueprint focuses upon. In doing so, we shall consider how 
to modify the attributes of such a governance blueprint in the Chinese context. 
Following this, the chapter then examines the relevant social determinants, as discussed 
in Chapter 4. Table 7.1 summarises the argument this chapter makes, by showing how 











Table 7.1 Chinese social determinants and the blueprint modification 
Board attributes Chinese Social Determinants Consequences influenced by the determinants 
Board size guanxi, mianzi, Group 
thinking 
1, guanxi improve resource collection more members 
2, mianzi resource collectors stay on board large board 




Director’s independence guanxi, Collectivism 1, Positive guanxi and negative guanxi  






Administrative and financial 
resource from the Government 
1, Lacking of resources 
2, Destroy non-profit independence and become government-
affiliated organisations 
danwei system Government-controlled work 
unit  
1, Affect director’s behaviors and ways of thinking  
2, Improve guanxi net with the Government 
Professionals Qualification vs Experience 
Adverse selection 
1, Unfix criteria;  
2, Biased decisions by directors/managers 
Board structure Black corruption in China Anti-corruption committee in the non-profit board 
Board process High Context Chinese Society 
(guanxi, collectivism, mianzi, 
confucianism) 
1, Ineffective meeting 
2, Inactive performance;  
3, Lack of frankness and creativity 
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7.2 Contextual barriers in comparative research  
The blueprint outlined in Chapter 4 was largely based on theories and empirical 
evidence drawn from Western countries. Although most Western systems have so far 
proven to be well suited to the functioning of industrialized countries, their overall 
suitability for China is yet to be determined.745 China has in fact already borrowed, or 
‘transplanted’, a number of different governance mechanisms – relating to for-profit 
companies – from the West. This borrowing has occurred during a period of rapid 
social change. As the evidence below demonstrates, the unsatisfactory consequences of 
a variety of legal transplantation attempts demonstrates how factors such as culture, 
legal systems, individual social and political histories and institutional dependence can 
often prevent the convergence between two legal systems from taking place.746  
 
In consequence, it would appear to be irrational to attempt to apply the blueprint in 
Chapter 4 directly into the Chinese context, without first making modifications. Indeed, 
as research by Shi has argued ‘…every country is unique, and the effect of 
transplanting rules, systems is uncertain because it is all contingent on the history of the 
particular institutional structure, politics, economics and society. Stability, continuity 
and gradual evolution will continue to be the hallmarks of non-profit governance in 
China’.747 Without appropriate assimilation of traditional knowledge and legal practices 
into the ‘imported regime’, it could be painful for the Chinese legal system to 
overcome ‘other traditional perceptions that stood in the way of legal 
transplantation’.748  
 
Concerning the actual practices that take place in China, over the past two decades, it 
has made significant efforts to reform its implementation measures within the legal 
system. Intellectual property (‘IP’) law in China, for example, has been developed 
through the transplantation of the models from Western countries. 749  However, a 
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variety of local Chinese social norms have been deeply shaped by many contextual 
factors, which may inherently conflict with the understanding of intellectual property 
rights in Western countries.750 Therefore, ‘the resistance to legal transplantation of IP 
Regulations has led to a divergence between the formal IP rules in China and the actual 
IP norms as they are followed in practice, which has resulted in difficulty in the 
enforcement of IP laws’.751  
 
In addition to the contextual barriers, irrational decisions made by Chinese legislators 
and the Government have resulted in transplantation failure on a variety of levels. 
Legislators and the Chinese Government have overused their discretionary power to 
transplant Western governance regimes, without applying the necessary critical 
judgment in respect of factors such as the legal infrastructure and supporting 
mechanisms of the source country, therefore undermining the overall effectiveness of 
these rules in the Chinese context.752 Mechanisms such as directors’ fiduciary duties, 
duty of care and due diligence, and independent directors are all ideas that were 
transplanted from UK and US to improve the current Chinese corporate governance 
regime, which later did not turn out to be a success.753 
 
The undesirable consequence of the transplantation has proven that ‘all these 
governance, regulatory and enforcement factors which originated within China’s 
distinct social, political and cultural contexts are likely to offset China’s convergence 
towards any particular international corporate governance mode’.754  
 
With these potential barriers in mind, we shall examine and select the most important 
Chinese contextual factors that may require modification of the blueprint to make it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Property Rights in China: Resistance, Adaptation and Reconciliation' (2017) 48 IIC-International Review 
of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 4 
750 Zabielskis, (n628)  
751 D Bosworth and D Yang, 'Intellectual Property Law, Technology Flow and Licensing Opportunities 
in the People's Republic of China' (2000) 9 International Business Review 453 
752 Ng, (n748) 
753 The Chinese Company Law adopted the board of supervisors which was modelled on the supervisory 
board in the German two-tier board system to exercise supervision over directors and managers. 
However, the law did not provide the board of supervisors with sufficient power to make directors and 
managers accountable, which turned out to be inefficient. The CSRC then introduced another supervision 
body, an independent director system for listed companies in 2001 which was borrowed from UK/US 
system. This strategy does not improve the governance efficiency in the Chinese context; see Shi, (n746) 
96 
754 ibid   
! 156!
appropriate for China. And, in so doing, we shall mainly focus on the impact of the 
Chinese Government (primarily addressing political factors). These political factors 
are, without doubt, the most essential matters influencing non-profit governance in 
China. Indeed, it is clear political factors cannot exist independently, and we must 
otherwise combine cultural, social, economic and legislative factors to undertake a 
comprehensive investigation. Accordingly, sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 will briefly examine 
the potential impact the Chinese Government may have upon the non-profit sector, 
alongside other influential factors, which shall be addressed in the frame of a blueprint 
modification later on (in sections 7.3 - 7.6).  
 
7.3 The impact of the Chinese Government (political barrier)  
‘Corporate governance in China cannot be separated from political governance’.755 
Such a classic statement captures the persuasive dominance and influence the Chinese 
Government continues to have over the internal governance of corporations in China, 
be these found within the profit-based or non-profit sector. It cannot be denied that this 
type of intervention encumbers the operation of mechanisms that were otherwise 
transplanted from Western economies, where there exists no heavy form of government 
intervention.756 Indeed, a majority of the social factors that are important here, such as 
economic development strategies, the enactment of legal rules, as well as a citizen’s 
ideology, which have been strictly controlled by the Chinese Government for centuries, 
all contribute to the well-established authority of the Government in China. 
 
Indeed, the Chinese Government can influence non-profit governance in two respects 
in particular. These are the internal governance (7.3.1) and external governance (the 
legal regulations in 7.3.2 and other social determinants in 7.3.3). Having addressed 
these two matters, section 7.3.4 then explores the interplay between the Government 
and non-profit governance (both internal and external) in the Chinese setting. 
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7.3.1 Internal governance of non-profits  
By ‘internal governance’, we mean those institutional control mechanisms which are 
developed and adopted by organisations themselves, and which are enforced by 
participants within the organisation. They include such mechanisms as internal 
transparency systems, internal monitoring and control by boards, mechanisms for 
disciplining management (such as remuneration rewards, or removal from the job) and 
so on.   
 
Although these function as internal mechanisms, the Chinese Government has always 
attempted to control the non-profit governance through manipulating their internal 
governance. In China the governance of both large for-profit enterprises and non-profit 
organisations may be categorized as an ‘administrative model’, largely if not entirely 
coordinated by the Chinese Government.757 The Government frequently attempts to 
enable their own representatives to occupy influential positions (i.e. directorships) in 
non-profits, as to maintain power and influence over their operation. 758  Such 
representatives are then often criticized to behave like ‘government officials in the 
hierarchy, and report their findings to Government agencies from which they are 
dispatched’.759 Indeed, unlike in a Western market economy, the ‘unwritten rule’ in 
many Chinese non-profits is that the Government’s order is in a higher position of 
authority and priority, above any legal rule. 
 
7.3.2 External governance of non-profits 
External governance (or external control mechanisms) 760  includes laws and 
regulations, capital market, product market and labour market, external stakeholders 
and media, for example. Among these potential external control mechanisms, the 
Chinese Government has the most frequent interaction with the legal system. As 
discussed in section 7.2.1, a majority of corporate governance reforms in China were 
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partly politically driven. Indeed, their overriding goal was to improve the interests of 
the Chinese Government and ‘maintain political, economic and social stability’.761 
Therefore, any form of legal transplantation has to take account of the intervention of 
the Government. 
 
The Chinese legal system is highly centralized, and remains controlled by the 
Government as a means through which to influence non-profit governance. It has been 
argued that ‘[t]he control function of the legal system is mainly carried out by the 
government institutions with either political or bureaucratic or legal powers of control. 
Political factors have been the primary determinants of corporate ownership and 
regulation in China…’.762 This is essentially due to the fact that Government bodies are 
often more powerful, higher in the hierarchy, than the legal department. The Ministry 
of Public Security and the Ministry of State Security, as the Government police agency, 
could ‘exercise far more influence over the criminal process than the Ministry of 
Justice, the prosecutors, and the courts’.763 The Committee of Political and Legislative 
Affairs, as a central committee directly controlled by the Government, has the 
responsibility to control and oversee the performances of all the legal departments, 
including the Supreme Court of China.764 
 
7.3.3 Social determinant—Confucianism  
In addition to the interventions discussed above, there may also be an interaction 
between the Government and other social determinants. We shall take Confucianism as 
an example here. China has taken a unique path that is strongly affected by 
Confucianism, which emphasises order, balance and harmony. From a political 
dimension, the Communist Party could struggle to maintain its authority without an 
ideological underpinning.765 Confucianism, emphasizing ‘the central role of the state in 
the society’, would seem to provide a ready-made ideology that teaches people to 
respect the authority of the Government, and does not challenge its rules.766 Indeed, 
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Confucianism is the notion of ‘suppressing one’s desires and maintaining a high moral 
ground’, which has been advocated and used over generations by the Chinese 
Government to maintain its authority over social affairs and thus improve social 
unity.767 Aside from the historical impact of Confucianism itself, the Government is 
making a great effort to reinforce the impact of Confucianism on individual political 
views. Relevant approaches include the proposed idea of Harmonious Society in 
2004768 and the Chinese Dream in 2013.769  
 
Given the impact of Confucianism on society, the Chinese Government may naturally 
attempt to affect a director’s way of thinking by implementation of this way of 
working. Non-profit board governance could also be affected in two respects. First, 
from an individual level, directors, heavily affected by Confucianism, could 
acknowledge the importance of worshiping authority, and therefore fear to challenge 
others’ exercise of authority (especially by managers) in board meetings.770 However, 
this would go against a director’s most essential task, which is to supervise and 
challenge managers’ decisions when necessary.771 From another perspective, the non-
profit, as an entity, may respect the power of the Government, and thus be more willing 
to accept orders in any given situation. 772  Consequently, this could weaken the 
independence of non-profits from the Government, which shall be further discussed in 
section 7.4.2.1.  
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7.3.4 Interplay between the Government and non-profit governance (internal and 
external governance)  
Based on the preceding analysis, I would argue that in the non-profit sector in China, 
the interaction of internal and external governance operates in a way that is quite unlike 
that in Western countries. In Western countries, it is readily accepted that external 
governance may well influence and guide the operation of internal mechanisms within 
an organisation. Most obviously, external legal rules can influence the way the board 
functions as an internal control mechanism. External capital markets can drive internal 
transparency arrangements or boardroom accountability, and so on. However, internal 
governance mechanisms are understood not to have any impact upon external ones.773 
The internal arrangement a particular company makes for, say, the operation of its own 
board, is assumed to make no difference to the external governance norms. Such 
external norms are general, applying universally, and will not be changed in relation to 
a particular company because of the local internal mechanism it has chosen to adopt. 
The influence, in other words, is ‘one directional’ – from the external to the internal, 
but not vice versa. 
 
By contrast, in China there is a two way process of influence. As in the West, the 
external influences the internal. But, crucially, the internal can also influence the 
external. Internal and external governance are, in other words, interactive functions in 
China. The internal arrangements a particular company has chosen to adopt can indeed 
influence how external governance mechanisms are then applied against that particular 
company. Why does the Chinese system operate in this way? The primary reason 
leading to this difference between China and Western countries is because the Chinese 
Government is actively involved in the process of governance through its direct impact 
on the implementation of regulation. Compared to Western legal systems, which 
operate separately to the government, as section 7.3.2 has already started to detail, legal 
regulations and their implementation in China are heavily influenced by the 
Government policy. Moreover, as sections 8.3 and 8.4 will demonstrate, most non-
profit regulations remain silent on the subject of governance issues, which therefore 
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Country Levels' (2014) 22 Corporate Governance: An International Review 179, 183 
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leaves considerable space for the Government to make use of their discretionary 
powers during the implementation process.  
 
This discussion will be supplemented by evidence in sections 7.4.2.1 and 8.4.4.2.2, 
demonstrating how the Government’s attitudes toward non-profits can vary greatly 
depending on whether the Government trusts the organisation and how close their 
relationship may be. But because of that, non-profits in China may in turn influence 
Government decisions by establishing and building up appropriate networks with the 
Government.774 According to this logic, non-profits in China may also have an impact 
on the implementation of (external) regulations by maintaining connections with, and 
thus gaining trust from, the Government. Consequently, there exists a high possibility 
that the relationship between Government and non-profits will influence the way in 
which legal regulations are implemented. This relationship may be understood 
according to the following Table 7.2.   
 






774 Social networks can be defined as guanxi in China. guanxi and how could it influence board 
governance and Government decisions shall be extensively examined in the following part and in 
Chapter 8. 
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7.4 Modifying the blueprint in light of the Chinese contextual factors  
Following our analysis of transplantation barriers above, we can now consider how our 
blueprint for the non-profit board should be modified to make it appropriate for China. 
Recall the four basic attributes of non-profit board governance on which we focused: 
board size, characteristics, structure and process. Whilst these four attributes are as 
important in China as in the West,775 there is less agreement on how these attributes 
might be affected by the contextual determinants identified above.776 That is the task 
now before us. 
 
7.4.1 Board size 
Recall our earlier discussion regarding the most appropriate size for non-profit boards. 
We suggested that, overall, there seemed to be a good case, in general, for favouring 
larger boards for non-profits. In particular, larger boards seemed better able to fulfil the 
multiple roles that our ‘integrated model for board governance’ requires. They will be 
able to devote sufficient time and effort to the control role, whilst also attending to the 
strategic and service roles (including ensuring sufficient space for stakeholder 
representatives). Larger boards will be less likely to become dominated by more 
powerful, expert, full-time managerial insiders, and less dependent on a small number 
of key individuals whose departure could cause significant difficulties for the 
organisation.  
 
However, we also noted that, set against these advantages, there were also a number of 
potential downsides in enlarging the board. There was an increased chance of ‘social 
loafing’ by some members, and a greater tendency towards ‘group think’. There was 
the risk that board meetings would become too long, too unfocused and inefficient as 
larger numbers of directors all competed to participate. And non-profits might simply 
struggle, practically, to find enough willing recruits to produce a board of a 
theoretically ideal size.   
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Our task now is to see how this balance of advantages and disadvantages plays out in 
the specific context of China. In doing so, we focus on two key points. Firstly, as noted, 
larger board structures are assumed to be more capable of co-opting external influence 
and therefore being more effective at resource collection. Section 7.4.1.1 tests whether 
this assumption holds true for China, given the influence of contextual factors. 
Secondly, we shall examine whether the positive relationship between board size and 
group thinking noted above is likely to hold in the Chinese context. Here, two 
important Chinese social determinants – guanxi (network) and Mianzi (face saving) – 
shall be examined. We may infer from the argument below that these two social 
determinants, which widely occur throughout Chinese society, may also influence a 
director’s behaviour and the way that non-profits deal with business partners.  
 
7.4.1.1 guanxi and resource collection  
guanxi has been defined by Smith, Chua and Morris as ‘a Chinese version of 
networking’.777 ‘It has more to do with the building and maintaining of deep, complex 
interpersonal relationships and bonds between individuals’ 778  Within Chinese non-
profits, a large board is considered desirable not only because of the enhanced resource 
collection ability organisations of this kind tend to be capable of achieving, but also due 
to the influence of guanxi (network) in Chinese society. The larger the board, the more 
directors, and the more individuals who can build and maintain guanxi, and thus 
facilitate the resource collection function of the board. guanxi ‘serves as a form of 
insurance in an otherwise risky business environment’.779 Many observers have noted 
that lacking a sufficient guanxi or network can be a ‘fundamental barrier’ to attaining 
business entry in to some environments.780  Meanwhile, guanxi facilitates not only 
access to financial support, but also to other resources such as information and 
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777 guanxi is essentially the influence of relatives, friends, and contacts; see R Y J Chua and M W Morris, 
'Dynamics of Trust in Guanxi Networks' (2006) 9 Research on Managing Groups and Teams 95; Smith, 
(n639)  
778 Chua and Morris, (n777) 13 
779 T Casciaro and M J Piskorski, 'Power Imbalance, Mutual Dependence, and Constraint Absorption: A 
Closer Look at Resource Dependence Theory' (2005) 50 Administrative Science Quarterly 167 209; K K 
Xin and J L Pearce, 'Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for Formal Institutional Support' (1996) 39 
Academy of Management Journal 1641 
780 Xin and Pearce, (n779); Smith, (n639); C Ho and K A Redfern, 'Consideration of the Role of Guanxi 
in the Ethical Judgments of Chinese Managers' (2010) 96 Journal of Business Ethics 207  
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transaction priorities.781 Accordingly, in order to fulfil their boundary-spanning role, the 
most important matter to Chinese non-profits is to establish guanxi in the markets 
through which they operate.  
 
To see this more clearly, we need to understand better just how guanxi works in 
Chinese society. There are basically three layers of guanxi, based upon how close the 
relationships are between those involved. The most basic level is shengren 
(strangers). 782  The instinct of most Chinese people is to distrust and avoid doing 
business with shengren unless they are able to step up to the second category, shuren.783 
Shuren refers to ‘individuals with which commonalities exist’.784 These commonalities 
originate from a variety of aspects of social life.785 The third category, the closest 
relationship among individuals, is jiaren, namely, a ‘family member-like 
relationship’. 786  While kinship is undoubtedly regarded as the closest relationship, 
Chinese people also treat those extremely trustworthy people as their family members, 
even if they are not blood relatives.787 Since establishing connections with the right 
people can provide tremendous benefits in business transactions, every individual and 
organisation in China seeks to ‘move beyond the shengren status’ and be taken as 
shuren or even jiaren.788  
 
Although important to China, it can be argued that the social connection (guanxi) in 
Western business culture can be equally important to transactions too. The blueprint 
outlined in Chapter 4, as well as the later discussion of legal regulations (Chapter 5), 
have pointed to the fact that UK non-profits equally appreciate the importance of 
building and maintaining good relationships with their partners, be these individuals or 
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781 T W Dunfee and D E Warren, 'Is Guanxi Ethical? A Normative Analysis of Doing Business in China' 
(2001) 32 Journal of Business Ethics 191  
782 shuren refers to those individuals who have met for the first time. 
783 P P Fu, A S Tsui and G G Dess, 'The Dynamics of Guanxi in Chinese Hightech Firms: Implications 
for Knowledge Management and Decision Making' (2006) 46 Management International Review 277 
784 U C Braendle, T Gasser and J Noll, 'Corporate Governance in China—Is Economic Growth Potential 
Hindered by Guanxi?' (2005) 110 Business and Society Review 389, 393 
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786 Fu, Tsui and Dess, (n783) 
787 H Davies and others, 'The Benefits of “Guanxi”: The Value of Relationships in Developing the 
Chinese Market' (1995) 24 Industrial Marketing Management 207, 211 
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organisations.789 Accordingly, it might be argued, the prevalence of guanxi in China 
will not make any significant difference to the decisions or board size of Chinese non-
profits, compared to, say, those in the UK. But this understates the significance of 
guanxi in Chinese business relationships. For ‘in China, business is driven to a much 
greater extent by relationships and connections than is business in many other 
economies’.790 This relationship-based approach to business, as Alston calls it, has 
numerous ramifications for non-profit organisations involved in any business 
transactions.791 The range of different approaches there are to building connections 
indicate a range of differences between China and Western countries.  
 
Firstly, there are differences between the social understandings of guanxi. guanxi, as 
the core social value in China, would appear to be more fundamental to business in 
Chinese society than those in Western countries. Vanhonacker summarizes this when 
arguing, ‘…in the West, relationships grow out of deals; in China, deals grow out of 
relationships’.792 As such, guanxi has become ‘a carefully calculated science’ that is an 
‘unwritten law’ that has emerged from Chinese society.793 As research by Garten states, 
people in Western countries consider wealth as the symbol of a successful businessman, 
whereas the greatest business achievement in China is the establishment of guanxi.794  
 
Secondly, the approach taken to establishing guanxi tends to vary from country to 
country. guanxi in China has been defined by Levin as a long-term deep and complex 
connection that is ‘developed and nurtured over time, in many cases, without a specific 
need for that relationship’.795 Indeed, “[b]y ‘using’ the individual with whom one has 
guanxi, the moral code of reciprocity means that the user is likely to be called upon at a 
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789 For instance, the rise of business associations in Western countries have partly been to provide 
opportunities for organisations to establish networks and thus conduct business on the basis of well-
formed relationships; see Y Fan, 'Ganxi's Consequences: Personal Gains at Social Cost' (2002) 38 
Journal of Business Ethics 371, 380 
790 Smith, (n639) 7; J P Alston, 'Wa, Guanxi, and Inhwa: Managerial Principles in Japan, China, and 
Korea' (1989) 32 Business Horizons 26, 28 
791 Alston, (n790) 34  
792 Vanhonacker, (n35) 28  
793 D Z Levin and R Cross, 'The Strength of Weak Ties You Can Trust: The Mediating Role of Trust in 
Effective Knowledge Transfer' (2004) 50 Management Science 1477 
794 This can be explained as follow: ‘to those in the West, where you can secure a deal through formal 
meetings even if you don't know someone’, while without the assistance of guanxi, it is especially 
challenging to make a deal; see ibid 1487 
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later, unspecified date, to assist the other party [in] solving unpredictable issues”.796 As 
Smith further explains, guanxi cannot be developed until ‘you have a problem’ and, 
instead, people should take a long-term view. 797  However, Western culture is not 
accustomed to the slow building of relationships, especially those with unpredictable 
short-term returns or gains. From the perspective of Western non-profits, only those 
relationships likely to bring benefits to the organisation in the relatively near future are 
likely to be selected and developed by the board.798  
 
According to the discussion so far, it could be assumed that non-profit boards in China 
do not necessarily identify directors as being responsible for any specific kind of task. 
Instead, the expanding membership of an organisation’s board may be merely to show 
an attempt by the non-profit to establish guanxi with particular institutions or 
individuals.799 This behaviour of the non-profit board could be understood as a gesture 
of goodwill. Excluding these people from non-profit boards would signal the non-
profit’s intention to cut off this particular guanxi, which may then put the non-profit at 
a disadvantage.800  
 
7.4.1.2 mianzi and social status 
Although the oversized nature of non-profit boards in China may have the effect of 
improving guanxi, and thus lend itself to the facilitation of fund-raising or resource 
collection, by contrast, as we have argued in 4.3, this is likely to result in an increase of 
agency costs and unnecessary administrative expenses. Indeed, in order to reduce the 
agency cost without deterring the non-profit’s resource collection function, research by 
Vandenbrouke, Knockaert and Ucbasaran suggested that resource collectors may 
consider working outside the non-profit board, a practice that has already found success 
in many other European countries.801  
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This practice would appear to be efficient at first glance. However, it is unlikely to 
work well in Chinese non-profits. In China, those who fulfil the position of boundary 
spanners in non-profits always prefer to have a position on the board, since the title of 
director, according to the traditional Chinese class hierarchies,802 is regarded as a much 
higher social class than that of employee.803 Such social hierarchy matters are of the 
utmost importance to Chinese people, owing to the traditional understanding of mianzi 
(saving face).804 Saving face may be understood as ‘…the lengths that an individual 
may go to in order to preserve their established position in society, taking action to 
ensure that one is not thought badly of by his or her peers’. 805  With its root in 
Confucianism, mianzi is ‘a sociological manifestation of the respect, pride, and dignity 
of an individual or business’.806 Ting-Toomey noted that mianzi is one of the most 
precious social tools of the Chinese people, and a strategy that protects self-respect and 
individual identity.807  
 
Admittedly, face saving is essential in many cultures throughout the world, and people 
in Western countries may also prefer to be members of a board with the title of director 
rather than work as a normal employee. However, Chinese culture would appear to 
place greater emphasis on face-saving.808 For example, Chinese culture strictly adheres 
to a hierarchical regimentation, where people may be strictly classified according to a 
different hierarchy, primarily based on their working positions. 809  Accordingly, 
‘treating name cards with respect is a central element of face—looking at the name 
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802 The Chinese class hierarchies are based on the classification of the four traditional occupations: ‘in 
descending order, these were the shi (gentry scholars), the nong (peasant farmers), the gong (artisans and 
craftsmen), and the shang (merchants and traders)’; see S McQuaide and A J Barbieri-Low, Artisans in 
Early Imperial China (University of Washington Press 2009)  
803 Accordingly, to improve resource collection ability, non-profits have to cater to the demands from 
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804 mianzi, or face, is regarded as another core value within the Chinese social setting and therefore of 
significance in the context of non-profit governance. 
805 Smith, (n639) 
806 P J Buckley, J Clegg and H Tan, 'Cultural Awareness in Knowledge Transfer to China—the Role of 
Guanxi and Mianzi' (2006) 41 Journal of World Business 275  
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Gudykunst (eds) Theories in Intercultural Communication (Sage, 1988)  
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card, commenting on the individual’s job, and treating the item with respect all save 
face to the individual’.810  
 
7.4.1.3 Group thinking 
A further concern in respect of large boards is likely to be the issue of effective group 
thinking, which may also be referred to as herding-type behaviours. Research carried 
out in relation to Western organisations would appear to suggest that herding 
behaviours within the board can have the effect of destroying director creativity.811 
Indeed, this can have the effect of undermining the argument in favour of a large board 
in Chinese non-profits, since without a director’s creativity, the strategic role of the 
board could be ruined. Whilst this view is addressed in more detail below, it would 
seem the herding behaviour mentioned is thought to have little impact on board 
efficiency in China. Indeed, given the evident pros and cons of board size noted above, 
we may conclude that, unlike non-profit organisations in the UK, the size of non-profit 
board in China is heavily influenced by contextual factors.812 Non-profits, especially 
those with financial difficulties, are likely to do well by expanding on their board in 
order to improve their boundary-spanning role. 
 
7.4.2 Board characteristics 
We now turn to address ‘board characteristics’ in the Chinese context, focusing on a 
director’s independence and her background.  
7.4.2.1 Directors’ independence 
As the blueprint outlined in section 4.4 has made clear, director’s independence is 
linked to a variety of benefits. Nevertheless, in China, the independence of non-profit 
directors may be heavily influenced by social determinants. Indeed, compared to the 
UK, directorial independence is far more complex in China, owing to two contextual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
810 Smith, (n639), 9  
811 ‘Group members try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision without critical evaluation 
of alternative viewpoints, by actively suppressing dissenting viewpoints, and by isolating themselves 
from outside influences’; see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, (n396) 
812 Brown and Guo, (n179) 
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factors (guanxi, and Chinese collectivism). Section 7.4.2.1.1 will explore how a 
director’s independence could be affected by external guanxi (directors’ social network 
with their business partners). Section 7.4.2.1.2 will then investigate the interaction 
between director’s independence and internal guanxi (director’s connection with their 
colleagues/other directors). During this process, Chinese collectivism shall be taken 
into account. Finally, section 7.4.2.1.3 shall modify the blueprint to reflect the reality of 
directors’ independence in the Chinese context.  
 
7.4.2.1.1 External guanxi (director’s network with business partners)  
We have seen how external guanxi, between a board and its business partners, can 
compromise a director’s independence. And yet, failing to develop guanxi could be a 
fundamental barrier to business in China. In reality, then, non-profits in China 
frequently have to compromise board independence in exchange for a better guanxi.813 
Put differently, directors are encouraged to enable their friends and relatives to be 
involved in transactions, so as to secure resources and thus facilitate the boundary 
spanning role of non-profits. In spite of the advantage that guanxi could bring to non-
profits, the board should be aware of the negative guanxi that may result in a wide 
range of misconduct, such as corruption, which shall be examined in 7.4.2.1.3. 
  
7.4.2.1.2 Internal guanxi (director’s relationship with colleague) 
In addition to the external guanxi, the internal guanxi, referring to the individual 
director’s connection with their colleagues, could also significantly affect a director’s 
independence. In the Chinese context, the internal guanxi is closely linked with 
Chinese collectivism. Concerning non-profit governance, the notion of Chinese 
collectivism is one that promotes the idea of better director connections, which is to say 
greater interdependence rather than their independence.814 Collectivism as a concept is 
closely associated with other ‘positive’ concepts such as teamwork, unified 
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813  Since the concept of guanxi is deeply rooted in Chinese ideology, business is often conducted 
between individuals who share a close relationship; see Smith, (n639)  
814 Shi, (n746) 
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management, and working efficiency. 815  Consequently, in light of collectivism, 
directors in the Chinese context treat connections as a human resource net to improve 
working efficiency, rather than something that infringes upon independence.816 As such, 
to encourage and facilitate the establishment of collectivism within non-profit boards in 
China, directors are more likely to select people with whom they are already familiar, 
preferably with close guanxi. As a result, they will favour family members, such as 
jiaren, rather than those who offer a solely commercial advantage.  
 
As Collier has argued, it is vital to recognize the importance of collectivism, which has 
developed for a long time as a social rule within the Chinese context. Indeed, the 
concept of individualism, which was introduced to China from the West over the recent 
two decades, strongly counters the traditional collectivism of ancient China,817 where 
reliance upon collective behaviours and interdependence had become engrained among 
modern day Chinese citizens.818 Research by Braendle and others noted that ‘social and 
economic transactions in collectivist cultures are organized around small groups 
defined by familial, tribal, ethnic, religious, or other social relationships’.819  
 
In essence, this is thought to be based on the mutual trust environment in the Chinese 
society, which has gradually diminished as people refuse to communicate with 
strangers and are more reliant on guanxi they have already built by themselves.820 
Interestingly here, a social attitude survey in 2013 indicated a dramatic decline in social 
trust in China. Results revealed over 70% of respondents did not trust strangers, and 
their trust in business operators in particular was extremely low.821 As such, guanxi 
contacts that begin with personal relationships founded on trust and prospects of mutual 




815 ibid  
816 ibid  
817 Braendle, Gasser and Noll, (n784) 393  
818 ibid 391 
819 ibid 390  
820 China’s transformational economy and diversified social values have accelerated the trust crisis to a 
stage where it is almost past the point of no return; see Chu, (n732) 332 
821 H Gao and others, 'Spillover of Distrust from Domestic to Imported Brands in a Crisis-Sensitized 
Market' (2015) 23 Journal of International Marketing 91  
822 Vanhonacker, (n35) 52 
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7.4.2.1.3 Directors’ independence and guanxi  
Based upon such work, and in order to secure directors’ independence, without 
affecting resource collection and positive interpersonal relationship, we intend to 
distinguish positive guanxi from negative guanxi, and treat them differently. In spite of 
people’s frequent usage of guanxi, Chinese people are often prone to treat it as a 
negative activity, inextricably linked to the existence of corrupt practices (perhaps due 
to social pressures and custom), rather than trustworthy ones.823 However, guanxi need 
not necessarily destroy directors’ independence. In fact, guanxi, according to many 
theorists, can be understood as a ‘neutral’ word.824  Indeed, ‘[w]hen used for legal 
purposes that do not infringe on public interests, guanxi can be an extremely useful 
way for members of a relationship network to take care of legitimate personal or 
business affairs’.825  
 
Both positive and negative features of the practice of guanxi have been reflected 
through the earlier research conducted in to the use of guanxi in the Chinese business 
world. Positive guanxi, commonly being associated with power and authority and the 
extension of resources in society, has been considered a major source of business 
success within Chinese society.826 To non-profit boards, positive guanxi can improve 
board efficiency, and create a better working environment, without necessarily affecting 
directors’ independence of judgment.827 Conversely, in this context, negative guanxi828 
will occur only on the condition that ‘the exchange or transaction taking place 
within guanxi involves corrupt activities or one or more of the parties operate outside 
the law’.829  
 
Given the discussion so far, it would appear irrational to ask or expect non-profit 
directors in China to be as independent as those in the UK, as this will destroy the 
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826 Ho and Redfern, (n780) 
827 ibid  
828 A typical negative guanxi example is the recent scandal in Chinese non-profits involving Guo Meimei, 
a young woman who posted numerous pictures of her lavish lifestyle on the Internet. She claimed to 
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earthquake; see Hong and FlorCruz, (n682) 
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positive guanxi, which is particularly important to non-profit governance. Research by 
Tamanaha, which has sought to build upon this, noted that positive guanxi has been 
relied upon as a mechanism for organisational governance when legal and institutional 
mechanisms fail to resolve problem in a reliable manner.830 He further divided social 
rules into two categories – ‘the rule of man’ (Chinese guanxi mechanisms) and ‘the rule 
of law’ (international standards and use of legal norms).831 In China, people are more 
likely to handle their conflicts by the rule of man (guanxi) than they are to adopt the 
apparently ‘Western’ approach.832 Based upon the argument above, it can be concluded 
that positive guanxi will not destroy a director’s independence, which is an 
acceptable/welcomed matter in the Chinese context. 833  Non-profits are therefore 
recommended to establish a threshold (but one that is more permissive than in the UK 
standard) based on the contextual factors mentioned above, in order to restrict directors’ 
connections with the relevant organisations and individuals. 
 
7.4.2.2 Directors’ background 
What type of people should sit on Chinese non-profit boards? Three types of directors 
shall be discussed here: Government-appointed directors (7.4.2.2.1), directors affected 
by danwei system (7.4.2.2.2) and directors with professional knowledge (7.4.2.2.3).  
 
7.4.2.2.1 Government-appointed directors 
The Government can influence non-profits ‘externally’, from outside, without actually 
becoming a director. However, is it better, or worse, for Chinese non-profits to the 
Government inside the organisation, giving them an external role in governance, 
through appointing one or more government representatives as directors? What are the 
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advantages and disadvantages, for the non-profit itself, of taking that step? The 
following sections will provide a further investigation.  
 
7.4.2.2.1.1 Advantages (financial and administrative resource) 
Consistent with stakeholder salience theory in Chapter 4, theorists believe that the 
Chinese Government, as one of the most powerful and influential stakeholders in China, 
often takes priority when getting to sit in the boardroom.834 Guo identified that there 
are two advantages to having government representatives–provide funding and 
facilitate administrative resources. 835  Firstly, the Government serves as a major 
funding source for most registered non-profits in China. Over 56% of non-profits 
surveyed in 2014 relied heavily on government funds.836 Between 2012 and 2013, the 
Chinese Central Government provided about $200 million each year for social services, 
provided by non-profits which have a close relationship with the Government. 837 
Directors themselves have noted that adding several government employees does not 
harm the board, rather such people can bring in money that other directors may find 
difficult to obtain through public support.838 
 
Secondly, having government officials on the board of a non-profit may help non-
profits to overcome administrative barriers, such as registration difficulties.839 As we 
shall see in Chapter 8, in China neither the national constitution, acts of law nor other 
regulations confer a positive right to establish a non-profit. Indeed, law had provided 
for the set-up of a dual management system, ‘whereby so-called sponsor organisations 
are involved, alongside the Government body’, to take charge of the registration, 
management and monitoring of non-profits.840 In practice, these sponsor organisations 
are actually affiliated to and controlled by Government departments.841 
 
As Li and Zhang note, ‘the dual management system gives almost all of important 
power to business supervision units of government in charge, and the government 
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stipulates that only the agencies authorized by government and the Communist Party 
can serve as business units in charge’.842 This situation obviously leaves non-profits 
with no choice but to welcome government representatives to join the board. Although 
no legal rule requires this, theorists believe that it has already become the unspoken 
rule that non-profits are better to include government officials in their boardroom.843  
 
7.4.2.2.1.2 Deficiencies (loss of independence) 
There is little doubt that establishing a close connection with government authorities 
often may bring short-term benefits to a non-profit. Once a non-profit permits a 
government representative to sit on the board in exchange for an amicable relationship 
with the Government, then it will often gradually lose its independence. Guo noted 
within his research that over-depending on the Government is likely to ‘push nonprofit 
boards away from the making of important decisions and even further away from the 
community’.844 Firstly, the Government, as the primary (and perhaps the only) funding-
provider, could take advantage of this and use its control over funding as a source of 
discretionary power. 
 
Moreover, the Chinese Government may interfere with the daily-operation and 
governance of non-profits. For example, research has indicated that ‘the Government 
has always attempted to prevent non-profits taking those sensitive activities that uphold 
citizens' political and other rights which could politically challenge government’.845 Li 
then uses the term ‘government offside’ to describe the common phenomenon in the 
non-profit sector, which refers to “governmental actions ‘without legal basis’, which 
mainly reflect in the fact that government is directly involved in non-profit fundraising, 
the usage of charity funds, and that the government intervenes in the internal 
management of social organisations”.846 
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that has three or more CCP members to establish a party branch to supervise its political behavior’ since 
1998; see Guo and others, (n627) 
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However, as we have consistently argued so far, non-profits, no matter in China or in 
Western countries, serve as the third sector, supposedly independent from the 
commercial market and the government. Salamon and Anheier have argued, ‘non-
profits are not only formal, private, and non-profit distributing, they are also self-
governing and voluntary’.847 However, it is largely assumed, once non-profits in China 
rely upon Government support, then sooner or later, they will end up as government-
affiliated organisations, catering for Government preferences alone.848 Meanwhile, by 
virtue of their interaction with the state, often such non-profits will then lose the 
public’s confidence.  
 
At present, when compared to the practices in the UK, the number of non-profits 
supported by the Chinese Government is extremely high. Somewhat expectedly, 
perhaps, the Government is believed to carry significant weight in the governance and 
management of these non-profits. Although having guanxi with the Government is not 
by itself sufficient to enable non-profits to achieve their organisational goals, more 
often than not it is a significant factor in smoothing out the delivery of their day-to-day 
functions.849 Accordingly, the non-profit sector could build a proper relationship of 
trust with the Government as an independent organisation, rather than being 
government affiliated institutions.  
 
7.4.2.2.2 Board members influenced by ‘danwei’ system  
In spite of the changing policy towards non-profits, board governance in China remains 
government-denominated through a variety of unique Chinese mechanisms. The 
danwei system is one such mechanism, which has existed in Chinese society since 
before the year 2003.850 Notably, no researcher has attempted to link the danwei system 
with non-profit governance to date, so far as I am aware. This is perhaps surprising, 
since danwei could significantly affect the performance of non-profit directors and with 
it their way of thinking. The danwei system itself, and its relationship with non-profits, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
847 Salamon and Anheier, (n82) 
848 S Cho and D F Gillespie, 'A Conceptual Model Exploring the Dynamics of Government–Nonprofit 
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is introduced in section 7.4.2.2.2.1, and section 7.4.2.2.2.2 then investigates how the 
danwei system could affect director’s performance and thus influence non-profit 
governance.   
 
7.4.2.2.2.1 Relationship between danwei system and non-profits  
The danwei system was a government-controlled work unit tied to almost every urban 
resident in China during the Maoist period.851 It provided ‘employment and welfare 
benefits such as free housing, schooling and health care’.852 Most urban residents were 
also required to ask for permission from the system if they intended to undertake events 
such as travel and marriage.853 It was ‘the first step of a multi-tiered hierarchy linking 
each individual with the central Communist Party infrastructure’, and ensuring that 
citizens obeyed the Communist Party's rules.854 
 
Broadly speaking, the danwei system was the old version of non-profits, though as an 
operation its social function was far more than that. Almost all the social welfare 
services in China at the time were provided by local Government in the form of a 
danwei system.855 danwei, in both cities and rural areas, was considered to be “self-
sufficient entities [provided] ‘cradle-to-grave welfare’ filling the space that non-profits 
often inhabit” today in the Chinese society.856 With the implementation of reforms, the 
traditional structure of danwei was profoundly changed, and then replaced either by 
official/private non-profit organisations, or by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 857 
Although the danwei system has gradually lost its dominant role since the launch of 
these reforms, it continues to affect the governing mechanism of the newly established 
communities in its own way, particular in respect of administrative and procedural 
traditions, for example.858 This shall be further addressed below.  
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promotion or better housing to imprisonment. Beijing, ‘Danwei people become citizens’ (The Economist, 
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7.4.2.2.2.2 The impact of danwei system on directors 
Naturally, the effect of removing the danwei system has also had an impact on the 
governance of non-profits as these exist today. In spite of this, it might be said the 
danwei system was rather a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can be said to 
have improved guanxi between non-profits and local Government, primarily because a 
majority of today’s non-profit employers were in the danwei system, which itself 
belonged to the Government.859 Therefore, directors may still take advantage of this to 
facilitate their fund-raising for non-profits. Conversely, on the other hand, the old 
tradition inherited from danwei might be said to prohibit the application of the modern 
way of thinking – or Western mode of governance – within Chinese non-profits.860  
 
To the system itself, there were basically two typical characteristics recognized in 
China as the danwei system – strong political control and traditional bureaucratic 
mechanism, and research has suggested these two features may influence a non-profit 
director’s way of thinking and behaviour in two specific ways.861 First, those non-profit 
directors who experienced working under the danwei system would have been required 
to attend mandatory weekly meetings to study the Chinese Party’s documents, for the 
purpose of cultivating their personal respect and worship of the Chinese 
Government.862 As a result, those non-profit directors would likely voluntarily follow 
Government policy, and would not go against government representatives in the 
decision-making process. 
 
Second, the danwei system has been applied to the Chinese society for decades, which 
could have significant impact on individual’s performance and ideology. It is highly 
likely that non-profit directors who were ‘brought up with’ or operated within the 
frame of the danwei system will be heavily influenced by the traditional mode of 
thinking, and the bureaucratic mechanisms that are associated with this.863 Moreover, 
non-profit directors who were part of the danwei system could have a sense of spiritual 
attachment and belonging to this system.864 Accordingly, many may refuse to adapt to, 
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or accept, a new mechanism, particularly based upon Western governance. The danwei 
system therefore has the effect of impacting upon a director’s independent thinking 
ability, creativity and decision-making skills.  
 
7.4.2.2.3 Professionalism and expertise 
Professional knowledge and expertise, as we argued in 4.4, may be equally, if not more, 
important to non-profits in China than to organisations in the UK. Research indicates 
that without the assistance of professional directors, a non-profit board in China could 
be more likely to shift its governance towards Government control, owing to some of 
the historic factors addressed above.865 However, compared to what may be expected of 
a UK-based blueprint, the Chinese non-profit would appear to show a contrasting 
attitude towards professionals on the board. The directors of Chinese non-profits are 
frequently inactive in their role, insofar as many know very little about their 
organisations and their duties or functions.866 Evidence would appear to suggest that 
directors do not understand the importance of governance in the non-profit sector, 
primarily because the majority of Chinese non-profits do not believe they are part of 
the ‘epistemic community’ or community of experts.867 Fieldwork statistics equally 
suggest that the majority of non-profits do not consider professional knowledge as an 
important tactic to improving board effectiveness.868  
 
In spite of this complex understanding of professional knowledge that exists throughout 
China, non-profits have recently attempted to improve on matters pertaining to board 
professionalism. Research indicated that there has been a noted change in the 
recruitment policy of many Chinese non-profits over the past few years —more 
emphasis was placed upon candidates’ professional knowledge. 869  Applicants are 
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865 This may include, but is not limited to, the overreliance on the Government’s fund, a multitude of 
government representatives on the board, and the impact of danwei system.  
866 Huang and others, (n41) 
867 A Li, ‘Critical Examination of the Legal Environment for Social Organisations in China’, in Y Li (ed), 
Freedom of Association in China and Europe (Brill, 2005) 
868 Rather, building up long-lasting guanxi with government authorities is often perceived as being the 
primary tactic to influencing the Government’s decision making; see K W Simon, 'Regulation of Civil 
Society in China: Necessary Changes after the Olympic Games and the Sichuan Earthquake' (2009) 32 
Fordham International Law Journal 943 
869  G Peterson, 'Overseas Chinese and Merchant Philanthropy in China: From Culturalism to 
Nationalism' (2005) 1 Journal of Chinese Overseas 87, 88  
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usually now required to have higher educational qualifications in order to perform their 
role.870 Despite the efforts made by many non-profits, cultural factors may get in the 
way of recruiting professional directors in China.871 To be specific, the Chinese people 
tend to seek to create a harmonious working environment, and avoid conflict and 
disagreement. 872  As such, directors and managers do not like their opinions to be 
challenged, particularly by those fully-qualified professionals, who they may perceive 
as threatening their authority. 873  And so, empirical evidence indicates that when 
selecting from candidate directors, features such as personality, flexibility and their 
attitude toward authority and senior directors may outweigh an individual’s 
professional knowledge and experiences.874  
 
7.5 Board structure (anti-corruption committee) 
We have already been able to note some of the advantages that having a committee 
structure can bring to an organisation. However, in the context of China, this work 
argues there is a practical need for a specialist committee absent from the blueprint so 
far. This is, specifically, an anti-corruption committee. A wealth of recent literature in 
this area would appear to indicate that in countries with a high level of corruption, 
organisations do not normally have good corporate governance practices.875 As a result, 
this work argues that the blueprint proposed should be adapted to include a requirement 
that boards create an anti-corruption committee as a primary part of the sub-committee 
structure.  
 
Of course, many might argue that almost every country, including the most advanced 
democratic one, with well-developed institutions, may and often do encounter 
corruption scandals. Corruption, it has been said, is ‘the humiliation of agents due to 
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the deficiency of moral principles’.876 This may be, and often is, multifaceted and can 
be categorized on different scales, based on varied criteria. Nevertheless, as the 
research below will indicate, the corruption in China is currently much more serious 
compared to that in most Western countries, which indicates the importance of the anti-
corruption committee to the non-profit governance.  
 
To distinguish between corruption in China and Western countries, Friedrich classifies 
corruption into three levels depending on the types of exchange between partners, and 
the number of people involved. These are petty corruption, grand corruption, and 
systemic corruption. 877 Based on this classification, theorists insist that, within recent 
years, China has experienced a wave of systemic corruption, most of which has been of 
a very serious kind, whereas Western countries such as UK experience typically only 
petty corruption.878  
 
Moreover, Rothstein claims corruption is more prominent in countries with weak anti-
corruption laws, and particularly within emerging markets, such as China.879  And, 
corruption is more common and accepted by society with a collectivist culture (such as 
China) since ‘people in collectivist culture cannot recognize and reveal corrupt 
behaviours’.880 The level of corruption in China could be further established by the 
result of the most recent anti-corruption campaign. 881  According to the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection in 2017, the campaign, launched in 2012, had 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
876 Braendle, Gasser and Noll, (n784) 
877 ‘Petty corruption occurs at a smaller scale and takes place at the implementation end of public 
services when public officials meet the public. Examples include the exchange of small improper gifts or 
use of personal connections to obtain favours...Grand corruption is defined as corruption occurring at the 
highest levels of government in a way that requires significant subversion of the political, legal and 
economic systems. Such corruption is commonly found in countries with authoritarian or dictatorial 
governments but also in those without adequate policing of corruption...[S]ystemic corruption (or 
endemic corruption) is corruption which is primarily due to the weaknesses of an organisation or process. 
Factors which encourage systemic corruption include conflicting incentives, discretionary powers; 
monopolistic powers; and a culture of impunity’; see C J Friedrich, 'Corruption Concepts in Historical 
Perspective' in A J H M Johnston (ed), Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts, vol 3 (Transaction 
Publishers 2002) 17  
878 S Yuen, 'Disciplining the Party: Xi Jinping's Anti-Corruption Campaign and Its Limits' (2014) China 
Perspectives 41 
879 B Rothstein, 'What Is the Opposite of Corruption?' (2014) 35 Third World Quarterly 737, 740 
880 This society’s perception has been classified as white corruption. Concerning the society’s 
perceptions, corruption can be classified as white, gray, and black. According to Collier, ‘white 
corruption means that the majority of society, including its elite and the masses, would not punish the 
particular behaviour’; see Collier, (n839) 
881 Most of the officials investigated so far in the campaign were removed from office, facing accusations 
of bribery and abuse of power.  
! 181!
resulted in more than 100,000 individuals being indicted for corruption.882 Nearly 2,600 
fugitives have been extradited or repatriated, and 8.6 billion yuan in assets were 
recovered.883 
 
Given the extensive corruption in the Chinese society and the argument towards guanxi 
above, the anti-corruption committee should be aware that any such anti-corruption 
process should be able to distinguish clearly a genuine guanxi from corrupt behaviour, 
and this distinction needs to be clearly specified by non-profits. Research carried out by 
Braendle, Gasser and Noll found that ‘guanxi can in many cases be interpreted as a 
borderline case of corruption’.884 Indeed, as we have argued, although there have been 
a number of incidences in which guanxi have been abused, naturally it would be 
irrational to consider every guanxi as the prospective source of corruption per se.   
 
7.6 Board meeting  
In the Chinese context, the decision-making process of non-profits could be shaped by 
contextual factors such as collectivism, guanxi, mianzi and Confucianism in the 
following ways. Firstly, the Confucianism, which places emphasis upon a ‘rigid social 
hierarchy’ and ‘deference towards leaders’, encourages top–down control.885 This top-
down control leadership model may also be understood as paternalism, with leaders 
telling people what to do and those people tend to do as they are told, 
unquestioningly.886 At the same time, seniors/leaders in an organisation do not expect 
or appreciate being challenged by their junior colleagues.887 As a result, this model in 
non-profit boards is likely to create strong barriers to communication between senior 
directors (such as the chair of the board) and juniors within the boardroom, and thus 
reduce information flow in the decision-making process.888  
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Secondly, frankness, arguments and conflicts are not appreciated during the board 
meeting. And so many do not want to give their opinions in public. Li et al recount 
how one corporate manager in China complained, with regard to board meetings, that 
‘no matter how much fellow colleagues may attempt to encourage others to participate 
in the meeting, they will sit there, smiling politely...Board members will not tell you 
when they do not understand’.889 Fear of losing face and damaging guanxi are often 
cited as reasons for Chinese unwillingness to deal with problems openly and directly. 
As Warner noted, directors always attempt to ensure that they can retain ‘face’ (or 
mianzi) in the presence of people of greater or similar seniority.890  However, this 
passive reaction of directors tends to lead to real discussion happening outside of the 
meeting, which could significantly reduce the information flow and creativity within 
the boardroom.  
 
Hall, a pioneer cross-culture researcher, explains all these typical individual 
performances in the Chinese context as follows. 891  Individuals could be heavily 
affected by the context of the society they are living in. 892  For example, Western 
countries belong to low-context societies, which are typified by high levels of 
forthright and explicit communication and the verbal and written communication of 
rules and norms.893 China belongs to the high-context societies, in which the most 
important principal ‘when dealing with business associates with who one must 
maintain working relationships’ is to ‘preserve harmony through deference, courtesy, 
and indirection’.894 
 
To deal with it, Warner suggested that the board meeting be held within a small group 
involving only the most relevant directors. 895  This can help to create a relatively 
relaxed environment to avoid directors’ pressure of proposing difficult questions and 
arguments. Through this approach, guanxi could be preserved, as well as mianzi. In 
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addition, small group discussions are an alternative approach that can encourage 
individuals to voice their opinions without the fear of embarrassment. To better 
understand the interaction between these Chinese social determinants and board 
meeting processes, relevant factors can be identified in Table 7.3 as follows.  
 
 





Contextual factors could affect the performances, choices and behaviours of individuals 
in the Chinese society. Values such as guanxi, corruption, face and collectivism 
embedded in the China have proven to have significant impacts on the governance 
regime in non-profit organisations. This chapter presents solid evidence on the 
influence of contextual factors in shaping the governance mechanism in the Chinese 
non-profits. In Chapter 7, we attempt to challenge the conventional wisdom on the 
influence of social factors and its relationship to the performance of non-profit 
governance. During the process, we are able to establish a tailored governance 



































Chapter 8 | Reviewing non-profit regulations in the Chinese context 
8.1 Introduction  
As the discussion in Chapter 6 has demonstrated, the last two decades have witnessed a 
significant rise in Chinese non-profits, particularly insofar as the scale and scope of 
their work in China is concerned. In spite of the great efforts made by non-profit 
practitioners, the legal framework governing the Chinese non-profit sector has long 
been criticized as being extremely vague, lacking in detail, disclosure requirements and 
any coherent form of governance structure. 896  Chinese legislators are now largely 
aware of this fact, and have posited various reforms to different aspects of the non-
profit sector.897 Meanwhile, various measures have been adopted over recent years to 
foster partnership between the Chinese Government and non-profit groups, which is a 
significant departure from previous practices.898  
 
Since the presence of, and ideas behind, non-profits in China are generally less 
developed, and therefore attract little attention within academic circles, often this has 
meant little or no research has been carried out in relation to comprehensively 
reviewing regulations in this sector.899 As mainstream academic literature in China 
tends to focus on predicting the attitude of the Chinese Government, analysing every 
detailed aspect of law and regulation in relation to this and its implementation, this has 
meant little has been done from the outset of exploring strategies to improve non-profit 
governance itself. And very little attention has been focused upon the matter of how 
could non-profits counterbalance the power and intervention of the Chinese 
Government.  
 
However, given the current performance of non-profit boards in China, improving 
board governance would appear to be particularly urgent and important. As we shall 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
896 Wu, (n875) 
897 Hasmath and Hsu, (n34) 49 
898 For instance, the Plan was officially released in the 25th session of the National People’s Congress in 
2013. This plan incorporates significant content on legislation that affects the Chinese non-profit sector. 
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note in the following analysis, compared to those good practices in many Western 
countries, the non-profit board in China often fails to play its role effectively. For 
example, a non-profit board in China has no power to dismiss itself, nor does it have 
the influential decision-making power over the non-profit governance and 
management.900 Hence, the politically weak board in China has long been criticized to 
be ‘ineffective in supervising directors and managers who are often appointed by, and 
generally have good connections with the Government’, the major funder of many non-
profits.901 In this respect, although the Amendments of the Company Law 2005 gives 
more power to the board, it does not provide any relevant practical instrument/ 
mechanism to exercise the monitoring power.902  
 
Accordingly, this work has opted not to follow the mainstream, and shall instead aim to 
test whether the current legal framework has underperformed and is counterproductive. 
To achieve this, this chapter will list relevant regulations in this area to consider 
whether they are able to satisfy the blueprint proposed. In doing so, this chapter is 
divided into three sections. Section 8.2 briefly summarizes the legal system for non-
profits in China; section 8.3 reviews regulations in relation to Chinese foundations 
under a modified blueprint; and section 8.4 then examines the performances of SOs and 
CNIs.  
 
8.2 Non-profit legal regulations and our research focus  
The most important regulations in relation to non-profits in China are the ‘Regulations 
on the Management of Foundations’ 903  (herein, the Foundation Regulations), the 
‘Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Social Organisations’904 (the 
SO regulations), and ‘Temporary Regulations on Registration and Administration of 
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Civil Non-business Institutions’905 (the CNI Regulations). Since the Charity Law 2016 
only came into force in September 2016,906 this Chapter 8 shall omit any discussion of 
that Act. Instead, Chapter 9 considers the Act as a whole, making a comprehensive 
discussion. This chapter will predominately focus on the first three regulations to 
explore the extent to which these may be regarded as helping to improve non-profit 
board governance in China.  
 
Ahead of doing so, we shall narrow the scope of our research by addressing the type of 
board.  
In contrast with the UK non-profit sector that operates using a one-tier board system, 
the Chinese legal system (both profit-based and non-profit organisations) imposes a 
two-tier board structure. In China, two separate boards of directors (the supervisory 
board and management board) work together in order to govern a business.907 The role 
accorded to the board in our blueprint largely corresponds to the function of the 
supervisory board under the Chinese legal system. Accordingly, in our discussion here, 
we shall consider the roles and attributes of the supervisory board in the non-profit 
sector. When doing so, we shall use the term ‘board’ (except where we mention the 
executive board specifically) to mean the supervisory board.  
 
8.3 Regulations on Chinese foundations  
8.3.1 Foundations 
The Foundation Regulations, which came into effect in 2004, were the first 
comprehensive national rules on the subject to be issued in over 15 years.908 These 
Regulations replaced the Rules on the Management of Foundations 909  (hereafter 
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Foundation Rules 1988). The latter were widely regarded as extremely short and 
vague.910 When compared with the Foundation Rules 1988, the Foundation Regulations 
provide a relatively comprehensive administrative regime, such as foundation 
classifications, disclosure requirements, and relevant governance structures. 911 
Accordingly, this section shall consider the effect Foundation Regulations have had in 
the Chinese context. 
 
The meaning of the word ‘foundation’ varies according different jurisdictions. In the 
UK, for example, Keen notes that whilst the term appears in the names of some 
charities (e.g. the British Heart Foundation), it is ‘not commonly used in English law, 
and (unlike in civil law systems) has no precise meaning.’912 In China, the Foundation 
Regulations define foundations as ‘non-profit legal persons, which […] utilize assets 
donated by natural or legal persons or other organisations to pursue a public benefit 
purpose’.913 Foundations in China can be divided into one of two sorts, fundraising and 
non-fundraising ones.  
 
The former Foundation Measures 1988914 stated that all foundations were expressly 
granted the right to raise funds, and ‘the amount of uniform endowment capital was 
prescribed as RMB 100,000 Yuan (circa US$ 17,000)’.915 However, this rule has been 
replaced by the Foundation Regulations that hold a notably ‘restrictive stance’. In the 
Foundation Regulations, the endowment capital requirement is connected with the 
permission to raise fund in a unique approach, through which it introduced a new 
classification of foundations. This classification distinguishes between non-
fundraising/endowment foundations, which are not permitted to raise funds publicly, 
and fundraising-oriented foundations, which may raise funds publicly. 916  The 
fundraising-oriented foundations could be further divided into two groups based on 
‘whether they can raise funds nationally’ or only in the particular area where they are 
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914 Measures for the Administration of Foundations []  
915 Foundation Measures 1988, reg 3 (2) 




Foundations in China bear a variety of features which make them different to SOs and 
CNIs. The first and foremost of these is their membership. Since there is no provision 
in the Foundation Regulations describing this matter, the actual practices imply a fact 
that foundations do not have a membership in China.918 Accordingly, unlike SOs that 
are membership-based, foundations are typically financial institutions.919 
 
Second, the Foundation Regulations hold that a Chinese foundation may only pursue 
purposes with a public benefit, which is again different from CNIs.920 However, the 
Foundation Regulations remain silent on which purposes may be considered as being 
for the public benefit. Based on the Official Commentary on Foundations, ‘reference 
may be made to the designated public benefit purposes in the Donation Law of 1999,921 
which covers a wide range of social aspects’.922 According to the official statistical data 
on different organisational forms of non-profits in China, there has been a steady 
decline in the number of foundations formed until 2004, when the Foundation 
Regulations 2004 were enacted.923  
 
8.3.2 Board size 
Foundation Regulations delineate the expected board size by noting ‘…foundations 
must have an executive board composed of 5-25 directors’.924 Similarly, foundations 
must consist of a supervisory board which is primarily responsible for monitoring, 
advising and long-term decision-making. Unfortunately, in contrast with the specific 
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917 Administrative regions are, within provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under 
the central government of China; see Foundation Regulations 2004, reg 3 (2) 
918 R Keen, Charity and the Voluntary Sector: Statitics (House of Commons Library, 2015) 
<http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05428#fullreport> accessed 23 
March 2016 
919 ibid  
920 Foundation Regulations 2004, reg 3 (1) 
921 Donation Law 1999, reg 3 
922 That is: ‘disaster relief, poverty alleviation, assistance to the handicapped, and other activities for SOs 
and individuals in difficult circumstances; education, scientific, cultural, public health, and sport 
undertakings; environmental protection and construction of public facilities; and other public welfare 
undertakings promoting social development and progress’; see Foundation Regulations 2004, reg 4 (1) 
923 Von Hippel and Pissler, (n664) 437 
924 Foundation Regulations 2004, reg 5 (3) 
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requirement on the size of the executive board, Foundation Regulations fail to specify 
the number of directors in the supervisory board. In other words, this gap in the law 
enables foundations to elect their desired number of directors to the supervisory board, 
which may vary significantly. As the discussion in section 7.3 suggested, a large 
supervisory board may better facilitate fund raising in the Chinese context, given the 
complex guanxi and a heavy Government intervention that exists surrounding non-
profits in China. However, the Foundation Regulations apparently fail to account for 
the pitfalls of an oversized board, particular in terms of cost, or by encouraging group-
thinking in the decision-making process.  
 
8.3.3 Board characteristics 
8.3.3.1 Director independence 
Evidence pertaining to the importance of director’s independence was summarized in 
section 7.4. The Foundation Regulations, in order to guarantee the independence of 
directors from one another, provide that: 
‘For non-public foundations established with private properties, the total 
number of foundation board members that have close relatives with each 
other may not exceed 1/3 of the full board. For other foundations, those 
who are close relatives with each other may not serve the board 
concurrently’.925  
 
The use of ‘board member’ in this context refers to the executive board. In terms of the 
supervisory board, the requirement in the Foundation Regulations is stricter than that of 
the executive board:  
‘A foundation shall set up the position of supervisors. Term of office of a 
supervisor is the same as that of a board member. No board member, or 
close relative of any board member or accounting staff member of the 
foundation may concurrently hold position as supervisor’.926 
 
Building upon this, the Foundation Regulations also list special situations that may 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
925 Foundation Regulations 2004, reg 2 (20) 
926 Foundation Regulations 2004, reg 2 (20) 
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affect a director’s independent judgment:  
‘Where personal interests of any board member of a foundation are related 
to interests of the foundation, such board member may not participate in 
decision-making of related issues. None of the board members or 
supervisors or their close relatives may be engaged in any transactions 
with the foundation they are serving’.927 
 
Thus, the Foundation Regulations do legally emphasize the importance of directors’ 
independence. Most directors both in the executive and supervisory board are 
prohibited from working with those with whom they have a close family relationship. 
However, it is noteworthy here that the requirement on the executive board is less strict 
than the supervisory board. Foundation Regulations do not require all directors to be 
relationally independent; rather, non-public foundations can institute an exemption that 
allows for ‘a quarter of directors to have close family tie’.928 Research presumes that 
this may be because the Foundation Regulations have already taken account of the 
social factors we addressed in the modified blueprint (e.g. guanxi and Chinese 
collectivism), and link them with director’s independence.929  
 
However, deficiencies in this particular article of the law would seem obvious. Firstly, 
although close family relationships between directors are restricted in foundations, 
these articles above fail to officially specify what constitutes a ‘close family 
relationship’. A variety of Chinese regulations attempt to define this concept in 
different legal contexts and in different approaches.930 Unfortunately, these regulations 
fail to reach an agreement, and none of them provides a clear and specific explanation. 
For example, there are distinctiveness and contradictions between the ‘General 
Principles of Civil Law 1988’ and ‘Provisional Measures on the Administration of 
Disclosure by Trust and Investment Companies 2005’.931  
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927 Foundation Regulations 2004, reg 2 (20) 
928 Foundation Regulations 2004, reg 2 (5) 
929 Kaur, (n646) 
930 The People’s Supreme Court Opinion on Several Questions of the Implementation of the ‘People’s 
Republic of China General Principles of Civil Law’ (trial implementation), art 12 
931 On the one hand, the General Principles of Civil Law 1988 state that ‘close relatives include spouses, 
parents, children, siblings, grandparents and grandsons’. On the other hand, provisional Measures on the 
Administration of Disclosure by Trust and Investment Companies 2005 holds that ‘close relatives’ in 
these measures include parents, spouses, siblings and their spouses, children past the age of majority and 
their spouses, parents of spouses, siblings of spouses and their spouses, siblings of parents and their 
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Secondly, since the Foundation Regulations have allowed for the existence of 
individual connections and family ties, approaches to evaluating the director’s 
independence of judgment need to be further specified. Regulations could also provide 
a set of standards to distinguish positive guanxi from negative guanxi.932 This standard 
would appear to be particularly important to foundations in China. Unlike non-profits 
in the West, which are mostly privately initiated, a great many foundations in China 
were transformed by China’s state-owned enterprises/government departments. 
Consequently, a large proportion of board members were government officials. Such 
government related experience enables directors of this kind to have increasing 
connections with the Chinese Government, even if they are not working for the 
Government itself.933 Therefore, how to define and require director’s independence of 
judgment in this context should ideally be clearly outlined within the Foundation 
Regulations. 
 
Unfortunately, the Foundation Regulations, as the most fundamental set of legal rules 
in this area, fail to detail any specific approach which secures directors’ independence 
as such. There is an absence of requirement such as whether directors who have been 
employees of the company previously, have had or still have a material relationship 
with organisations before, or have a partner or relative within the organisation they 
serve, may be considered independent. This requirement for benchmarking was 
emphasized in the blueprint, which details the need to promote director integrity, 
accountability and effective oversight. 934  As argued in 7.4.2.1, without such 
restrictions, directors may be at risk of making biased decisions that present a conflict 
of interest, or the undue influence of interested parties.935 
 
Admittedly, the benchmark for directors’ independence can vary depending on the 
changing social contexts, and it is not always possible to explicitly cover all factors 
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spouses and the children past the age of majority of siblings of spouses and their spouses’. General 
Principles of Civil Law 1988, s6; Provisional Measures on the Administration of Disclosure by Trust and 
Investment Companies 2005, art 9 
932 As we have argued in 7.4.2, this could help non-profits to secure directors’ independence of 
judgement without sacrificing directors’ boundary spanning skills. 
933 Huang and others, (n41) 50 
934 Von Hippel and Pissler, (n664) 437 
935 The legal silence is likely to give directors the impression that they can build and rely upon any kind 
of guanxi (both positively and negatively) rather than opting to behave independently. 
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influencing a director’s independence through the Foundation Regulations. However, 
addressing a few typical cases within the regulations and official legal explanations 
with respect to what may at least give the impression to non-profits and the public that 
a director’s independence has been breached would prove of use.936  For instance, 
Chapter 5 listed a range of UK regulations encouraging the director’s independent 
judgment. The Model Statute of Non-profit Sector also recommends that circumstances 
such as interlocking directory and conflicts of interest within non-profits should be 
listed within the Foundation Regulations.937  
 
8.3.3.2 Government representatives  
Chapter 7 detailed some of the advantages and disadvantages of Government 
representatives and professional directors sitting on boards. In terms of professional 
directors, although discussion in Chapters 4 and 7 have emphasized the importance of 
professional knowledge and the role this has in board governance, the Foundation 
Regulations fail to specify an entry requirement on the qualification of candidate 
directors. In practice, even though many foundations will have indicated their 
preference for recruiting directors with high qualifications, the importance of 
professional directors has not been fully realized. 938  This section shall mainly 
concentrate on the government representatives and examine relevant legal regulations 
as they apply in the present context.  
 
8.3.3.2.1 Departure from the Foundation Regulations  
Discussion within section 7.4.2.2 has already indicated how including government 
representatives on the board may help facilitate fund-raising collection and thus 
improve the boundary-spanning role of non-profits. However, based on the previous 
argument in 7.4.2.2, there is little doubt that overreliance on the Government will 
undermine a foundation’s independence, and with it the risk of becoming the 
government-affiliated institutions. Some 41% of respondents to a survey conducted in 
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937 Huang and others, (n41) 
938 J Chen, J Jin and P Liu, The Recommended Model Statute of Non-Profit Sector (Social Sciences 
Academic Press 2010) 
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2012 observed that the Government in China moderately supervises and controls board 
activities in foundations through its introduction of representatives.939 At the same time, 
the chairperson to most foundations is often equipped with a strong government 
background and connections.940  
 
However, the Foundation Regulations only state that ‘…current government officials 
may not concurrently become Chairperson, Vice Chairperson(s) or the Secretary 
General of a foundation’. 941  At first sight then, the regulations would appear to 
conform with the blueprint proposed, as it seeks to prevent interventions from the 
Government. However, this is not without a number of identifiable weaknesses. Firstly, 
it is unclear who may be regarded as ‘government officials’. Based on the Official 
Commentary on Foundations, the general and vague definition of ‘government 
officials’ is the same as that applied under Chinese Criminal Law, which need to ‘be 
construed more narrowly in its application to foundation law’. 942  Secondly, the 
Foundation Regulations fail to control the total number of government representatives, 
nor do they specify the positions, power and functions of government representatives 
on the board. Even if the Government, as one among a number of potential non-profit 
stakeholders, is permitted to place representatives on the board, the number of 
representatives and the extent to which it is involved in governance activities is 
inconsistent with the blueprint.   
 
8.3.3.2.2 Discretionary authority by the Chinese Government  
In addition to the vagueness and ambiguity of the Foundation Regulations regarding the 
matter of government representatives, the abuse of the ‘discretionary authority’ by the 
Chinese Government also indicates a departure from the blueprint (see section 
7.4.2.2.1). By ‘discretionary authority’, this refers to ‘the ability to exercise powers that 
may not be expressly granted by law’. 943  Research indicates that ‘discretionary 
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939 Guo and Zhang, (n38) 
940 Han, (n37) 216 
941 Huang and others, (n41) 165  
942 People’s Republic of China Criminal Law [
], s93  
943 R J Estes, Emerging Chinese Foundations: The Role of Private Philanthropy in the New China 
(Aspen Institute 1998) 
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authority commonly extends beyond government offices’. 944  Government often 
executes its discretionary authority through those government related agencies, which 
may include ‘central banks, internal revenue services, antitrust authorities, public 
prosecutors and energy regulators’.945 Those government agencies in the West may be 
regarded as organisations ‘in the machinery of government with a certain amount of 
autonomy and independence from political influence in the execution of their functions 
in oversight and administration’.946 
 
The legal regulations would often ‘leave considerable freedom to these institutions to 
choose among different possible courses of action according to their own 
judgement’.947 However, this authority should obviously be subject to restrictions and 
limitations. For example, many bureaucratic functions of the British government ‘are 
written policies regarding the liberties and limitation of their discretionary authority’.948 
In addition, ‘those government related agencies may only exercise discretionary 
authority when certain conditions are met, although they are not required to exercise 
their power of discretionary authority at any time’.949 
 
However, there is a danger that either the government or these agencies may 
abuse/misuse the discretionary authority for ‘illegitimate purposes’ such as a repression 
of political sensitive business activities. These business activities, as research indicates, 
are supposed to be managed by mechanisms from commercial market. Theorists also 
define “an excessive level of involvement as ‘big government’.” 950  In China, the 
existence, and potential misuse of, discretionary authority in respect of foundations can 
be identified from the perspective of two areas: negative administrative power and the 
dual management system.  
 
As to the first of these, although the Foundation Regulations have clearly outlined 
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944 M P Schinkel, L Tóth and J Tuinstra, 'Discretionary Authority and Prioritizing in Government 
Agencies' (2015) Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper 2014 
945 ibid  
946 N Rose and P Miller, 'Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government' (1992) British 
Journal of Sociology 173 
947 Schinkel, Tóth and Tuinstra, (n945) 5 
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949 ibid  
950 Schinkel, Tóth and Tuinstra, (n945) 7 
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requirements for an organisation to register as a foundation, neither the Chinese 
Constitution nor Foundation Regulations grant a positive right to establish a 
foundation. Instead, this right belongs exclusively to the Chinese Government. The 
department of the Government maintains discretionary authority to review the 
qualifications for applicant organisations, and can withhold approval of establishment 
even when all legal requirements have been satisfied.951  
 
This may be supported by the second point – the dual management system which leads 
to excessive government intervention. Under Article 6 and 7 of the Foundation 
Regulations, 952  a so-called ‘sponsor organisation’ is involved alongside the 
Government body in charge of the Foundation Registrations. This dual management 
system is a unique feature to the Chinese Government – a non-profit supervision 
mechanism, which is applied to foundations, SOs and CNIs since 1998. Upon filing an 
establishment application with the competent registration and administrative authority, 
the establishment of any foundation in China must gain an initial consent from a 
sponsor institution, which is normally Government related agencies. 953 
 
The deficiencies of this dual-management system seem to be apparent. Firstly, the entry 
criteria are unspecified and obscure, which gives government related agencies too 
much discretionary authority to make decisions. Put differently, government agencies 
are able to decide whether applicant organisations are competent to get registered 
depending on their personal (maybe subjective) judgement. The dominant position of 
the Government in relation to foundations derives from its ability to threaten the 
withholding of consent.954 From another perspective, the monopoly of the government 
sponsored foundations all across China clearly indicates the abuse of this discretionary 
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952 Regulations 6 and 7 in Foundation Regulations note that:‘ The Ministry of Civil Affairs of the State 
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authority. According to the statistics in 2013, more than one thousand fundraising 
foundations, charities and more than two thousands semi-official Red Cross 
organisations which were founded by the Chinese Government monopolized over 90% 
of donated resources in China.955 These organisations were mostly controlled by the 
Government, which in turn meant many private charitable organisations were left short 
of resources.  
 
8.3.3.2.3 Efforts to reduce the discretionary authority  
In spite of the government’s discretionary power authorized by Foundation 
Regulations, there is a tendency that in the last few years, the Chinese Government has 
gradually withdrawn its discretionary authority over non-profit governance. Firstly, the 
voice of those advocating the abolition of these complex and time-consuming 
administrative mechanisms would appear to be becoming increasingly stronger. The 
Government has demonstrated a willingness to loosen control over the administrative 
process of non-profits, and has sought to create a relatively open and free environment 
for non-profits to operate within.956 The Chinese Government has endeavoured to make 
the administrative apparatus leaner and more efficient. The biggest step forward here 
has been the enactment of the Charity Law 2016, which shall be discussed in Chapter 
9.  
 
Moreover, several mechanisms have been brought in to force over the last decade in 
order to facilitate the registration and application of foundations. For example, as we 
have mentioned, to register as an officially recognized non-profit, organisations must 
find a qualified sponsor which has always been difficult. In 2013, the MoCA itself was 
permitted by the Government to act as the sponsor in a number of cases, which 
obviously encouraged a great number of private foundations to register.957  
 
The other major improvement here has been the Government’s advance of the ‘State 
Council Institutional Reform and Transformation of Functions Plan’ (Plan 2013 
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957 Such as Heung Kong Bright Future Foundation, Huamin Charity Foundation, and the Aiyou Huaxia 
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hereafter), which has been regarded as a symbolic piece of legislation and an important 
piece of government guidance.958 Plan 2013, with the objective of developing Chinese 
philanthropy, sends a clear message to the public that the Government has officially 
accepted the tremendous growth of the non-profit sector, confirmed its contribution to 
society, and is now ready to reform this sector.959 It sheds light on the social reform that 
China is likely to witness within the coming years. Indeed, it makes clear the 
government has prepared to replace the dual management system with the one level 
administration system (minus the supervisory unit), as previously discussed. 960 
However, Plan 2013 also pinpoints that the reform outlined will only be taken with 
consideration to four categories of social organisation.961 This four-category restriction 
has been criticized as being against the nature of Chinese citizens’ human rights of free 
association – this being that all non-profit institutions regardless of their organisational 
objectives should be treated equally. 
 
8.3.4 Board structure  
On the matter of board structure, the Foundation Regulations apply a two-tier system 
and suggest that appointing a supervisory board is a compulsory requirement.962 Owing 
to the more sustainable management of foundations, the application of a two-tier 
system is generally thought to achieve an improved compliance of the social market 
system, the result of which is more monitoring, less aggressive performance targets and 
a dissemination of power by not allowing the CEO to be the chairman.963 With respect 
to anti-corruption, discussion in section 7.5 detailed the proposition of the committee, 
however there has been no particular mention of this in the Foundation Regulations. 
Following the extremely negative impact of the Red Cross foundation scandals, the 
anti-corruption campaign in recent years has already listed the Chinese foundation as a 
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top monitoring target, and investigations have since been carried out nation-wide. 
Accordingly, in line with the amended blueprint, this work suggests that establishing an 
anti-corruption committee in foundation boardrooms would prove promising for the 
future.  
 
8.3.5 Board process 
Article 9 of the Foundation Regulations details a number of requirements concerning 
the process of board meetings.964 However, the Foundation Regulations do not address 
the matters we discussed in the blueprint. It seems that the Regulations intend to offer 
enough flexibility for foundations to choose and design their own form of decision-
making process as to ensure such a requirement works in accordance with their 
preference.  
 
8.4 Regulations on SOs and CNIs  
8.4.1 Introduction  
Regulations concerning SOs and CNIs are very similar. We shall therefore address 
these organisations together. Indeed, the vast majority of the articles contained in the 
CNI Regulations, particularly with respect to board governance, are a direct copy of the 
SO Regulations, without any further adaptation. Accordingly, to begin, this section 
shall briefly summarize in section 8.4.2 the key characteristics of SOs and CNIs and 
identify their different features compared to foundations. Following this, the legal 
regulations of SOs and CNIs will be examined in section 8.4.3. Before continuing to 
further examine SOs and CNIs, Table 8.1 below provides an outline of the following 
sections, summarizing the distinctive features of SOs/CNIs and the impact on board 
design:  
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Table 8.1 Board blueprint and SOs/CNIs 
Board attributes SO/CNI features  Differences in Board design (Compared 
with blueprint of foundations) 
Board size CNI and foundations --non-membership 
SO --membership based  
SO board needs to consider stakeholder’s 
interests, particularly their member’s 





Director’s independence SO and CNI have less connected with the Government  
 
Government could hold more suspicious attitude towards 
them  
Take more efforts to connect with the 
Governmentachieve trustless 







No unique feature that can bring significant difference  Cannot bring any difference in board design  
danwei 
system 
No unique feature that can bring significant difference Cannot bring any difference in board design 
Professionals Due to the features above, SO/CNI needs more efforts to 
build and maintain guanxi with the Government  
Recruit professional directors  
Board culture No unique features that can bring significant difference Cannot bring any difference in board design 
Board structure Establishing network with Government Government connecting committee (Resource 
collection committee) 
Board process No unique features that can bring significant difference Cannot bring any difference in board design 
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8.4.2 SOs and CNIs 
8.4.2.1 SOs’ purpose, characteristics and establishment 
SOs are defined as ‘organisations voluntarily formed by Chinese citizens in order to 
realize a common intention by developing non-profit activities in accordance with their 
statutes’.965 According to the SO Regulations themselves, ‘…social organisations’ (SOs) 
should ‘promote the construction of socialist material and spiritual civilization’. 966 
Membership is seen as one central characteristic that distinguishes SOs from 
foundations and CNIs. Although SO Regulations do not refer to membership, in 
practice SOs are required to have and maintain members if they intend to be officially 
registered in China.967 Although SO Regulations remain silent on whether SOs may 
undertake public fund-raising, research and practices indicate that SOs are permitted to 
receive donations and financial aid through public channels, such as ‘television, radio, 
newspapers, setting up collection boxes in public spaces, holding charitable 
performances, sales, competitions, gala dinners’.968  
 
When compared to foundations, obtaining official registration as a SO is subject to 
more modest entry requirements. SOs are required to consist of at least 50 members, 
and must hold a capital of ‘RMB 30,000 yuan for local and inter-area SOs (RMB 
100,000 yuan for national SOs)’.969  
 
In addition to these requirements above, there are obstacles that SOs cannot always 
overcome. First, as with the foundation, the dual management system that we 
introduced in Chapter 7 is also applicable to SOs, which means the establishment of a 
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! 201!
SO is on the condition that it can have ‘the consent of a sponsor organisation’.970 At the 
same time, the registration of a SO needs to be taken on the national level ‘either with 
the MoCA or with corresponding departments for civil affairs’. 971  Although this 
regulation has been annulled in some areas of China, the enforcement of this is really 
dependent upon the discretionary power of local government, which shall be discussed 
later. Secondly, unlike foundations, MoCA will only approve the establishment of a SO 
when ‘there is no pre-existing SO with the same purpose in the same administrative 
region’.972 Moreover, the Commentary further adds that ‘blind competition’ can be 
taken between different SOs with the same objective in the same area.973 However, 
there have been a number of changes to this regime which shall be discuss in the 
context of the Charity Law 2016 addressed in Chapter 9.  
 
8.4.2.2 CNIs’ purpose, characteristics and establishment  
CNIs were not introduced for use until 1998.974 Much like SOs, CNIs are required to 
‘promote the construction of socialist material and spiritual civilization’.975 CNIs have 
no equivalent in Western countries. It remains unclear why this particular type of legal 
form was introduced in addition to SOs and foundations. It seems it may have been due 
to a particular historical gap, which has since been closed.976 CNIs are broadly defined 
as ‘social entities carrying out social service activities of a non-profit nature, which are 
run by enterprises, institutional work units, social organisations, other social forces, or 
individual citizens using non-state assets’.977 They are characterized in a non-profit 
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Yang and others, (n686) 
977 CNI Regulations, reg1 
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oriented manner, offering a number of charitable services. The Official Commentary on 
SOs and CNIs indicates that CNIs may work in those fields such as ‘education’, ‘health 
and labour services’, and sometimes ‘legal services’.978  
 
Much like any other non-profit, ‘there exists no positive right to establish a CNI’.979 
Moreover, according to the CNI Regulations, the dual management system should be 
applied to CNIs as well,980 and the establishment of CNIs should also be taken in a 
national level by corresponding institutions (either the MoCA or the Civil Affairs 
department).981 It seems that it is difficult to be registered as CNIs on the national level, 
for ‘even more than in the cases of foundations and SOs, only a tiny proportion (0.01%) 
of CNIs are registered on the national level with the MoCA’.982  In order to fully 
comprehend the characteristics of foundations, SOs and CNIs, Table 8.2 sets out their 
differences.  
Table 8.2 comparison of SO, CNI, and Foundation 
 
Aspects Foundations SOs CNIs 












SO Regulations CNI Regulations 




Relatively close No connection No connection 
Board 
requirement 
Compulsory  Optional  Optional  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
978 The Official Commentary on SOs and CNIs explains that one characteristic of CNIs is to 
continuously provide services through an institutionalized organisational structure. In doing so, CNIs 
would be distinguished from SOs characterized by what the commentary terms a ‘loose institutionalized 
organisational structure’(=>?0+/&#) and non-regular activities. 
979  CNI Regulations, reg 1 
980 CNI Regulations, reg 8 (1) 
981 CNI Regulations, reg 6 and reg 7 
982 See statistics of the NPO Affairs Bureau of the MoCA for the year 2006. 
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8.4.3 Non-profit governance rules in SOs and CNIs  
SO and CNI regulations are considered to be an out-dated, vague and temporary set of 
regulations which remain silent on the subject of board governance. The original 
regulation governing SOs could be dated back to 1950s, and it then underwent major 
reform in 1989, followed by a number of revisions in 1998.983 Based upon the most 
recent version of law, membership-based SOs are equivalent to associations in many 
Western countries. Von and Pissler identified that both associations and SOs could be 
defined as ‘voluntary groups formed by citizens in order to fulfil a shared objective, 
and to develop non-profit-making activities’.984 Additional to the SO Regulations were 
also other rules developed in 1998, namely the CNI Regulations, which for the first 
time introduced the legal form and organisation referred to as CNI. Aside from the 
three regulations which have comprised the primary focus of this chapter (Foundation 
Regulations, SO Regulations and CNI Regulations) issued by the State Council of the 
Chinese Government, there are a number of model statutes issued by MoCA 
concerning foundations, SOs, and CNIs.985  However, compared with the impact of 
model constitutions in the UK, model statutes in China are less respected and their 
contents are generally more superficial and symbolic. Therefore, here we shall focus 
our consideration on the SO and CNI Regulations.  
 
Interestingly perhaps, the public expectation of the SO and CNI Regulations is ‘in the 
wake of the crackdown on the Democracy Movement, a moment of conservative 
reaction against demands for political reform and separation between the Party and the 
government, the state and the society’.986 However, both the SO Regulations and CNI 
Regulations are considered to ‘dampen the expectation’ towards a liberal legal 
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983 Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Social Organisations[95D<4.], 
promulgated on October 25, 1989. 
984 Von Hippel and Pissler, (n664) 
985Model Statutes for Foundations [!J;:8B',]; Model Statutes for SOs [9    ; : 
8 B ' ,]; Model Statutes for CNIs (Legal Persons) [2M3;:8B',], 
Model Statutes for CNIs (Partnerships) [2M;:8B',] and Model Statutes 
for CNIs (Individual Entrepreneurs) [2M	;:8B', ]. These three sets of 
Model Statutes were issued on February 3, 2005, by the MoCA through the Circular for the Distribution 
of the‘Model Statutes for CNIs’ [2%H2M;:8B',6G7] 
(Minhan [2005] No. 24). 
986 ‘Bound and gagged: Freedom of association in China further curtailed under new regulations’ (HRIC, 
2013) <http://www.hrichina.org/en/content/2780> accessed 19 April 2016  
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environment for the development of non-profits in China. Since these two rules clearly 
aim at binding SOs and CNIs more tightly to the Chinese Government, they represent 
an effort to bring the entire sector under a stricter control, thereby expanding the dual 
management scheme currently in operation. It is easy to identify a range of articles in 
these two sets of regulations that exist merely to serve the interests of the 
Government.987 In sum, both the SO and CNI Regulations have proven to be very strict 
on the use and implementation of administration and state supervision mechanisms. 
However, the regulations remain very general in terms and vague regarding the matter 
of board governance.  
!
8.4.4 Government interventions and SO/CNI’s independence  
As we have mentioned at the beginning of this section, there is no provision in the 
SO/CNI Regulations addressing the matter of board governance, which means none of 
the four attributes in the modified blueprint in Chapter 7 has ever been discussed in 
SO/CNI regulations. Therefore, instead of analysing SO/CNI Regulations and 
identifying the conformance and departure compared to the blueprint, this section shall 
focus on one essential issue within the attributes of the blueprint—SO/CNI’s 
independent governance.988 The interaction between the Government’s intervention and 
the independence of non-profit has been discussed in the blueprint, and as we shall 
demonstrate, this issue is considered to be particularly important to the SO/CNI 
governance. This section shall be divided into three parts. 8.4.4.1 shall propose that 
compared to foundations, SOs/CNIs are less likely to maintain organisation’s 
independence/autonomy, and their internal governance are more easily affected by the 
Government. Section 8.4.4.2 then intends to develop this point by proposing an 
argument which, so far as I am aware, has not be advanced before. It is that, by 
accepting some limitations on independence, SO/CNI’s can build greater trust with the 
Government, and by doing so, paradoxically ensure greater real autonomy. Finally, 
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987 To further prove this statement, I list the following Articles in SOs and CNIs (SO Regulations, reg10, 
reg 11, reg 13, reg19, reg 27); Von Hippel and Pissler, (n664) 
988 The rest of board attributes will not be discussed in this section. This is primarily because when 
compared to the law on foundations in the rest of board attributes, the organisational characters of SOs 
and CNIs do not indicate any significant difference in the application of the blueprint described in 
Chapter 7. Therefore, relevant practices can be referred to the argument made within the discussion and 
evidence outlined in section 8.3.!
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8.4.4.3 explores how SO/CNI can gain trust from the Government, and thus maintain 
an organisation’s independence.  
!
8.4.4.1 Intervention from the Chinese Government  
In the past two decades, the Government has always carried out a number of 
interventions to interfere with the SOs/CNIs’ governance. As noted in 7.3.1, these 
interventions could be divided into two categories—internal governance and external 
governance.989 One of the typical approaches has been via the dual management system 
employed by the Government. As analysed in 7.3.2.2, the dual management system has 
always been considered as a deliberate and fundamental barrier set by the Chinese 
Government to control the establishment and management of a non-profit organisation 
in China. Although the dual management policy has been eliminated in many types of 
non-profits, the Government still has the discretionary authority that enables them to 
subjectively refuse or cancel the registration, and control every aspect of the non-profit 
activities. 
 
In terms of the Government’s attitude towards SOs/CNIs, the fieldwork at present 
indicates that the entry requirement as well as relevant government regulations toward 
SOs/CNIs’ operations are much stricter on SOs and CNIs than those of foundations. 
The Government’s actual attitude towards SOs/CNIs is far from certain, varying 
significantly on a case-by-case basis.990  
 
8.4.4.2 Reasons for the Government control  
Accordingly, to improve SO/CNI’s governance, we have to find out the intention of the 
Government by taking this high degree of intervention. Academic researchers and 
practitioners may hold two contrasting points of view toward this issue, and we shall 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
989!Relevant approaches include but are not limited to, appointing government representatives in the 
boardroom, influencing legal regulations and using its discretionary authority through the government 
related agencies.!
990 Z Liu, “Zhengfu yu Feizhengfu Zuzhi guanxi: Boyi, Chongtu ji Qi Zhili” [Relation between 
government and NGOs: Game theory, conflict, and their governance], (2008) 1 Jianghai Xuekan 
[Jianghai Academic Journal] 94 
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now investigate which one is more convincing in light of the social determinants we 
outlined in Chapter 7.  
 
8.4.4.2.1 Government’s deliberate suppression 
Firstly, many studies insist that the Chinese Government attempts to suppress the 
development of the entire non-profit sector in order to tighten its control over the 
Chinese society. As Yang, Wilkinson and Zhang held, ‘under authoritarian governance, 
NGO activities may threaten the interests or authority of the government, and those that 
give support to dissenting voices are likely to be restricted’. 991  As a result, the 
Government shall control and enable SOs/CNIs to be its affiliated bodies.  
 
However, in past two decades the Government has been ‘gradually withdrawing from 
many responsibilities, initiating policies that allow civil society to expand’.992 It seems 
that the Chinese Government attempts, in a variety of ways, to encourage non-profits to 
be autonomous. For example, it is outlined in the Plan 2013 that non-profits in China 
should be responsible for entire section of society than become affiliated.993 Moreover, 
Plan 2013 was set in train to reform the government affiliated institutional structure 
(i.e. the organisation’s independence and autonomy, and be free of government control) 
over the coming years. Aside from the legal/governmental mechanisms, senior 
government officials would also appear to send a clear signal that the Chinese 
Government is rethinking its attitude toward non-profit governance and thereby 
considering a reduction in its control over such bodies.994 In 2013, Liguo Li, Minister 
of the MoCA said that ‘…after the reform of social organisation and the management 
system, the scope, pace and intensity of the transfer of governmental functions to social 
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991 T Hildebrandt, Social Organizations and the Authoritarian State in China (Cambridge University 
Press 2013) 
992 Y Yang, M Wilkinson and X Zhang, 'Beyond the Abolition of Dual Administration: The Challenges 
to NGO Governance in 21st Century China' (2016) 27 International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit 
Organizations 2292 
993 Plan 2013 makes clear that the Government intends to hand most of its social functions over to the 
non-profit sector over the next five years. This policy is targeting most of the public services both in the 
for-profit and non-profit sectors which the Chinese Government is currently responsible over to the 
society. Xinhua She, ‘ L-0$N@AF(16E)’ (www.gov.cn,2013) 
<http://www.gov.cn/2013lh/content_2350848.htm> accessed 23 March 2016  
994 T Branigan, ‘China's new premier, Li Keqiang, vows to tackle bureaucracy and corruption’ (Quality 
Journalism, 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/17/china-premier-li-keqiang-
bureaucracy> Accessed 14 April 2016 
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organisations will increase and get faster, transferring some administrative and charity 
functions to social organisations, which will help improve the governments 
administrative efficiency’.995 
 
With respect to the SOs and CNIs, since the Chinese Government has increasingly 
realized their declining capacity to implement policy consistently geared toward 
socially demanding roles and functions, SOs and CNIs are actually welcomed by local 
Government authorities, which are otherwise at breaking point.996 Services that SOs 
supply are mostly targeted on groups under ‘heavily moralistic institutionalized 
prejudice’, such AIDS-related issues, ‘supporting sex workers or the welfare protection 
of migrant workers’ children’.997 CNIs are largely about education, arts, museums and 
culture. Such issues cannot be efficiently resolved by the local Government as groups 
do not trust the government, while on the other hand, the SOs and CNIs are more 
specialized and professional in relation to information access, volunteer training, and 
service provision, for example. 998  In keeping with the above argument, the 
Government’s attitude may alter with SO/CNI’s performance. 
 
Admittedly, the Chinese Government has an extremely high expectation with respect to 
the development of SOs and CNIs, as they can help to alleviate government pressure 
and facilitate social contribution. Over the course of the past two years, the 
Government has attempted to reduce the overregulation on non-profit organisations 
through the enactment of the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises and Non-profits 
Policy Guidance (Guidance 2015) and the Charity Law 2016. 999  Crucially, the 
Guidance 2015 outlines the Chinese Government attempts to relinquish its control over 
non-profits, and to set a clear and strict boundary line over board governance, without 
cutting their funding, thereby promising a brighter future for their development.1000 
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995 Yang, Wilkinson and Zhang, (n992) 
996 T M o C Affairs, 'Top Ten Major Events for Social Organizations in 2013' (China Development Brief, 
21 March 2014) <http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/articles/the-ministry-of-civil-affairs-top-ten-major-
events-for-social-organizations-in-2013/> accessed 24 March 2016  
997 Hildebrandt, (n991) 17 
998 ibid  
999 ibid  
1000  R Summerfield, 'China's Soe Reform' (Financier, Februrary 2015) 
<https://www.financierworldwide.com/chinas-soe-reform/#.WG7-F7aLSqA> accessed 17 March 2015; 
Q He, ‘Tag Archives: Mixed Ownership’ (China Changes, 2015) <http://chinachange.org/tag/mixed-
ownership/> accessed 7 October 2015  
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Although there exists no strict rule in restricting the number of government 
representatives active in non-profits, it specifically emphasizes the importance of 
reducing the number of government representatives on a non-profit’s board to build an 
equal and independent relationship between the government and non-profits.1001 These 
efforts made by the Chinese Government clearly indicate that non-profits, should they 
wish to, may exist and perform as a separate entity beyond the Government’s control. 
 
8.4.4.2.2 Government distrust due to a lack of information 
Given the discussion so far, it would seem to be irrational to define those government 
interventions as a political repression, which leads us to concentrate on the second 
explanation. Many studies argue that the Chinese Government does not intend to step 
in to control the non-profit governance, and transform non-profits governance into the 
Government-dominant model. Instead, the close supervision and high degree of 
intervention are primarily owing to two Government concerns.  
 
Firstly, given there has not been any sufficient legal system systematically regulating 
the non-profit governance, the Government could consider that ‘autonomy may not 
always be a positive factor in the development of NGOs’, which could allow the 
flourish of corruptions and director’s misconducts.1002 Accordingly, the Government 
would then use its discretionary authority to supervise the governance. Secondly, the 
Government is likely to be cautious on those political contentious activities which may 
cause social instability, chaos, and violence. Research indicates that those political 
sensitive issues can be defined with four characteristics,1003 and many activities held by 
SOs/CNIs fall into these categories. 
 
Indeed, SOs/CNIs are often pursuing ‘activism in areas which officials have often 
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1001 Y Bai, 'Guiding Opinions on Strengthening and Reform of State-Owned Enterprises' (Xinhua Net, 13 
September 2015) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-09/13/c_1116547305.htm> accessed 13 
September 2015 
1002 Peterson, (n869) 
1003 This could include ‘1. Involving advocacy, e.g., human rights, labour issues, and environmental 
policy. 2. Involving international affairs, e.g., programs promoting international cultural exchanges. 3. 
Involving religious or ethnic issues, e.g., Christian activities and Tibet issues. 4. Involving the police or 
the legal system, or related social stability (weiwen) issues’; see Q Ma, 'The Governance of NGOs in 
China since 1978: How Much Autonomy?' (2002) 31 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 305, 310 
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found worrying’.1004 SOs are associations that regularly need to hold membership-
based activities in public areas, such as parades, assemblies, associations and protests, 
for example. These social service activities carried out by CNIs ranging from the field 
of health care, labour to legal services, some of which would appear to be sensitive to 
the Government. Moreover, when compared to most foundations with a strong 
government background, CNIs are mostly private-owned small business, and so the 
Government is less likely to have opportunity taking informal conversation with CNIs 
and getting familiar with their business operation.1005 Hence, the Government would 
appear to be more cautious with respect to activities taking place in CNIs, as they may 
know very little about each aspect of the CNI from the outset. 
 
However, there are apparently a great number of SOs/CNIs taking activities irrelevant 
to these political sensitive issues but which have nevertheless been suspected and 
mistreated. The reaction of SOs/CNIs is intensifying the suspicious attitude of the 
Chinese Government. Most SOs/CNIs are showing a passive attitude and refuse to 
collaborate with the Government. Without the government background, they presume 
that they are more vulnerable, and in an opposite position to, the Chinese Government, 
when compared to foundations.  
 
As a result, most SOs/CNIs choose to hide from the Government surveillance, and 
avoid any opportunity to get in touch with the Government. Some of them simply opt 
not to get official registration as SO/CNI owing to the sensitivity of this legal 
format.1006 Apparently, those inactive reactions toward the Government intervention are 
inefficient and may lead to an unpleasant result. It is likely to result in a more 
suspicious attitude, a closer monitor by the Government. Also this type of practice 
seriously limits the scope of a SOs or CNIs work, as it exposes them to taxation and 
enables the Government to freeze their operation citing various causes.1007 
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1004 ibid   
1005 A Saich, Providing Public Goods in Transitional China (Springer 2008) 56 
1006 Guo and others, (n627) 
1007 ibid 95 
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8.4.4.3 Approaches to encourage SO/CNI’s independence  
According to the discussion so far, we shall propose that in order to reduce the 
suspicions of the Government, SOs/CNIs should build trust with, rather than hide from, 
the Government. Research evidence also indicates that a number of SOs and CNIs have 
successfully taken back control of their organisation’s governance and have been 
increasingly less affected by the Chinese Government as the Government has faith and 
confidence towards them.1008 Accordingly, this section shall explore how non-profits, 
particularly SOs and CNIs, could interact with the Government in an equal and 
collaborative way, so as to gain trust and support from the Government. In doing so, we 
shall propose three steps. These three steps are interrelated and interactive, which could 
progressively help non-profits achieve the organisation’s autonomy and independence 
in the greatest extent. 
 
8.4.4.3.1 Build trust through familiarity  
‘Familiarity is a precondition for trust’, Gefen held that ‘trust, in a broad sense, is the 
confidence a person has in his or her favourable expectations of what other people will 
do, based, in many cases, on previous interactions,’ and these previous interactions 
constitute the familiarity.1009 Therefore, in the SO/CNI—Government relations, as long 
as familiarity exists, the Chinese Government could place more confidence and faith in 
SOs/CNIs, and less monitor and control over their internal governance.1010  
 
8.4.4.3.2 Maintain the positive guanxi  
In doing so, SOs/CNIs have to build and maintain positive guanxi with Government 
officials, as to improve familiarity and trust, secure tolerance for their performances 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1008 ibid 96 
1009 ‘Although another party's (person or persons) previous behavior cannot guarantee that that party will 
behave as one expects, previous interactions in which that party behaved as expected increase trust, that 
is the belief that the other will behave as one anticipates’; see D Gefen, 'E-Commerce: The Role of 
Familiarity and Trust' (2000) 28 Omega 725 
1010 ibid  
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and operations, thus maximizing their autonomy.1011 The empirical work of Ma has 
suggested that SOs/CNIs in China exhibit more autonomy than imagined by the 
West.1012 The closer the tie between the Government and SOs/CNIs, the more trust that 
may be established, thus the greater governance independence that may be achieved. 
 
For most SOs/CNIs, connecting with Government does require tactical measures. This 
may include notifying the changes of government officials and the release of new 
national policy, being aquatinted with the local Government and getting to appreciate 
the factors that influence their decision-making. 1013  Similarly, the condition and 
requirements of SOs/CNIs themselves need to be considered, such as the organisation’s 
long-term strategic plan, organisation’s short-term target, financial situation, and 
stakeholder input, for example. 1014  Therefore, SOs/CNIs need to recruit relevant 
expertise and skills from those who may act as their ‘government connectors’. These 
connectors may preferably have skills such as negotiation, facilitating interpersonal 
relationship and ‘bureaucracy acquaintance’.1015 
 
8.4.4.3.3 Equal and independent partnership  
As I have mentioned in 7.3.1, there is a danger that non-profits could become 
Government affiliated body if they overreliance on the Government’s support. 
Moreover, misconducts such as corruptions are likely to occur if non-profits overstep 
the boundary and convert positive guanxi to the negative one. Accordingly, when 
dealing with the Government, non-profits need to set a baseline for themselves to 
secure their governance independence. For example, government representatives are 
welcome to sit in the boardroom, but their power should be restrained and clearly 
spelled out by their organisation’s constitution.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1011 As noted in section 7.3.1, guanxi can be divided into positive and negative categories, and they 
should be treated differently. Referring to the discussion of guanxi in section 7.4, it will be noted that the 
relationship between the Chinese Government and foundations can be treated as shuren; or even a 
family-like connection, as a newly registered CNI is equivalent to a strangers/shengren to the 
Government. 
1012 Lane, (n832)  
1013 Shi, (n746) 
1014 Braendle, Gasser and Noll, (n784) 395 
1015 ibid  
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Deng and Jing also indicate that the relationship between non-profit and the Chinese 
Government should be taken as a form of ‘constructive interaction’.1016 This interaction 
is believed to be a negotiation and collaboration between non-profits and the 
Government. During this process, both the Government and non-profits need to bear in 
mind that this interaction is ‘a partnership of equals, rather than the subordinate 
position of non-profits’.1017 The board of SOs/CNIs should also keep their independent 
thinking skills, and be prepared to counterbalance and challenge government 
authorities. As Deng and Jing further demonstrate, the partnership between the 
Government and non-profits should take place in ‘a private sphere where members of 
society engage in economic and social activities following the rule of contract and 
voluntary principle as well as based on autonomous governance; it is also a non-
governmental public sphere for participation in policy discussion and decision 
making’.1018  
 
However, our previous argument has demonstrated that non-profits–government 
partnerships are difficult to manage even in Western society, where NGOs are socially 
and historically well established. It is not possible for NGOs to be totally unaffected by 
the government in partnership, particularly when in receipt of government funding. 
There is clearly a power imbalance when the sector collaborates with either the 
government or the business sector. 1019  How to keep the balance between self-
independence and interaction with the Government is a challenge to SOs/CNIs and 
needs a further exploration on a case-by-case basis.  
 
8.5 Conclusion  
This chapter looks at three sets of the most important regulations within the non-profit 
sector in China, which are Foundation Regulations, SO Regulations and CNI 
Regulations. By reviewing these three sets of regulations under the modified blueprint, 
the potential legal gaps and deficiencies can be identified. Accordingly, strategies in 
improving the board governance in the Chinese context have been proposed. Meantime, 
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1016 Z Deng and Y Jing, 'The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society' in Z Deng (ed), State and Civil 
Society: The Chinese Perspective (World Scientific Publishing Company 2010) 28 
1017 ibid 29 
1018 ibid   
1019 Z Deng, State and Civil Society: The Chinese Perspective, vol 2 (World Scientific 2011) 
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Chapter 8 also provides guidance and recommendations on the drafting of legislations 






















Chapter 9 | Reviewing the Charity Law 2016 
9.1 Introduction  
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 have each considered the social determinants that seem likely to 
impact upon the application of my blueprint in the Chinese context, and the impact 
regulations (i.e. Foundation Regulations, SO Regulations, and CNI Regulations) may 
have upon the governance of non-profits. I have identified a number of concerns about 
these regulations, and in particular the extremely high entrance bar, strict dual 
management system, and lack of provisions for non-profit governance. Additionally, 
there has been no statute in the Chinese non-profit sector, in order to guide subordinate 
(secondary) regulations.1020  
 
Against this backdrop, on 23 March 2016 the Chinese Government passed its first 
major statute law at the national level – the Charity Law 2016 – concerned primarily 
with regulating non-profit organisations and rebuilding confidence in the scandal-hit 
sector. As ‘the first fundamental and comprehensive law on the construction of 
philanthropy in China’, the Charity Law 2016 immediately raised concern among 
scholars, participants in civil society organisations, and non-profit practitioners in 
China.1021 The law itself is expected to reshape and redefine the whole non-profit sector 
in order to allow for greater accountability in non-profit activities on a number of 
important matters, including reducing ‘red tape’, encouraging fundraising, increasing 
organisation’s autonomy and adding transparency measures to the law, among others. 
The enactment of the Charity Law 2016 was designed to ‘provide a boost for China’s 
lagging non-profit sector and economy’.1022  
 
Ahead of the enactment of the law itself, commentators from various backgrounds in 
China held very different and often conflicting views on the proposed reforms. As 
researchers such as Finder, Guo and Meng argued, the Charity Law 2016 should be 
regarded as a step forward, since it reduces the regulatory burden placed upon 
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1020 In theory, legislation issued by administrative organs is subordinate to that issued by the basic law 
released by state-power organs and the enactments of rules by administrative organs must not conflict 
with the basic law.  
1021 Deng, (n1019) 
1022 Z Meng, 'Understanding the Core Essence of the Charity Law' (2016) 9 China Journal of Social 
Work 184, 195 
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organisations in the non-profit sector. 1023  In spite of these positive comments, 
professionals and practitioners remain cautious about some of the less clear, more 
ambiguous, areas of the Charity Law 2016, such as those which impose restrictions on 
agency costs or management fees, and information updating or monitoring 
mechanisms. From this point of view, the Charity Law 2016 presents an interesting 
paradox in the field of non-profit governance in China. On the one hand, the law has 
created a relatively clear, accountable and sustainable environment for both registered 
and grassroots non-profits. On the other hand, a number of provisions within the law 
continue emphasizing the importance of external control in the non-profit governance, 
which could then make it easier for the Chinese Government to engage in arbitrary 
interventions.1024 Further discussion of this shall be made in section 9.3.  
 
The Charity Law 2016 itself can be divided into nine sections, covering different 
aspects of the non-profit sector in China, including ‘temporary activities’, ‘regulation of 
conduct’, ‘supervision and management’ and ‘legal responsibility’. 1025  This chapter 
focuses only on those articles and provisions that are most relevant to non-profit board 
governance. Section 9.2 summarizes some of the basic features and the scope of 
Charity Law 2016. Following this, section 9.3 reviews whether the Charity Law 2016 is 
a suitable means through which to facilitate good governance within non-profits. 
Sections 9.4—9.6 then consider how these different provisions of the law may 
influence board governance in NPOs.  
 
9.2 An overview of the Charity Law 2016 
9.2.1 Hierarchy of regulations in non-profit sector in China   
The charity sector in China has always lacked the presence of any formal statutory 
regulation.1026 The enactment of Charity Law 2016 has therefore filled this gap. To 
understand the legal status of the law itself, it is necessary to explain the hierarchy of 
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1023 Agence France-Presse, ‘China aims to increase giving with first charity law’ (Global post, 2016)  
<http://www.globalpost.com/article/6743856/2016/03/09/china-aims-increase-giving-first-charity-law> 
accessed 25 April 2016 
1024 ibid 
1025 The Charity Law 2016, s5 
1026 Meng, (n1022) 
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law and regulation in China, and compare this with the UK legal system. Briefly, the 
hierarchy of the Chinese legal system can be divided into five levels: 
1. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China 
2. National laws, which are issued by the National People's Congress 
3. Administrative regulations, which are issued by the State Council 
4. Local decrees, which are issued by local People's Congresses 
5. Administrative and local rules, which are issued by an administrative agency or 
by a local People's Congress 
 
To illustrate this difference, Table 9.1 has listed a comparison of the hierarchy of laws 

























Table 9.1 Hierarchy of laws 
 
 
As the table above clearly indicates, the Constitution of the People's Republic of China 
is the highest legal authority, while Administrative and local rules rank lowest. 
Naturally, the lower level laws are guided to develop consistently with higher-level 
regulations. If any circumstance arises where the content of lower level laws or 
regulations contradict higher ones, the resolution of that conflict requires reference to, 
and the following of, higher level laws. 1027  Foundation Regulations/SO 
Regulations/CNI Regulations belong to the third level—administrative regulation. The 
Charity Law 2016, by contrast, is regarded as national law. Accordingly, in case of 
inconsistencies and contradictions between the three regulations mentioned, and the 
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1027 Feng, Advisors and Zhang, (n632) 
! 218!
Charity Law 2016, the latter remains the higher authority. 
 
9.2.2 The scope of the Charity Law 2016  
Although the terms ‘charity’ and ‘charitable’ appear frequently throughout the Charity 
Law 2016, the Law itself does not regulate only charitable organisations. Rather, it is 
designed to regulate the entire non-profit sector in China, on which two points may be 
noted. First, the definition of philanthropic organisations and charitable activities under 
the Charity Law 2016 is broader than the common understanding of charitable 
organisations in the UK.1028 In the UK, charities or charitable organisations cover those 
non-profits with charitable purpose such as the ‘British Heart Foundation’, which is 
equivalent to foundations in China. However, by contrast, the Charity Law 2016 refers 
to all non-profit organisations. Second, Article 3 of the law holds that ‘charitable 
activity’, as used in the Act, indicates the initiation of relevant non-profit activities on a 
voluntary basis, by natural persons, legal persons or other organisations through means 
such as donating property or providing volunteer services.1029 Article 9 sets out the 
basic requirements that charitable organisations must meet, and these requirements 
effectively constitute a further explanation of the scope of charitable organisations in 
the Charity Law 2016.1030 
 
Moreover, the common understanding of ‘charitable/charity’ among Chinese non-profit 
practitioners and researchers is one that is in line with the definition used in the Charity 
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1028 Meng, (n1022) 195 
1029 Article 3: ‘Charitable activity as used in this law indicates initiation of the following non-profit 
activities on a voluntary basis by natural persons, legal persons or other organisations through means 
such as donating property or providing volunteer services: 
(1) poverty relief and helping the elderly, young, disabled or other disadvantaged groups; 
(2) relief from damage caused by natural disasters and other emergencies; 
(3) promotion of the development of areas such as education, science, culture, health, and sports; 
(4) prevention and control of pollution and other public harms, and protection and improvement of the 
environment; 
(5) other activities consistent with the societal public interest’; see the Charity Law 2016, s3 
1030 Article 9: Charitable organisations shall comply with the following requirements: 
‘(1) Have carried out charitable activities as its main purpose; 
(2) Not have a profit-making purpose; 
(3) Have its own name and location; 
(4) Have an organisational charter; 
(5) Have necessary assets; 
(6) Have institutional framework and responsible parties meeting requirements; 
(7) Other requirements provided for by laws and administrative regulations’; see the Charity Law 2016, 
s3 and s9  
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Law 2016. Zhang and Wang’s survey, based on 795 million pieces of literature from 
500 major newspapers, reveals that “the key words ‘philanthropy’ and ‘charity’ were 
interchangeably used with the terms ‘non-profit’, ‘voluntary’, and they are often 
considered with the similar meaning in the Chinese context”.1031  
 
9.3 Reviewing the Charity Law 2016 (converting blueprint attributes into four 
factors) 
Unfortunately, the Charity Law 2016 itself does not specify any non-profit internal 
governance mechanism, nor does any single chapter, even a single provision, mention 
anything regarding four attributes addressed in the board governance blueprint 
developed in this thesis.  
 
There would appear to be two reasons for this omission. First, the development of 
Chinese non-profits is still in its early phase. Both the Charity Law 2016 and the 
Chinese Government appear to be focusing their attention on issues such as non-profit 
registration procedures and fund-raising resources/approaches, since these would 
appear to be closely connected to matters of national security and social stability.1032 
The reform of the governance mechanisms inherent in Chinese non-profits would 
appear, by contrast, to be considered rather less important. Naturally, this work argues 
that this is unfortunate, and suggests that improving the governance of Chinese non-
profits is one of the most essential and urgent issues for the Chinese government, and 
should have been included in the new law.1033  
 
The Charity Law 2016, which sits high in the legal hierarchy and authority, should be 
able to provide proper guidance on non-profit governance in China. It would also, 
because of the Chinese hierarchy of legal norms referred to earlier, provide clearer 
guidance on, and the means for resolving inconsistencies in, lower level rules. 
Similarly, without guidance by the Charity Law 2016, there may also occur conflicts 
and contradictions within certain rules in the same legal hierarchy. Consequently, this 
will bring inconsistencies to the approach taken to non-profit governance. Nevertheless, 
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opponents insist that the Charity Law 2016 is not supposed to concern itself with too 
great an amount of detail.1034 With respect to the restrictions relating to non-profit 
board governance, the legislator may have intended to leave these to administrative 
regulations, which normally provide further explanation of the Charity Law 2016.1035 
Although the existing administrative regulations in the non-profit sector (Foundation, 
SO, CNI Regulations) have not yet been revised, these are likely to be modified further 
to the Charity Law 2016. 
 
Since the Charity Law 2016 failed to provide any detailed provision concerning the 
governance of Chinese non-profit boards, it is, obviously, not possible to directly 
review the Act’s treatment of these four attributes. However, there are still many 
provisions within Charity Law 2016 that potentially affect the non-profit governance 
mechanism, both positively and negatively. In order to explore the impact and 
efficiency of the Charity Law 2016 on the non-profit board governance in China, and 
identify to what extent the Charity Law 2016 is conforming with or departing from the 
blueprint, we shall convert the four attributes within the original blueprint into a new 
standard. Table 9.2 shall briefly summarize the relationship between the four board 
attributes in the blueprint and four factors we shall analyse in this section. These factors 
include the relationship with the Chinese government, organisation’s 














1034 ibid   
1035 Meng, (n1022) 
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Table 9.2 The relationship between board attributes and four factors 
 
 
In order to understand better the influence of the Charity Law 2016 on the governance 
of Chinese non-profits boards then, these four factors shall be justified below.  
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9.3.1 The Government control and intervention  
The relationship between the Chinese Government and non-profits has been addressed 
in Chapters 7 and 8. According to research considered in these chapters, historically, 
Chinese non-profits have always had a much closer tie with the Government than their 
Western counterparts.1036 Nowadays, non-profits in China exist within a limited scope, 
defined by the Government, with many being in a transitional phase between complete 
dependence upon the Chinese Government and a greater degree of autonomy.1037 The 
Government can ‘enable and impede their development based on policy or regulation 
changes’.1038 Hence, to what extent the Government maintains control over non-profits, 
and significantly influences governance strategies in China, remains debatable.  
 
9.3.2 Autonomy/Independence of non-profits 
According to Chapters 7 and 8, a great majority of non-profits are required to maintain 
affiliation with the Chinese Government and its agencies for the purpose of getting both 
administrative and financial support. These non-profits, however, are criticized for 
losing their autonomy and independence. Fisher argues that ‘autonomy is the defining 
criterion for non-profits because it vitalizes a non-profit’s functions and enables it to 
influence government, and thus to play a part in advance of political pluralism’.1039 Of 
course this statement is general and may not necessarily apply to the Chinese context. 
From this argument at least, it may be implied that a significant number of Chinese 
non-profits, particularly GONGOs, cannot be defined as legitimate non-profits 
according. As the discussion in Chapters 7 and 8 has suggested, the notion of autonomy 
should be understood differently in China when compared to those in Western 
countries. ‘Interdependence between government and NGOs may be functional for 
achieving a positive socioeconomic impact’.1040 Inviting government representatives to 
sit as part of the board is merely to create more convenient avenues to resources, which 
is a means rather than an end (organisational objective).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1036 ibid 546  
1037 Yang and others, (n686) 550 
1038 ibid  
1039 ibid 547 
1040 In the Chinese context, it is not necessarily essential for the non-profits to contribute to socio-
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Without sufficient legislation in place and adequate government monitoring, corruption 
may easily flourish within the Chinese non-profit sector.1041 It is not expected Chinese 
non-profits are to be entirely independent of the Government, and thereby achieve a 
similar autonomy to those based in industrialized countries.1042 Furthermore, it would 
seem impossible to behave in such a way, owing to a range of factors discussed in 
Chapters 7 and 8. Chinese non-profits, like many organisations which operate in China, 
must still consider guanxi, resource collection, political power and impact as essential 
elements of their strategy for survival. However, Chinese non-profits must still 
maintain their autonomy against the dominance and control of the Chinese Government. 
Indeed, Chinese non-profits are required to tread a narrow and careful path between 
organisational independence and government assistance/control.1043  
 
9.3.3 Public trust  
As with most organisations, and especially with non-profits, public trust is able to 
facilitate more sustainable development. As research by Sargeant and Lee has made 
clear, ‘higher degrees of trust in a charity are associated with a greater willingness to 
become a donor and give greater sums’.1044 With the depletion in government funding 
over recent years, an increasing number of non-profits in China are dependent upon 
donations and volunteers from the public.1045 As section 6.2 demonstrated, the serious 
crisis in trust has largely been due to widespread scandals and the reduction of basic 
social trust in non-profits, within Chinese society. Accordingly, gaining public trust has 
become ever more important for the survival and thriving of Chinese non-profits.1046 
Without this, non-profits in China may encounter significant obstacles to fund-raising, 
volunteer recruitment, and carrying out public activities. The Charity Law 2016 itself 
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State (Routledge 2005) 
1043 Jaskyte and Holland, (n376) 546 
1044 Chua and Morris, (n777) 550 
1045 Yang and others, (n686) 
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has outlined a set of provisions relevant to building up public trust, which are discussed 
later in section 9.6. 
 
9.3.4 Individual director’s behaviours  
Both Table 9.2, above, and the blueprint discussed in Chapter 7, emphasize that proper 
standards with respect to directors’ behaviour is vital to the appropriate governance of 
non-profits in the Chinese context. Chapter 8 further indicates that skills and 
knowledge of establishing guanxi with the Government should be added to the 
directors’ list of essentials attributes.  
 
9.4 Government control versus organisational independence (autonomy) 
9.4.1 Dual management system, a broader definition of non-profits and legal rights 
of unregistered non-profits 
An important aspect of the Charity Law 2016 is that it includes a more expansive view 
of the business sectors that a non-profit may operate within. These include ‘the 
promotion of health, environmental protection and other activities consistent with the 
societal public interest’.1047 This has been widely seen as a big step forward for non-
profits, and ‘in the right direction given the importance of the term non-profit in 
Chinese discourse on civil society’.1048  
 
Moreover, the law also now allows non-profits to obtain direct registration, thereby 
getting ride of the old dual management system (we discussed in Chapter 8) in which 
non-profits had to find a qualified monitoring institution before they were able to 
register with MoCA. Article 9 states that charitable organisations would have to meet 
‘other conditions stipulated by law and administrative regulations’, so leaves open the 
possibility that many other laws in China, such as the Overseas NGO Law or a variety 
of other regulations concerning registration and management of non-profits could also 
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be taken into account.1049 In any case, Article 18 in the Charity Law 2016 notes that 
‘even when a non-profit organisation with the purpose of conducting charitable 
activities is not registered, it can still conduct charitable activities within its limits, but 
shall comply with the relevant provisions of this Law and benefit from relevant rights 
and interests according to law’. 1050  This article clearly indicates that those 
unregistered/grassroots non-profits we have discussed in Chapter 6 should not be 
treated as illegal organisations and should be permitted to undertake charitable 
activities. 
 
These fundamental improvements brought about by the Charity Law 2016 clearly 
indicate how the Chinese Government intends to gradually withdraw its administrative 
powers, and make greater efforts to adapt to new situations and initiate new policies 
allowing the non-profit sector to expand.1051 Undoubtedly, these will lead to changes in 
the Chinese non-profit sector. The Government, first, can never ban any grassroots non-
profits, for the sake of their illegal social status. This is ‘a significant step forward from 
seeing non-profits as illegal, and recognizes that small, community groups or groups 
consisting of marginalized populations may not have the capacity or desire to register 
but may still perform an important societal purpose’.1052 Operating in China has never 
been straightforward without government control or intervention, before this provision 
was enacted.1053 As Chapters 7 and 8 made clear in discussion, a vast majority of non-
profits in China undertake their business activities ‘in a grey zone’ as the legal 
requirement is onerous. To be specific, many of them choose to register as commercial 




1049 There have also been talks about drafting a Social Organisations Law, which would address the 
registration and management of all social organisations, not just charitable ones, but also trade and 
professional associations, scientific associations, community organisations, among others. Given that the 
Overseas NGO Law and other related regulations are currently being drafted and revised, their impact on 
the Charity Law remains to be seen.  
1050 The Charity Law 2016, s18(3) 
1051 S Shieh, 'More Comments on the Charity Law Draft (Public Comments Due November 30!)' (NGOs 
in China, 29 November 2015) <http://ngochina.blogspot.co.uk/2015/11/more-comments-on-charity-law-
draft.html> accessed 23 March 2016 
1052 Wang, (n745) 
1053 Shieh, (n1051) 
1054 Meng, (n1022) 
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Secondly, through expanding the definition of non-profits and their diversity, the public 
may develop a more comprehensive understanding of this sector. Zhang’s research 
observes that there is a tendency in the Chinese society that philanthropists prefer to 
donate to local groups, focusing on a few single causes which are the most important 
matters in relation to Chinese social value, such as education, health care and 
poverty.1055 Among famed donors in China on the top 100 list, only Ma, the founder of 
Alibaba donated to those causes with relatively less public attention.1056  Among a 
variety of donation causes, education institutions obviously received the most majority 
of donations. By contrast, environment causes receive only 0.9% donations.1057 This 
evidence clearly indicates that the Chinese public has very limited knowledge toward 
the types of philanthropic organisations that exist.1058  
 
Thirdly, the abolition of the dual management system means, at least officially, that the 
Government cannot intervene in non-profits governance/management activities in the 
name of the dual management power. At the same time, their discretionary authority, 
discussed in section 8.3.3.2.1, is effectively constrained. In practice, non-profits are 
now able to get registered directly as long as they satisfy the legal requirement, which 
clearly simplifies the procedures compared to the old dual management system. From 
another perspective, this action by law indicates the supportive attitude and confidence 
of the Government ‘in its administrative capacity, as well as its determination to 
promote Chinese non-profits’.1059 
 
With respect to non-profit board governance, the changes outlined in relation to the 
Charity Law 2016 operate as something of a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it 
endows the Chinese non-profit with more autonomy, by reducing the Government’s 
administrative intervention and withholding their power from being abused in relation 
to non-profits.1060 Ideally, this will lead to a reduction in government representatives in 
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1056 ibid  
1057 Deng, (n659) 
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1060 H K L Offices, 'Comments on the New Prc Charity Law' (Lexology, 22 March 2016) 
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the boardroom, the board size will be slimmed down and Government authorities will 
not so severely intervene in the board’s decision-making process. On the other hand, 
gaining organisational autonomy means that the tie with government officials 
(professional supervisory agency) is broken, and relevant government assistance will 
likely be reduced. As we have argued in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, ‘this affiliation gives the 
organisation the bureaucratic identity necessary to function in the highly governed 
environment of the Chinese political society’. It enables non-profits to access a variety 
of resources, ranging from office space to financial funding. The Charity Law 2016 has 
drawn a clear line between GONGOs and the Chinese Government. At the same time, 
the Charity Law 2016 indicates that the Government is unwilling to deal with the 
financial/administrative requirements from non-profits.1061  
 
9.4.2 The public donation qualification  
The Charity Law itself uses a whole chapter of the Act (Chapter 3) to address the issue 
of Charitable Fundraising. Disappointingly, it does not make any fundamental change 
to this practice, and continues to divide non-profits into two classes: public fundraising 
and non-public fundraising.1062 In other words, the law still treats GONGOs and other 
non-profits differently.  
However, notably, it does provide non-profits, especially those without the Government 
background, with more opportunities and approaches to raise funds. Before the 
enactment of the Charity Law 2016 itself, as we have demonstrated in Chapter 8, only a 
few GONGOs with strong government background could enjoy the privilege to ‘engage 
in public fundraising’.1063 At the same time, the process of public fundraising turned 
out to be extremely ‘complex and painstaking’.1064 Under Article 22 of the Charity Law 
2016, non-profits that used to engage in public fundraising can ‘keep their privileged 
status’, while other registered non-profits need to apply for the public fundraising 
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1062Public fundraising allowed NPOs to fundraise through public channels such as television, radio, 
newspapers, setting up collection boxes in public spaces, holding charitable performances, sales, 
competitions, gala dinners, etc. The private fundraising is only allowed to accept private gifts and 
donations.  
1063 Yang and others, (n686) 
1064 Yang, Wilkinson and Zhang, (n992) 
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qualification two years after they are registered, and prove that ‘they operated within 
the rules and have not violated the previous regulations’.1065 In addition to that, those 
‘unqualified non-profits and individuals’ are allowed to collaborate with qualified non-
profit organisations to attract public donations, which will be supervised and managed 
by the qualified non-profits.1066 !
!
From an optimistic point of view, we may suggest by looking at Article 22 that the 
Government is loosening its control, and providing a more liberal environment for the 
non-profit governance in China.1067  The Charity Law 2016 discourages non-profits 
from relying on the Government financial assistance. Meanwhile, a ‘healthy and 
orderly’ competition environment can be created among non-profits, and the public 
confidence and donations could be increased accordingly.1068 Before the enactment of 
the Charity Law 2016, the Chinese Government had largely been the primary fund 
provider.1069 Registered non-profits, without the public fundraising qualification, had to 
maintain a close guanxi with the local Government, in order to secure funding.1070 
Alternatively, grassroots non-profits had to collect resource through private channels. 
In addition to Government support, over recent decades, foreign donations have turned 
out to be another major funding source, and a potential trigger for Article 22 of the 
Charity Law 2016. Foreign donations tend to prefer supporting grassroots non-profits 
in China, particularly those concerned with international issues.1071 However, those 
non-profits receiving foreign-supply fund still need to be subordinate to the 
Government, in order to establish guanxi since local Government has always been very 
strict and therefore sensitive to foreign funds. 
!
However, we might pause here to offer a different, and rather more pessimistic, view of 
Article 22. For it may be that the Government has, in fact, never been determined to 
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give up its control over non-profit internal governance. Providing more fundraising 
approaches for NPOs is merely a tactic to regain public trust, and enable non-profits to 
attract more funds from the public.1072 This may also be regarded as a compromise to 
the current national economic situation, as the Government cannot afford the economic 
burden, and needs more flexible fund raising approaches to assist in social construction 
and the relief of poverty in China. From a purely legal perspective, although this 
stipulation (Article 22) would appear beneficial to non-profit governance, there is 
actually a difference between Government related non-profits and those without the 
Government background.1073 As we have argued at the beginning, Article 22 requires 
non-profits to maintain a two-class system for the public fundraising. Essentially, only 
those non-profits that have close guanxi with the Government may be granted public 
fundraising status, without making any effort, while others have to prove their 
credentials to obtain these rights.1074 However, ‘GONGOs are by no means deserving 
of that status’.1075 Scandals that have occurred involving GONGOs have rocked the 
Chinese society, and almost every incident implicated public fundraising with 
GONGOs. These Government related non-profits should also be required to prove their 
value, instead of being automatically granted the public fundraising right, by claiming 
themselves to be big, ‘professional’ and with government background.1076  
 
For those non-profits that are required to apply for the qualification of public 
fundraising, the authorizing power, even with a detailed application process, remains 
under Government control. Non-profits, particularly those without government 
background, are already likely to realise that the Government may still control the 
resource of funding and thus have a say in the non-profit boards’ governance.1077 
Irrespective of the Government’s intention, the Charity Law 2016 has brought welcome 
change to many grassroots organisations. Before the enactment of the Charity Law 
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2016, grassroots organisations conducting sensitive work were often frequently warned 
by authorities for their violation of law, using this as an excuse to close their 
business.1078 However, the new law, which has a high position within the hierarchy, 
permits the existence of previously neglected grassroots non-profits, which means such 
authorities can no longer, legally, simply close such NPOs, without an explanation.1079 
However, it must also be remembered that some ‘authorities’ maintain a selective 
application of regulations’.1080 
 
9.5 Individual director’s characters and qualifications  
The Charity Law 2016 itself does not address the particular issue of directors’ character 
and qualifications as UK regulations do (e.g. specifying their duties and responsibility), 
but touches the most serious problem among directors in China, as noted below.  
!
9.5.1 Limitations on the 15% management fee (agency costs)  
Article 60 of the law imposes a cap on annual management fees, which is regarded as 
an agency cost within governance theory. Article 60 means that: ‘the annual 
expenditures for charity activities by foundations with the qualifications for public 
fund-raising shall be no less than 70% of the average revenue of the past three years 
and the annual management costs shall not exceed 15% of annual expenditures’.1081 
This provision is considered as a reaction to the anti-corruption campaign by President 
Xi, in order to prevent directors/managers from corruption in non-profits.1082  
!
Although manager/directors’ expenses may be reduced, owing to the limitation on the 
overall administrative budget, the drawback of Article 60 is obvious. First, it does not 
mention director/manager’s particular responsibility, and fails to provide any further 
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restriction on directors’ behaviours. As a result, director corruption cannot be 
effectively controlled at the individual level.1083 Second, the restriction on agency costs 
fails to draw a clear boundary between internal governance and external governance, as 
we have discussed in section 7.2.4. Both legal regulations and government policies 
belong to the external governance, while cutting the agency cost is the mechanism 
employed by the use of internal governance.  
!
Although the internal and external can interact and collaborate to reach the optimal 
consequence, the Government is not supposed to influence the internal mechanism in 
this way. This provision implies the Government’s intention to keep controlling the 
internal governance of non-profits. Third, Article 60 does not sufficiently limit 
management fees. This one size fit all policy is unreasonable and the 15% is extremely 
low. This provision is likely to undermine governance mechanism/strategy, as non-
profits have to cut a range of agency costs, which may themselves be reasonable, 
merely to satisfy the legal requirement. According to research carried out by Wang, it is 
unreasonable to restrict the agency cost by a fixed number. Agency costs can be highly 
varied depending on a number of factors such as the organisational objective, 
membership, activities they are holding, the organisation’s size, fund raising and annual 
income, etc. The average agency cost in many US non-profits can be over 30% of the 
average revenue, but that does not necessarily mean there is any fault or failure in their 
governance mechanisms. 
!
Finally, allowing non-profits to spend as little as 15% on staff and overheads will 
prohibit the board attracting and retaining professionals and expertise. As noted in 
section 7.4.2.3, recruiting professional and experienced staff has already become a 
challenge to a majority of non-profits, even before the enactment of the Charity Law 
2016. This restriction makes it more difficult for non-profits to hire professionals, as 
they will struggle to offer an attractive salary. This change in the law will put non-
profits in a less competitive position, in terms of attracting skilled workers, when 
compared with profit-based industry.1084 
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9.5.2 Transparency improvement 
The new law itself requires registered non-profits to mandatorily update their annual 
financial reports, organisation constitutions, big events and changes within 
organisations, detailing this on a Government appointed website. 1085  There is a 
significant amount of emphasis within the law itself on the importance of transparency 
and information disclosure, with an entire Chapter of the act (Chapter 8, Article 69-76) 
devoted to this issue. As discussion in the blueprint has made clear, improving 
transparency in non-profits is about being able to properly regulate directors’ 
behaviours, enhancing their accountability, and thus improving the board governance 
mechanism. Nevertheless, one drawback to the new law is that it goes too far and into 
too much detail in requiring non-profits to specify and report how they shall use their 
donations. Articles 76 and 77, in particular, ‘require a level of reporting that will likely 
cause compliance difficulties for smaller, grassroots organisations, which lack staff to 
deal with professional reporting at this level’.1086 Therefore, researcher such as Meng 
insist that ‘more emphasis should therefore be placed upon self-discipline and self-
regulation, and relying more on professional associations and industry standards, and 
less on government authorities, to regulate this area’.1087 
 
9.6 Public trust  
9.6.1 Transparency improvement 
The transparency requirement discussed above could provide an easily accessible 
approach for the public to obtain information they need (e.g. how their donations are 
being spent and how the organisation has been managed).1088 This action can obviously 
boost public confidence towards non-profits, and affects non-profits in number of ways.  
!
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9.6.2 Encouraging public donation  
As discussed above, before the enactment of the Charity Law 2016, only a handful of 
non-profits, mostly GONGOs, were permitted to raise funds publicly, while others 
were restricted to some specific/private donors. However, some of these GONGOs 
have suffered reputational problems, owing to past scandals. Opening up public fund 
raising will encourage public donations, since their available choices will have 
widened.1089 Combined with this policy, the Charity Law 2016 provides tax credit for 
donors, offering a waiver on corporate income tax and donations. 
!
9.6.3 Reducing agency cost (anti-corruption campaign) 
Owing to the great number of scandals affecting the non-profit sector, combined with 
severe corruption problems within many Chinese organisations, it would appear to be 
that before the enactment of the Charity Law 2016, the public has little confidence and 
trust in Chinese non-profits. As the discussion above has made clear, although the 15% 
limitation on agency costs within non-profits appears to be harsh and unreasonable, it 
may still prove to be a good practice to improve the public confidence towards non-
profits. By introducing the agency cost limitation in the Charity Law 2016, it clearly 
indicates a tendency that the Government is reconsidering the importance of the non-
profit governance in China. This provision is able to give the impression to the public 
that there is little chance for board members to escape their work or take on improper 
behaviour, as the Charity Law 2016 has imposed restrictions on this. Consequently, it is 







1089 Shi, (n746) 
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9.7 Conclusion (Consistency between the Charity Law 2016 and corporate 
governance mechanism) 
The Charity Law 2016, as the first comprehensive law in the non-profit sector, aimed at 
helping improve the non-profit sector, alleviate social pressure and achieve economic 
target in China. Relevant provisions in the Charity Law 2016 have been assessed, 
focusing on the issues noted above, namely non-profits’ autonomy and independence, 
public trust, and standards of directorial behaviour. 
We now attempt to give a short summary on whether the Charity Law 2016 is efficient 
in improving non-profit board governance in the Chinese context. Certainly, the 
Charity Law 2016 does much to improve public trust aspect. A great many of its 
provisions are designed to enhance public trust towards non-profits, and thus encourage 
donors to contribute their money or efforts. This attitude can easily be explained 
through the Chinese economic background I have introduced in 6.3.2. With regards to 
the matter of public trust (fund raising), the non-profit internal governance and the 
Chinese Government shares the same objective, which leads to the clear position taken 
in the Charity Law 2016. It aims at ‘allowing non-profits to help the government in 
addressing the needs of the poor as China’s economy slows. It will also enable China’s 
new middle and upper classes to more easily donate to approved causes’.1090 
However, in terms of the tension between Government control versus non-profit 
autonomy/ independence, the attitude of the Charity Law 2016 appears to be rather 
ambiguous, which can also be explained by the background information set out in 7.2. 
Opponents of the Charity Law 2016 insist that there is a danger that this Act could 
prioritise the Government’s own interests at the expense of non-profit autonomy. In 
spite of the reform in the new Act, the Government can still continue tightening its 
control over non-profit internal governance in a number of ways.1091 However, based 
on my analysis above, it seems clear that most of these provisions will not severely 
interfere with the government’s authority in respect of non-profit governance. The 
landmark legislation appears to enable the Government to withdraw its power to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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influence non-profits’ internal governance, as evidenced in such provisions as 
the loosening of regulatory hurdles for non-profits to register. Overall, although the 
reform of the non-profit sector is not fundamental and revolutionary at this moment, it 
may seem like the Government is moving towards interfering/controlling non-profits 
less, and the Government’s attitude towards the development of the third sector is 
getting more supportive. In spite that the Government may continue to exert control 
over non-profits in the near future, this could be understood as a long process which the 
Government needs to withdraw its control progressively to ensure the social order and 
stability. The extent to which the Charity Law 2016 changes the situation, from where 
charity work is government-led to where everyone may directly participate in charitable 
activities, is still not entirely clear. Much work remains to explore the full implications 





















Chapter 10 Conclusion 
10.1 Summarizing the current situation of non-profit governance in China 
China needs a governance model and supplementary governance mechanisms in the 
non-profit sector that best suit its development in the context of China’s unique 
political, economic and legal cultures. The ‘roadmap for the trajectory’ of governance 
reform in China will take time despite the urgency for an effective regulatory regime. 
According to my analysis on the relevant influencing social determinants, it can be 
concluded that there cannot be any single reform, but multiple reforms over the 
decades. Each reform takes a small step forward, but builds on the existing structure. It 
is a ‘gradual and piecemeal’ process. My argument, as well as evidence from actual 
recent Chinese reforms, shows that any ‘quick fix’, by simply adopting international 
models, will not resolve fundamental problems. The path of non-profit governance 
development in the unique Chinese context would be ‘evolutionary’, not 
‘revolutionary’.  
 
10.2 Research Summary  
The introduction to this thesis set out its overarching goal, as follows: to develop a 
blueprint for an effective board for non-profits, which can be adapted to the distinctive 
characteristics of the Chinese non-profit sector, and against which current board 
regulatory requirements in China can then be measured.  
 
10.2.1 Looking at the nature of non-profits 
We began by noting that one cannot think about the design rules for an effective non-
profit board without thinking about what role such a board should play, and one cannot 
determine that without understanding the role of non-profits themselves. We began that 
task in Chapter 2. There, we focused on the two theories which focus on the demand for 
non-profits, which theories have dominated much of the literature. The first conceived 
of non-profits as a correction for the failures in commercial organisations owing to 
informational asymmetries and the lack of trust these generate. The other explained 
them as due to ‘government failure’, primarily caused by governments’ tendency to 
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supply only the level of goods or services that the ‘median voter’ will support. 
Crucially, we then expanded on these two dominant accounts of the role of non-profits 
by noting the importance of considering not only the demand for, but also the supply of, 
non-profits. After all, even with a public demand for non-profits, non-profits are 
unlikely to flourish if individuals are not prepared to come forward and supply them. 
That led us to emphasise the importance of non-profits in fulfilling the desire for 
‘participation’ and ‘expression of values’ by those who create and sustain non-profits. 
 
10.2.2 Designing a blueprint through reviewing board governance theories  
Having addressed the role of non-profits themselves, we then turned to the design of 
our governance blueprint. That was achieved in two chapters, focusing first on the role 
of the non-profit board (Chapter 3), and then on the attributes a board needs in order to 
better fulfil that role (Chapter 4). In Chapter 3, we saw how a number of different 
theories paint non-profit boards as performing a number of different roles, which we 
built into a three-fold typology: a control role (based on the insights of ‘agency 
theory’), a service role (based on the insights of resource dependency theory, and 
stakeholder theory) and a strategic role. The work then developed an argument, which 
it labelled the ‘integrated model for board governance’, that non-profit boards cannot, 
and should not, choose between these different roles. Rather, a non-profit board can, 
and should, fulfil all. The chapter concluded by considering a number of arguments that 
might be put against this integrated model. The chapter rejected these arguments, but 
did accept that accommodating the integrated model had implications for the design of 
the board, around issues such as multi-tasking, delegation, the structural use of 
committees, and the like. Chapter 4 then turned to the detailed design of the non-profit 
board blueprint. This blueprint focused upon four board attributes, namely board size, 
characteristics, structure and decision-making process. 
 
10.2.3 Reviewing UK board governance against my blueprint  
Before seeking to develop, and apply, the blueprint to the context of China, Chapter 5 
paused to measure how far the UK’s regulatory regime for non-profits currently 
corresponds with, or departs from, that blueprint. We focused on the two legal forms 
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most commonly adopted by non-profits in the UK, namely CLGs and CIOs. We noted 
that, on the whole, the UK does not contradict or challenge the blueprint, but that this is 
so largely in the sense that the UK regime for these two legal forms is largely 
‘permissive’ – it leaves it open to non-profits to choose their own board governance 
blueprint.  We noted, however, that soft law in the UK to some extent fills this gap, but 
concluded by noting that this mix of hard and soft law, whilst it works in the UK, may 
not be appropriate for all countries, including, specifically, for China.  
 
10.2.4 Modifying the UK-based blueprint to the Chinese context  
The thesis then turned its focus squarely onto China. The opening of the for-profit 
market and partial privatization of state-owned companies has encouraged the 
development of Chinese corporations on the international stage. However, the non-
profit sector is less developed and heavily influenced by the Chinese social context. 
Despite the potential of these social factors to harmonize the non-profit governance 
across jurisdictions, the social, economic and especially political conditions under 
which Chinese governance mechanisms are evolving offers little support for the 
prospect of full convergence with international non-profit governance models and 
practices. However, this does not mean that a large measure of convergence cannot be 
reached, notwithstanding these barriers. A more effective governance mechanism can 
be achieved in the Chinese context, and specifically so through the modification of the 
UK-influenced blueprint, developed through Chapters 2-4. But this must take account 
of the distinctive context for non-profit governance which China presents. Specifically, 
China is characterized by a weak legal system and strong traditional influences, such as 
guanxi, face saving and the danwei system. In order to better apply the blueprint in the 
Chinese context, these contextual factors had to be taken into account in the process of 
modification. Among political determinants, we also had to address the fact that the 
Chinese Government has throughout history played a significant role both as the drafter 
of the legislation, and as regulator of non-profits.  
 
Chapter 6 looked at the nature of non-profits in China, and also in doing so identified 
differences/similarities compared with the western world. This chapter helped identify 
the unique nature of non-profits in China, essential to the analysis of non-profit board 
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governance in China. Chapter 7 was of the utmost importance to my thesis. It reviewed 
the Chinese context and synthesised my blueprint with the relevant social determinants 
in China. The chapter acted as a bridge, linking the UK section with the Chinese part. 
The chapter contributed significantly to existing literature. Research looking at the non-
profit sector in China is notably underdeveloped, and especially compared to research 
on the Chinese for-profit sector. There has not been any attempt to date to design a 
blueprint for board governance, that examines comprehensively the board attributes 
encompassed within the blueprint presented here, contextualised to the distinctive 
environment for non-profits found in China.   
 
10.2.5 Reviewing the board governance in the non-profit sector in China  
With the blueprint modified to reflect the Chinese context, Chapter 8 then turned to 
review how far the current regime for non-profit board governance in China 
corresponds to that blueprint. In a sense, Chapter 8 therefore sought to repeat, for 
China, the exercise carried out in Chapter 5 in respect of the UK. We focused on three 
sets of administrative regulations (Foundation Regulations, SO Regulations, and CNI 
Regulations). During this process, it was recognized that most provisions in these 
regulations seem designed to satisfy the regulatory and social needs arising from 
China’s economic development, its reform of the danwei system, as well as the Chinese 
Government’s ever changing policies. Insofar as improving board governance in China, 
the legal contribution of these three sets of rules is, sadly, very limited. But in exposing 
these deficiencies, we have identified the legal gaps in establishing an effective non-
profit board, and a path for future governance reform in China has been mapped-out 
here. This path is also able to provide insights into how board governance is developing 
under the fast-changing Chinese context.  
 
Besides these three sets of longstanding regulations, the Charity Law 2016 marks a 
new, potentially fundamental (and, so far as this thesis was concerned, last minute) 
addition to the regulatory framework. Therefore, we devoted a whole chapter to 
identify its advantages/deficiencies, and examine its influence on non-profit 
governance in China. As we saw in Chapter 10, the Charity Law 2016 is symbolic and, 
indeed fundamental, as it has taken the first and most important step forward in 
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bringing Chinese non-profits to a new stage. In spite of the pitfalls of the Charity Law 
2016 that we addressed, we also noted a considerable number of changes that are 
mostly in favour of China’s non-profit governance and development. Chapter 10, like 
Chapter 9 before it, also contribute significantly to the Chinese literature on non-profit 
governance, in that not only do they provide a deep analysis of the existing regulations 
on non-profits in China, but also explore the existing legislative gaps and shortcomings, 
as well as the causes of those shortcomings in terms of existing social and political 
determinants. More specifically, the analysis presented here suggests that the biggest 
driving force behind non-profit governance failure is the over-intervention of the 
Chinese Government. To be sure, it is unlikely that the Chinese Government will 
completely withdraw from some measure of control over the non-profit sector. 
Fortunately, our research has managed to find out a range of viable strategies to deal 
with the intervention of the Government and thus facilitate the survival/governance of 
Chinese non-profits.  
 
10.3 Issues for Future Research  
This thesis makes a small contribution to the literature on non-profits in China, but, 
inevitably, much more remains to be done. As a final word, then, it is worth flagging up 
some of the side-roads this thesis has not had time to venture down, but which deserve 
attention. First, we need much more empirical research on actual boardroom practices 
in Chinese non-profits. Second, this thesis did not attempt to examine every legal form 
of non-profits in China. In particular, we excluded both unregistered grassroots non-
profits, and those organisations that perform a social role, often acting as non-profits, 
but which choose to operate through a ‘for profit’ legal form. Further research needs to 
be conducted on these phenomena. Finally, the introduction of the Charity Law 2016 
presented obvious challenges in drawing this thesis and its research to a conclusion. 
Our coverage provided a number of important insights about that legislation, but as 
with any such fundamental change of law, much more research is needed to understand, 
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